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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the international-domestic interaction within the context of the 1908 Ottoman 
Constitutional Revolution and examines it in relation to the international dimensions of the social 
transformation of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. So the focus of the research 
is on the extent and the mechanisms of the international constitution of political change within the 
Ottoman Empire in regard to the historical moment of 1908. The framework for the research question is 
the ongoing theoretical investigations of the scholars of International Relations into the possibility of 
using a historical sociological approach to conceptualize the reciprocal constitutive roles of the 
international and the domestic realms in engendering political transformations, whether in this longue 
duree or in sudden ruptures. As such, the thesis engages with the historical sociology tradition. The main 
objective is to enable a productive encounter between the case study itself and the general theory: the 
starting assumption is the impossibility of a purely national account of political changes of this scale. 
Given this framework, the thesis limits the examination of the case and the discussion of theory to the 
debate on the interaction between international and domestic dynamics. A creative understanding of how 
these two dynamics interact and co-constitute each other would contribute to the general analysis of 
political change within the field of International Relations. At the same time an analytical re-reading of 
the case study from this angle would locate this turning point in the history of the Ottoman Empire and of 
the Middle Eastern in a wider analytical context and thereby give it its due theoretical and historical 
weight.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
“Ben bu kadar kendi ziddi ile beraber gelen ve zitlarmin altinda kaybolan nesne [hiirriyet] 
gormedim. Kisa dmriimde yedi sekiz defa memleketimize geldigini i§ittim. Evet, bir kere 
bile kimse bana gittigini soylemedigi halde, yedi sekiz defa geldi; ve o geldi diye biz 
sevincimizden, davul zuma, sokaklara firladik. Nereden gelir? Nasil birdenbire gider? 
Veren mi tekrar elimizden alir? Yoksa biz mi birdenbire bikar, “Buyurunuz efendim, 
bendeniz artik hevesimi aldim. Sizin olsun, belki bir i§e yarar! ” diye hediye mi ederiz?1,1
I was deeply impressed when I came across these lines in the excellent novel of 
Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar, Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitusii (The Time Regulation Institute). It 
tells the story of a young boy who grew up in the late Hamidian regime and is 
complaining about his lack of understanding regarding the coming and going of Liberty 
in the country. It gives a perfect setting to this thesis and at the time when I read it, it 
clarified my thoughts. The 1908 Revolution when it triumphed over the Sultan and in 
the years after, was referred to as the Proclamation of Liberty (Hiirriyetin ilani). This 
paragraph by Tanpinar depicts Liberty as an object that comes from ‘outside’. As such it 
relates to the thesis in two ways: Firstly, it touches upon the central dynamic behind the 
formulation of the research question of this thesis, where do revolutions come from and 
how much of them come from what is termed as ‘outside’. Secondly, by turning Liberty 
into an object that can come and go several times, Tanpinar in his own humorous style 
(the hallmark of this novel) underlines the fact that we do not understand how it comes 
and goes, as such it does not feel like a part of us but an object outside of us, indeed 
external to us. Demonstrating the opposite is the intention of this thesis. The coming of 
Liberty in the summer of 1908, hence the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, partly stems
1 Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar, Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitiisii (Istanbul: Dergah Yayinlan 2008 [First published 
in 1962]), 21. “I have never seen such an object [liberty] that always comes with its opposite and gets lost 
under its opposites. In my short life-time, I heard that it came to our country seven or eight times. Yes, 
although nobody ever told me that it had left, it arrived seven or eight different times; and we have 
jumped to the streets out of joy. Where does it come from? How does it leave so sudden? Does the giver 
take it away? Or is it us who are suddenly bored and give it as a present saying “Here you are sir, I have 
lost my enthusiasm. Have it. Perhaps it will be of some use!”?”(All translations in the text from the 
Turkish resources are translated by the author). Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar (1901-1962) was a professor of 
Turkish Language and Literature and also served in the 1940s as an MP in the parliament for a short 
period.
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from the ‘outside’ but it is not ‘external’ to us. What is called the ‘outside’ is actually 
internal to the events in the individual countries. Indeed the ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ 
mutually constitute each other. This is the fundamental intuition of this thesis, in many 
ways the starting trigger of this project and what we will be looking for in the following 
chapters. This intuition is at once theoretical and empirical and that will be how it will 
be examined in this thesis.
The topic of this thesis brings together questions from multiple areas and 
disciplines. However, its central focus remains in the field of International Relations as 
it seeks the answer to the following question: What is the relation between ‘outside’ and 
‘inside’ in the coming of revolutions? What is the relation between what are perceived 
as international and domestic realms in the constitution of domestic change of 
revolutions’ variety? My curiosity in this regard started with my encounter with the 
historical sociology (HS) tradition and with various theories in International Relations 
(IR). It is impossible not to notice the common ground of research between the two, as 
HS is investigating macro-sociological change in its world-historical context and as IR 
seems to be primarily interested in large-scale change in the international realm, and 
also how states behave and reshape that realm. My interest in the intersection between 
the two heightened when I studied the HS tradition in IR, had the chance to read those 
works that examine the international system as they try to historicise it, relate it to the 
domestic context along the way and focus on how it changes over time and through 
which interventions. The story of HS in IR goes back a long way, and continues to
2 Fred Halliday, “State and society in international relations: A second agenda,” Millennium 16, no. 2 
(1987): 215-229; Halliday, Rethinking international relations (London: Macmillan, 1994); Justin 
Rosenberg, The empire o f civil society (London: Verso, 1994); Forum on Historical Sociology in 
International Relations, Review o f International Political Economy 5, no.2 (1998); Halliday, Revolution 
and world politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International 
systems in world history: remaking the study o f international relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000); Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson ed., Historical sociology o f international relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Benno Teschke, The myth o f 1648: Class, Geopolitics,
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produce fruitful research into the past and future of the international realm, into specific 
events hitherto deemed to be domestic, covers revolutions as well as long-term changes, 
and includes historical materialists as well as those who are more adhering to the 
‘cultural turn’.
It is not difficult to see how these theoretical discussions and their treatment of 
European history were simply not applied widely to the discussion of Middle Eastern 
politics and history. As rich and detailed as the literature on the Middle East is, as 
valuable the contributions to its analysis are, there is still room in Middle Eastern 
studies to treat the Middle East in general and Turkish history in particular in a more 
analytical and historical manner. The case is even more so for the history of the 
Ottoman Empire and how that history relates to the modem Middle East. There is also 
still room for improvement in the contextualization of Middle Eastern politics and 
history in a larger world setting. Finally, there are still important turning points in the 
history of the Middle East that are symbiotically tied to international history and to the 
politics of the twentieth century but which have not yet been studied with the 
thoroughness that they deserve. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 is chief among 
them.
After the late 1980s the literature on Turkish history witnessed an increase of 
interest in the Revolution within Turkey that is yet, however, to culminate in a richer
and the Making o f Modem International Relations (London: Verso, 2003); George Lawson, Negotiated 
revolutions: the Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
3 This is one of the claims of Virginia Aksan’s article entitled “Theoretical Ottomans”: “Let me not be too 
reductive, as there are always exceptions to the rule, but by and large we have not been able to find a 
theoretical “fit” for the time span and historical space occupied by the Ottoman dynasty.” History and 
Theory 47, no. 1 (2008): 115. There are exceptions to the rule and there are scholars who use an HS 
framework to understand the history of the Ottoman Empire. For an excellent example see Karen Barkey, 
Bandits and bureaucrats: the Ottoman route to state centralization (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1994).
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literature. One reason for this situation is the lack of the grasp of a simple fact: The 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 did not occur in the modem Republic of Turkey to 
come but in the Ottoman Empire, with causes and outcomes stretching back several 
centuries and to several geographical spaces which are now perceived as distinct. This 
geography covered the Balkans, the Middle East and even Caucasia and North Africa to 
a certain degree. It was also part of European history, firstly due to the integral relations 
between Europe and the Ottoman Empire and secondly due to the simple fact that the 
Young Turks were themselves engaged with European politics, culture and philosophy. 
As such to do justice to the Revolution would mean to acknowledge all these layers, 
rather than reduce it to a relatively insignificant moment in Turkish history. The 
historiography on the 1908 Revolution remains largely national. It has not yet 
completed its escape from the shadow of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey and 
from the rise of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as the founder. This is a specific problem that 
will be hinted at throughout the thesis and will be tackled in the last chapter, that of 
retrospective analysis. When we can manage to escape from this kind of analysis and 
from the borders of ‘national’ histories, we can begin to see the world-historical context 
and significance of the 1908 Revolution that stretches from the long nineteenth century 
of Europe and the Ottoman Empire well into the First World War and into the state 
formation process in the Middle East thereafter.
The crux of this project lies in the claim that the analytical tools and the general 
understanding of world politics provided by HS in IR should be our primary resource in 
such an attempt to locate the 1908 Revolution in its wider context. Moreover, such an 
analytical rereading of the narrative of the 1908 Revolution would have a great deal to 
contribute to the improvement of these tools of HS in IR, which are far away from being 
a rigid box of categories and concepts to be applied to the empirical world without any
12
further questioning. On the contrary, one of the merits of HS in IR is its tendency to see 
the political world in its totality rather than cut up into bits and pieces that fit our 
frameworks nicely and also its emphasis on being time and place specific.
As the thesis will endeavour to show how this intersection between HS in IR and 
the case study unfolds, it will no doubt face a few limitations that are better spelled out 
from the start. One obvious limitation is the scarcity of this kind of treatment of single 
case studies. Our coverage of international history will help in this limitation as we will 
attempt to contextualize the Revolution in the context of the international turning points 
that influence other Empires alike. And fruitful points suitable for comparison will open 
themselves up. However, the adherence of this thesis to this single case study will limit 
it and prevent it from fully exploring these points of comparison. A limitation hopefully 
compensated by the richness of the historical detail provided by adhering to a single 
case study.
A second obvious limitation stems from the lack of similar studies that connect 
the Ottoman Empire in this way to world history and the absence of any study that links 
the 1908 Revolution to the century before it and to the world around it. As such, rather 
than a rich historiography on the 1908 Revolution, studies of the Hamidian era, of 
Ottoman modernization and reform, of the international history of the nineteenth 
century and of the localities that were crucial such as the Balkans and the Macedonia 
question were largely used in this thesis. As such the thesis was not only an analytical 
attempt to bind the overall narrative to its distinct contexts but also at times an empirical 
attempt to produce an alternative literature reading.
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This brings us to another limitation: not being able to use primary sources on the 
subject. These are mostly in Ottoman but also in many languages of the Ottoman 
Empire, (Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian and Arabic among others, though the case 
benefited from the use of some memoirs printed in the modem Turkish transliterations). 
The thesis is limited to the secondary sources (in Turkish and English). However, the 
use of the Turkish literature on the subject proved to be valuable as can be seen in the 
references to the case study chapters. Moreover, this limitation was to a great deal offset 
by another issue: the questions the thesis posed could not be based on archival material, 
though it could have been enriched by them. Certainly this project remains open to 
contradiction in that regard. Still, this project remained focussed on analytical questions 
whose answers would require an analytical reading of the secondary sources. Also to be 
added is the point that the main contribution of this thesis will lie in the encounter 
between the theoretical insights and the rereading of the empirical material, rather than 
being a core contribution to the historiography of the 1908 Revolution.
This last point also determined the organizational structure of this project as well 
as its style of writing. The thesis outline reflects this central interest in the intersection 
between theory and case study, as well as an insistence on an analytical reading of the 
case.
Chapter 2 will focus on a general discussion of HS and HS in IR as they related 
to the central question of this thesis: what is the role of the ‘international’ in 
revolutions? The conceptual and analytical tools as developed by the historical 
sociologist and by the discussion of historical sociology in International Relations will 
be debated as they relate to this question. The chapter does not intend in any way to be 
an exhaustive reading of these debates but rather aims to intuit the reflexes of these
14
debates before the detailed reading of the case begins. In parallel with the nature of HS 
and HS in IR, we will not attempt to draw a theoretical map wherein which we will then 
fit the narrative on the case. Rather, the intention is to understand how we can 
conceptualize the conditions from which the Revolution has emerged. So, we will try to 
identify the levels, units and methods of analysis from which we can start the 
investigation instead of turning it to a closed discussion from the start.
The following four chapters will take the narrative on the Revolution from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century up to the summer of 1908 when the revolutionaries 
finally triumphed over Abdulhamid II, the Ottoman Sultan of three decades. To 
summarize in a very brief fashion, the 1908 Revolution resulted in the re-declaration of 
the Ottoman Constitution which was suspended by Abdulhamid II in 1878, only two 
years after it was proclaimed, and therefore in the establishment of a constitutional 
monarchy in the Ottoman Empire. It was the work of a combination of actors, mostly 
from two groups: the Committee of Progress and Union in Europe and (as it pursued 
propaganda in the Macedonia region and merged with the army members in that region) 
and the officers in the III Army in Macedonia. Almost a month after the Young Turks 
had armed and was growing in numbers and had taken the route to the mountains, 
sending telegraphs on the way to the Sultan pressuring him to re-declare the 
constitution, the Sultan replied with a positive answer and hence gave up most of his 
powers. How this revolutionary situation emerged in the first place and why it 
succeeded rather than failed in the face of the last Ottoman Sultan to rule and reign will 
be the axis of the chapters on the case study. However, this axis is only complete when 
we add the other dimension, the one so central for the main question of this thesis, 
namely the international.
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The narrative of the 1908 Revolution throughout these chapters on the case will 
be linked to the broader international context. Wars, international treaties, other 
diplomatic and military manoeuvres, the general characteristics of the period, prevalent 
international political trends, international rivalry all will be part of this international 
context and will be underlined when they crosscut the emergence of the Ottoman 
opposition and also the policies of the Sultan against whom the opposition emerged. So, 
we will follow international history, Ottoman history and the history of the Ottoman 
opposition and all will enter our discussion. Our focus on the interaction between the 
international and domestic levels will keep the narrative in order. But this task will be 
done in even greater extent by the style of writing. The empirical narrative will not be 
presented as it is but with analytical interventions throughout. Hence, this thesis will not 
be organized as one theory chapter followed by the case study and a final conclusion. 
Instead, the theoretical insights from Chapter 2 will be rethought whenever the 
empirical narrative forces us into such a rethinking. It will involve an interchange 
between the theoretical themes of Chapter 2 and the unfolding narrative.
The narrative on the case will be deliberately treated in its longue duree, in 
tandem with the reflexes from HS in IR. Chapter 3 will examine the Ottoman 
transformation in the long nineteenth century and identify those set of practices, habits, 
institutions as well as ruptures that led to the formation of the Hamidian regime. It will 
trace these in the interaction of the Ottoman Empire with the wider world and hence 
will show, in combination with Chapters 4, 5 and 6 that this interaction itself was 
subject to change: as the components transformed themselves they also transformed the 
relationship between them. Indeed, what will be displayed is the co-constitution 
processes in these transformations.
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will treat analytically the period of the Hamidian regime, 
within which the Young Turk movement was founded, developed and finally triumphed 
with the Revolution of 1908. Again, we will focus on the international-domestic 
interaction in the widest range possible and not limit the narrative only to the 
geopolitical realm, for reasons which will be discussed throughout the thesis. The 
empirical narrative will end in the summer of 1908 with the proclamation of Liberty. 
This thesis confines itself to the analysis of the long and short term causes of the 1908 
Revolution itself. This is so not only because the consequences are to some degree more 
explored than the causes but also due to the analytical direction of this thesis: the role of 
the international in the emergence of the revolutionary situations, in the final status of 
revolutions, hence in the coming of revolutions.
The last chapter will pick this question up once again: it will juxtapose the 
narrative as produced in this thesis with the initial set of theoretical insights and with the 
emergent insights from the rereading of the narrative. Hence, it will revisit the whole 
topic and list the mutual challenges of the theory and the case with each other. The hope 
is to produce sound yet not dogmatic suggestions as to how to develop the study of 
revolutions in their international context. Thereby, Chapter 7 will discuss all the 
possible contributions of this thesis to the discipline of IR and to the study of the 1908 
revolution.
The story of a group of Young Turks declaring the Revolution from the 
mountains of Macedonia and hence changing world history to a certain degree is a 
fascinating story. What is more fascinating however is that we can, through an 
analytical re-reading of this story, discover sound ways of discussing revolutions, and of
17
locating them in world history, the context from which they emerged and in which they 
intervened.
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CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
2.1 Introduction
"Social life does not consist o f a number o f realms -  each composed o f a bundle o f 
organizations and functions, ends and means -  whose relations with one another are those 
o f external objects. ”*
Historical Sociology (HS) had been from its inception the name of the general 
effort to show the intemality of social life without totalizing/reifying it.5 As 
heterogeneous it may be, HS is a substantial tradition, one that strives to achieve 
historically grounded and sociologically minded conceptualizations on the 
transformation of social relations, using detailed empirical research and (mostly) a 
comparative methodology. Following Mann’s phrasing, from an HS perspective the 
different realms of the social life are not ‘external’ to each other but rather it is the 
analysis of their interrelations (at various combinations and orderings) that are the stuff 
that HS is made of. We can indeed follow this thread from Marx and Weber, the 
canonical HS onto the HS after the ‘cultural turn’.6
4 Michael Mann, The Sources o f Social Power Vol.l: A history ofpower from the beginning to A. D. 1760 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 18.
5 Intemality of social life here refers to the HS effort to show that most of the boundaries that we take as 
given, such as the boundaries of the nation-state can be dismissed to a large extent, as there are path 
dependencies between, contingencies among and as well as structures that go beyond these boundaries. 
The merit of HS lies in showing that social life on a world-scale is an inter-linked platform and while it 
demonstrates this intuition HS most of the time manages to escape reification.
Reification is a phrase widely used in the IR literature and mostly common to the criticism of classical 
and neo-realism theory in IR. Though it may be used with slight variations, it generally refers to 
reductionist mentality in the social sciences, whereby a multi-layered social phenomenon with several 
linkages to other phenomena is reduced to a single level, or unit of analysis. Hence the reification of 
social life would mean to disregard all the linkages that go into it, and taking it as given, as an ahistorical 
phenomenon.
6 For a recent and detailed overview of the HS tradition see Handbook o f Historical Sociology, ed. Gerard 
Delanty and Engin F. Isin (London: Sage, 2003). Also see Dennis Smith, The Rise o f Historical 
Sociology, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991). For a recent overview of HS in IR see Roland Dannreuther and 
James Kennedy, “Historical Sociology in Sociology: British Decline and US Hegemony with Lessons for 
International Relations,” International Politics 44, no. 4 (2007): 369-389.
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The fundamental curiosity of this thesis lies at the following question: What is 
the role of the ‘international’ in revolutions, hence in domestic change? How can a 
social scientific analysis of this relation between international and domestic be 
produced? Is this relation between two ‘external objects’ or is it internal to the 
constitution of these objects? These questions have a dual face in social sciences: one in 
the discipline of International Relations (IR) and one in the tradition of HS. As such, it 
is of paramount importance that the central question of this thesis is located in both 
these areas. This chapter will endeavour to accomplish precisely that task and in turn 
will provide a brief overview of HS and HS in IR with that focus in mind. It will equip 
us with the theoretical tools -  though not in a very precise and definitely not in a 
complete manner -  to enter the discussion of the case study at hand, namely the Young 
Turk Revolution of 1908. It will proceed as follows: Firstly, we will follow the general 
characteristics of historical sociology through a brief overview of Max Weber’s 
approach. Secondly, the Weberian HS tradition, specifically in the works of Michael 
Mann and Theda Skocpol will be examined. This examination will not be a literature 
review but rather a focused exploration of their works with the purpose of 
understanding the international-domestic interaction. Thirdly, the chapter will move on 
to the similar endeavours in the discipline of IR; the impact of HS on IR’s 
conceptualization of this interaction. Lastly, the chapter will conclude with an overview 
of the theoretical intuitions which will be clarified only after the case study in the last 
chapter, where the double challenge of theory and the case will produce more tangible -  
but not clear cut -  directions as to how to study the international in the periods of social 
change.
In one of its dimensions, this debate is a disciplinary debate of IR. Whether and 
how IR should be tackling the international-domestic interaction? Specific to this thesis
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is the narrower disciplinary question: How to locate the international in the sudden 
domestic changes, such as revolutions? In another dimension this debate involves the 
discussion on the impossibility of purely national accounts on political change. In other 
words, the central claim is that one cannot fully explain a revolution, such as the Young 
Turk Revolution of 1908 while constraining the study to the national borders, which are 
themselves products of such changes. Although several other sub-themes will certainly 
emerge in the details of the case study and theory alike, the combined effects of these 
two questions are the central aim and focus of this thesis. As it will be clear HS and HS 
in IR constitute the most obvious angle to make an entrance to the subject and to ground 
the study on, as their intersection is also where these two questions intersect.
Fred Halliday in a discussion of his own study of these and many other related 
questions on revolutions commented on the evaluation of social scientific works as 
follows: “The greatest test of any work is not the issues it resolves, but the issues where
n
it indicates further research is possible and needed, in other words a research agenda.” 
Indeed, this study will not be able to and does not strive to resolve the issue of the study 
of international-domestic interaction at the political level. It is an interdisciplinary and 
multi-layered question and there is not (and perhaps should not be) a ready-made way or 
a model from which to study this interaction. Indeed, every model has the potential 
consequence of reifying the interaction and hence making its integrality fade away in 
the analysis process. This is certainly not the intent of this thesis. But rather it aims to 
first, underline the urgent necessity of empirical research and theoretical efforts towards 
that kind of study; secondly, to see what the available theoretical directions in that 
regard are; thirdly, to treat a case study in detail from that angle; and lastly, from the 
collision of the case and the theoretical direction to arrive at further research
7 Fred Halliday, “The great anomaly,” Review o f International Studies 27, no. 4 (2001): 698.
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suggestions. This chapter will be a contribution to the first and second aims, the case 
study chapters to follow will make up the effort to realize the third aim and the last 
chapter will summarize the previous efforts and present suggestions for further research.
2.2 Weberian Historical Sociology
2.2.1 Max Weber and the traits of a tradition
"Hence, 'politics ’for us means striving to share power or striving to influence
the distribution o f power, either among states or among groups within a state. ”
8
Although HS in the 21st century is a multi-faceted approach and ‘open society’9, 
the legacy of the canonical figures such as Karl Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber is no 
less heavy on the contemporary historical sociologists, both from the second wave and 
thereafter. As the HS figures we will engage mostly in this chapter are either from the 
Weberian tradition (such as Michael Mann) or tackle with Weberian (and neo- 
Weberian) thinking in HS, an effort to understand the main Weberian insights is 
indispensable. Weber’s influence on social science in general and on HS in particular 
does in no way match the brief and rough elaboration which will be presented in this 
chapter. Here, the main concern will be to grasp the Weberian principles -  primary 
propositions -  when approaching the issue of social transformation. Some of these 
principals are more methodological in orientation, i.e. ‘multicausality’, ‘the use of ideal 
types’, and the ‘comparative method’. Others are more content oriented, i.e. his 
handling of ‘ideas’ and ‘structures’ and his insistence on the historical character of any
8 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and 
C.Wright Mills (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 78.
9 HS as an open society is the characterization of George Lawson in an article titled with the same phrase: 
“Historical sociology, therefore, is not a homogenous field in which it is possible to lay down definite 
border positions — the enterprise is a prototypical open society.” “Historical Sociology in International 
Relations: Open Society, Research Programme and Vocation,” International Politics 44, no. 4 (2007): 
356.
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sound sociological analysis. While attempting to go over these, the intent is not to delve
into the details of Weber’s historical sociology, but to find a meaningful entrance point
for the discussion of HS perspective as it relates to the discussion of this thesis’ central
question: what is the nature of international-domestic interaction? Weber’s method and
analysis are relevant as they laid the ground for the future generations of HS scholars
and also because they were the ones that left the deepest mark on the historical
sociological endeavours in IR as a discipline. We will start with methodological issues
and then move on to the Weberian analysis of the modem state. The following summary
of Weber’s approach to methodology by Bryan S. Turner is a fruitful starting point:
“In principle, Weber opposed any notion of general laws in social 
history, remained skeptical even about the value of general 
concepts, and employed ideal types as limited, heuristic devices for 
specific tasks. In addition to having a strong sense of the 
importance of historically contingent events in social change,
Weber adopted a flexible approach to the complex interaction of 
many causes (both material and idealist).”10
Indeed, a multi-causal analysis, the use of ideal-types, and the comparative 
method are intrinsically linked in Weber’s arguments. They bring about each other and 
mutually enforce each other. Weber’s insistence on the need to shy away from the 
primacy of analysis based on one single cause and the need to rely on the collision of 
several causes at the same time when explaining any social phenomenon leads the way 
in this linkage between different methodological standpoints. To put it simpler, because 
-  for example in explaining the rise and character of the modem state -  he makes use of 
several causal explanations, he needs a tool for a rigid conceptualization on this ‘messy’ 
social world produced by various realms at the same time, hence the emergence of 
‘ideal types’, not as typologies given directly by the empirical world but as ‘types’ that 
the historical sociologist imposes upon the ‘messy world’ to make it more
10 Bryan S. Turner, preface to From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, xxii.
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understandable without reifying it. Hence the need to call them ‘ideal’, to highlight the 
imposition of the category as opposed to the deductive character of the category from 
the data. “For Weber, historical and social uniqueness results from specific 
combinations of general factors, which when isolated are quantifiable.”11 Not 
necessarily the use of ideal types per se, but this sociological lens that is adjusted to see 
the ‘specific combinations’ that are also prone to isolation and the method of analyzing 
these combinations in a persistently multi-causal manner is one of the hallmarks of 
Weberianism.
These sociological reflexes remain present in Weberianism, such as in the works 
of Michael Mann and Theda Skocpol but also passed on to the waves of Weberian 
historical sociology in IR. These reflexes also compose a great deal of the promise of 
Weberian historical sociology in IR, as the field develops a more theoretically minded 
curiosity on ‘combinations’ and ‘multi-causality’ especially in one realm where the field 
seems to be on the edge of transforming itself: namely the international-domestic 
distinction and how to rethink this dichotomy. This dichotomy stands in opposition to 
this methodology of historical sociology: to see the factors that go in to a specific social 
scientific phenomena as combined and to seek an analysis that considers a multiplicity 
of causes for that one event rather than the primacy and determinacy of one monolithic 
cause. Whether Weber himself or the Weberians that followed, especially with regards 
to that distinction, succeeded in making the most out of these sociological reflexes is a 
matter of debate, one that we will touch upon in the following pages.
Also to be added is Weber’s insistence on reconceptualising the ideational and 
the material distinction, by the help of his multi-causal approach which at least at the
11 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, “Introduction: The Man and His Work,” in From Max Weber: Essays 
in Sociology, 59.
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first glance seems to produce no hierarchy between the ideas and the material world
19when analysing their input in to the formation of a specific social phenomena : hence, 
Weber’s interest in including world religions to his analysis of the modem capitalist 
society and the nation state.
Indeed the study of the emergence and dynamics of the modem state is a 
specifically Weberian theme. The widely used definition of the modem state as an 
institution governing over a distinct territory through a monopoly of force also belongs 
to Max Weber.13 Weber detailed the mechanisms of the modem state as an institution 
and the means of modem politics as they emerged and as they developed; hence his 
meticulous analysis of the inner workings of the state, his separation between the 
‘officials’ and the ‘politicians’ and his reading of the power relations through the central 
position that he attributes to the state. “Hence, ‘politics’ for us means striving to share 
power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among 
groups within a state.” 14 This centrality of the state within the political analysis is also a 
Weberian heritage that passed onto historical sociologists such as Michael Mann and 
Theda Skocpol. Although Weber was deeply interested in state as a central institution 
around which politics was organized, and he did historicise the state through the use of 
comparative method to some extent, as Collins persuasively argues, Weber did not 
focus on the historical formation of the state per se15, and thus can be separated from the
12 “He developed a multi-causal approach to analysis, designed to transcend previous debates between 
materialist and idealist accounts of history.” Robert Holton, “Max Weber and the Interpretative 
Tradition,” in Handbook o f Historical Sociology, 28.
13 “Ultimately, one can define the modem state sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar 
to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force.” Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, 
77-78.
14 Ibid., 78.
15 In so doing, Weber was strictly adhering to the yet-to-be named HS tradition as well. Delanty and Isin 
argue that HS was from the very beginning an attempt to dispense the national history and arrive at an 
analysis of the modem politics as it emerged. “It was more concerned about the formation of modernity
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historical sociologists that followed, especially Charles Tilly and Michael Mann.16
Collins, when comparing Weber to Mann, stresses this feature of Weber’s sociology:
“Weber, by contrast, was primarily a comparativist using historical 
materials; although the comparisons are meant to contribute to 
explaining the crucial divergence in world history which gave rise 
to modem capitalism, Weber rarely gives much of an account of 
how processes of change actually worked themselves out.”17
As such, and despite the Weberian sensitivity towards not producing universal 
laws, this lack in the historical dimension of the story of the nation-state, combined with 
his understanding of politics as quoted above, namely as a struggle for power within and 
among states, leads to a specific conceptualisation of the realm of international. This 
idea of politics in general marks the Weberian understanding of world politics as an 
arena of competition among states, and hence always prone to violence and war. This 
idea of competition and politics as a struggle for power is diffused not only to the
international realm but also the domestic realm. The focus on inter-subjectivity is vague
18in comparison to the focus on personal and group interest and competition. And 
although several and various factors are at play in a Weberian analysis of a social 
phenomenon, the agency remains somewhat looming in the background of the evolution 
of modem politics. Political science, thereby, develops the danger of isolating the 
factors that go into that competition, through quantified or qualified analysis, with the
as the essence of the present than articulating ‘natural’ histories of the nations.” Gerard Delanty and 
Engin F. Isin, “Introduction: Reorienting Historical Sociology,” in Handbook o f Historical Sociology, 1- 
2 .
16 Regarding the in-depth historical analysis of state formation by Tilly and Mann, see Charles Tilly, 
Coercion, capital, and European states, A.D.990-1990 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992) and Michael Mann, 
The Sources o f Social Power, Vol. 1 and The sources o f social power. Vol. 2, The rise o f classes and 
nation states, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press, 1993).
17 Randall Collins, “Mann’s transformation of classical sociological traditions,” in An Anatomy o f Power: 
The Social Theory o f Michael Mann, ed. John Hall and Ralph Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 21.
18 Holton, “[Weber] emphasized the driving personal force of individual virtuoso performing leadership 
roles, rather than the inter-subjective negotiation of meaning between individuals.” Holton, 35.
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help of heuristic devices such as ideal types. Weber’s emphasis on the inclusion of the 
ideational realm does not necessarily translate itself to a sound understanding of inter­
subjectivity,19 as comparative method and competition based understanding of politics 
alone cannot give the historicisation and theoretical appreciation of agency requires a 
further social scientific shift.
This vagueness at the level of agency, due to a competitive model of politics is 
also reflected in Weberian understanding of the international realm. Indeed, it is now a 
widely referred criticism of neo-Weberian historical sociology in IR: this approach 
tends to resemble the neorealist conception of international politics; and most important 
for our purposes is that it cannot succeed in a sound social scientific rethinking of the 
international-domestic dichotomy. One problem is at the level of sophistication. 
Halliday, while examining Michael Mann’s work and its reflections in IR argues the 
following:
“But something both more resilient and intellectually significant 
may also be at work here -  the enduring influence on sociological 
thinking of Max Weber, mediated via Niebuhr, Kissinger, 
Morgenthau et al on IR, whose work betrayed a marked 
disjuncture between the sophistication of his domestic analysis and 
the unidimensionality of his international work.”20
Any further detail on Weber’s sociology is beyond the scope of this chapter and 
thesis. But his problematic understanding of inter-subjectivity and the international 
realm are traits that were reproduced in the neo-Weberian historical sociology. So were 
his invaluable contributions to the sociological thinking for methodology, such as multi­
19 Holton, “One is to draw attention away from interest in inter-subjective moral and political milieu as 
might be found in collective organizations and social movements.”Holton, 35.
“Another consequence of Weber’s monologic sociology is to underplay alternative forms or modalities of 
subjectivity.” Ibid.
20 Halliday, “He Hasn’t Finished Yet: Achievements and Challenges in the Work of Michael Mann,” 
Millennium 34, no. 2 (2005): 514.
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causality and the use of comparative method and for the analysis of the modem politics, 
especially as it is crystallized and centralized in the modem nation-state. Indeed, these 
themes would also be the themes of Michael Mann, one of the key figures of historical 
sociology, Weberian or otherwise. He is also one of the key historical sociologists who 
had an impact on the discipline of IR.21
2.2.2 Michael Mann and multiplicity
With this brief descriptive text on Weber, we had aimed to intuit the preliminary 
problems and merits of a Weberian sociological thinking in IR. Michael Mann’s work 
belongs to the classical sociology tradition and specifically carries Weberian traits that 
were underlined above. Two of the most fundamental premises of Mann’s historical 
sociological endeavour are also a good starting point to discuss the linkages of this work 
to the field of IR. Mann himself lists these as first, the view of the society not as a 
bounded, closed entity but “as multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial 
networks of power.”22 Here society is removed from the traditional understanding of 
being a unity, with rigid or soft boundaries and as such the boundaries of societies lose 
their theoretical primacy in political analysis. “Because there is no bounded totality, it is 
not helpful to divide social change or conflict into “endogenous” and “exogenous” 
varieties.”23
21 An evidence of Mann’s influence can be seen in the existence of a forum on Mann’s work in a key IR 
journal: “The Work of Michael Mann,” Millennium 34, no 2. (2006).
22 Mann, The Sources o f Social Power, Vol. 1, 1.
23 Ibid., 1.
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Even before any further elaboration on the details of the infamous IEMP 
model24, this stress on the fallacy of external/internal division when trying to explain 
social change is tied directly to the main problematic of this thesis and to the way this 
thesis will approach the case study at hand, namely the 1908 Revolution in the Ottoman 
Empire. The fact that Mann’s great work, examining world history from the beginning 
until the First World War, starts with this initial theoretical postulate, and the fact that 
this view of society constitutes a central claim for his whole social scientific endeavour, 
rather than a note in passim as it sometimes is the case, makes it all the more worthy for 
this specific perspective in IR that this thesis strives to contribute to. In this sense, Mann 
makes a solid case for the argument that postulates the social world as one, rather than 
divided into societies and into the space between them. Hence, examining social 
change, at least at this theoretical level, becomes not an effort of classifying the 
domestic and international causes -  and mostly establishing the primacy of one or the 
other depending on the social phenomena and on the approach -  but establishing a 
multi-causal narrative grounded in history and sensitive to interactions and 
interrelations between various processes and structures. Since if one ships the political 
analysis from this very fundamental distinction, namely what constitutes its unit, the 
unitary society, one is left with a messier world that can only be grasped with a messier 
lens. The effort to establish the unity of the social world has the pitfall of ending up 
with an ever bigger totality put forward as reification. Mann’s insistence on viewing the 
notion of society as almost futile and at the same time on die theoretical protection of 
the messiness, contingent character and interrelated nature of social phenomena can 
indeed be considered and utilized as a healthy intervention as to how one can 
analytically unify the international and domestic without reifying each other.
24 “A general account of societies, their structure, and their history can be best given in terms of the 
interrelations of what I will call the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and 
political (IEMP) relationships.” Ibid., 2.
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This messiness leads us to the second fundamental premise of Mann’s 
endeavour, the IEMP model, a reading of the history of power through the use of four 
ideal types -  a la Weber25 -  the ideological, economic, military and political relations 
that constitute the four sources of social power, in various combinations, changing 
hierarchies and intersections depending on the time and space of the social phenomena 
at hand. Hence this model is the device of the social scientist to cope with the messiness 
of the social world. All these four sources of social power have their own autonomy, a 
safeguard against reductionism 26 Once again this is a Weberian trait.
The distinction between the political and the military on the other hand is a 
divergence from Weber and one that is cmcial in approaching the issue of die 
international in Mann’s thinking. By attributing autonomy to the military power, 
recognizing that it has its own networks, infrastructure and relationality, though always 
in relation to the other sources of power, Mann opens up a theoretical space for 
geopolitics and its interconnectedness to the other spheres.27 Yet, this theoretical move 
has a two-fold consequence: by attributing an ‘autonomy’ to the military power and to 
the military relations among states, he also paves the way for the danger of seeing the 
international as an ‘independent realm’ working with its own military competitive logic.
25 “Weber, devised a methodology (of “idealtypes”) to cope with this messiness. I follow Weber’s 
example. We can emerge with a proximate methodology -  and perhaps even eventually with a proximate 
answer -  for the issue of ultimate primacy, but only by devising concepts suited to dealing with a mess.” 
Ibid., 4.
26 John Hall lists the main points of divergence between Weber and Mann with regards to the IEMP 
model in reference to the issue of primacy among these multiple sources of social power. Mann’s 
insistence on removing the issue of primacy from the analysis belongs to the Weberian tradition: “A 
second element here is his desire to respect the autonomy of different sources of power. It is here that he 
is most obviously Weberian, albeit he differs in three ways: in his insistence on the autonomy of military 
power; in his view of ideology; and in his attempt to replace Weber’s view that there is no pattern to the 
interaction of power sources with a systematic account of why particular sources gain salience at 
particular points of historical record.” John A. Hall, “Political Questions,” 'mAn Anatomy o f Power, 34.
27 “Mann’s move to separate military and political dimensions opens the way for a more systematic 
theory of both, and of their interaction. Geopolitical relations among states now come into their own.” 
Collins, 21.
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To argue that this potential danger is fully actualized in Mann’s work would be unfair. 
To recognize its existence on the other hand is a safeguard for the scholars in IR who 
seek a social theory that would help them to tackle the international-domestic 
bifurcation by dispensing the view that sees the international as a realm of ever 
repeating necessities.
Mann is criticized for this separation and it is argued that his equation of 
geopolitics with military power reduced the international realm to geopolitics only. “His 
neorealist conception of geopolitics unavoidably leads to an elevation of the ‘M’ within 
the IEMP model, a move which does a disservice to his multi-causal analysis and its 
evocations to avoid issues of ‘ultimate primacy’.” In one of his replies to critics, Mann 
argues that his two ‘refinements’ had saved his approach from that reduction and that 
although initially his model could have a tendency to produce such a reduction, this is 
no longer the case. What are these two refinements? Firstly, he made a separation 
between inter-national and transnational relations, whereby the latter goes right through 
the state boundaries and transcends the state -  as the main actor in geopolitics -  and 
hence is not blind but rather designed to see the other aspects of the international. 
Secondly, he made a separation between hard and soft geopolitics. “If the essence of 
political power is authoritative rule making and enforcement, while that of military 
power is rule-light lethal violence, then hard and soft geopolitics must be separated into, 
respectively, military and political power.”29
28 John M. Hobson, “Eurocentrism and Neorealism in the ‘Fall of Mann’: Will the Real Mann Please 
Stand Up?” Millennium, 34, no. 2 (2005): 520.
29 Mann, “Response: Sources of power revisited,” in An Anatomy o f Power, 357.
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Here again we can see that Mann is genuinely interested in not producing a 
model that would divide the social world into states and reduce the international only to 
a repetitive cycle of inter-state war and conflict. But whether that interest and the 
potential spark towards that aim are fully realized in the actual work is another matter. 
Here a reference to Lawson’s introduction to Mann seems appropriate. Lawson goes 
beyond just labelling Mann’s work as ‘neorealist’ and makes a more nuanced 
evaluation. Lawson’s interpretation of this disagreement as to how Mann approaches 
the realm of international is a sober and objective evaluation, giving its due credit to 
Mann’s accusation of the field of IR as one of labelling and paradigm wars but also 
acknowledging that Mann’s conceptualisation or rather lack of conceptualisation of the 
international-domestic interaction, his under-theorisation of the international realm 
leads the way to a simplistic view of the international, one that cannot cover all the 
dynamics of the international constitution of the social world.30 Despite Mann’s several 
responses to these criticism, he could not yet convince the historically and 
sociologically minded IR scholars that his IEMP model indeed does justice to the 
international as a constitutive field of the inseparable unity of the social world. The 
military power, despite Mann’s very consistent historical treatment of that source of 
power and despite his insistence on the importance of analyzing the infrastructure of 
military power and hence showing the links towards what is otherwise called the
30 “Here Mann clearly has a point. IR seems to revel in the mud slinging that accompanies academic 
labelling games. Much of this is rudimentary in the extreme -  to note the power of states and statesmen 
makes one a realist just as to be interested in meaning, perceptions and ideology denotes one a 
constructivist. This is a sorry state of affairs and Mann is right to chastise IR’s navel gazers. Nevertheless, 
the bigger question remains -  to what extent Mann’s limited view of what IR is, and should be concerned 
with, blinds him to the multiple ways in which international processes impact on world-historical 
development. It may be that this lack of attention to a broader understanding of international relations, 
both as subject matter and as discipline, is bom of Mann’s necessarily ruthless interdisciplinarity -  a kind 
of intellectual asset stripping in which Mann carries out what he calls ‘looting and pillaging raids’ on 
other disciplines. Perhaps these raids entail too much attention to detail and too little to the debate that 
surrounds them. Either way, this is certainly an issue that, like a good play, is likely to run and run.” 
George Lawson, “A Conversation with Michael Mann,” Millennium 34, no. 2 (2005): 483.
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domestic realm, still stands to represent the simplicity of Mann’s treatment of the 
international:
“Secondly, historical sociology, and Mann’s work in particular, 
invokes the international -  the global context in which individual 
states and societies are formed. (...) To put it at its simplest, the
four-part distinction of forms of power and structure at the
domestic level -  ideological, economic, military and political 
power relations (IEMP) -  is, once the frontier is crossed, met by a 
simplistic ‘M-alone’ model of the international.”31
Noting the dangers of this ‘M-alone’ model of the international, we should now 
turn to other aspects of Mann’s historical sociological endeavour, to those from which 
we can infer possible suggestions as to how to study international-domestic interaction 
(or if we shall insist on rephrasing this dichotomy based on our assumption of the unity 
of the social world: the co-constitution of international and domestic). For that 
purpose, the other, non-military sources of social power and how Mann utilizes these
classifications in his analysis of the state become important: ideology, politics and
economics. Mann asserts a very fundamental proposition to his analysis: that power 
should be analysed not over interest or ends but over means, and it is here that he 
resembles though not very closely Tilly’s theory of mobilization.33 What becomes 
crucial in both approaches is the fact that neither ideology, nor politics, nor economics 
are in themselves explanatory fields of social life, but it is the specific means that each 
crystallize in themselves -  in conjunction with each other and in a constantly changing
31 Halliday, “He Hasn’t Finished Yet,” 513.
32 What I mean by the co-constitution of the international and the domestic will only be truly clarified at 
the end of this thesis. However, to separate it from the ‘constructivist’ thinking in IR, it should suffice to 
note that this co-constitution is not occurring between units on the same level of analysis, but it is 
observed and conceptualized between two distinct levels of analysis. As such, it is touching upon a 
methodological issue as well.
33 “The four power sources offer distinct, potentially powerful organization means to humans pursuing 
their goals. But which means are chosen, and in which combinations, will depend on continuous 
interaction between what power configurations are historically given and what emerges within and among 
them. The sources of social power and the organizations embodying them are impure and “promiscuous.” 
They weave in and out of one another in a complex interplay between institutionalized and emergent, 
interstitial forces.” Mann, The Sources o f Social Power, Vol. 2, 10.
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manner -  and present to the actors -  who were shaped to a great extent by the historical 
evolution of these social sources of power anyway -  that the social scientists should try 
to reveal.34
This theoretical primacy of the analysis of the means of organization of actors 
rather than distinct realms of social life paves the way for the prioritization of the 
analysis of interrelations and interactions between what are generally seen as distinctly 
different spheres. And this trait of Mann presents the IR scholar seeking the 
reconceptualisation and methods of study of the international-domestic interaction an 
opportunity, namely reading this interaction through the means it presents to the actors, 
who will not use them in an all-wise, all intended way, and at a specific time and place. 
Hence, Mann provides us one of the initial theoretical steps to go beyond the “either/or” 
mentality towards the international and domestic and provides a justification as to why 
the historical sociological minded IR scholars see the international-domestic interaction 
as one of constraining and enabling, hence of constitution rather than a mere restraint or 
a one-way determination. Herein lies a perhaps not fully abused opportunity to open up 
the international, thereby preventing reification and determinism and at the same time 
covering all the non-M characteristics of the international which is a necessary 
condition to establish the argument on the constitutive character of the international.
Mann’s view of society as non-unitary, his identification of multiple sources of 
social power without neglecting the issue of primacy or reductionism, and his means-
34 The issue of how to adjust the empirical research according to this focus should be not neglected. 
Bryant emphasizes the relation between focusing on the means and the empirical focus on infrastructure: 
“In any given situation, the exercise of power will feature the deploy of various media -  resources, skills, 
capabilities -  that activate or mobilize relations and instrumentalities requisite for the achievement of 
chosen objectives. It is this focus on the infrastructures o f  power, i.e. logistics, communications, 
organization, tools and technologies that is the hallmark of Mann’s approach.” Bryant, “Grand, yet 
grounded: ontology, theory, and method in Michael Mann’s historical sociology,” in An Anatomy o f  
Power, 74.
34
based lens of reading the workings of power can be identified as points of inference for 
those who seek an alternative account of international-domestic distinction. Another 
fertile area from which one can contribute to this alternative account is the issue of 
agency. Here again Mann resembles Weber in the attempt to transcend the either/or 
mentality on the distinction between ideas and material world: “My model abandons the 
distinction between ideas and materiality in favour of one between ‘ideas-and-practices 
combined’ (or ‘action and structure combined’) in each of four power networks.”35 
Indeed, it seems that the means-based explanation, outlined above is directly linked to 
this issue as agents intentionally and unintentionally exercise their agential powers 
within the intersecting networks of these four sources of power which mutually create 
each other. In this narrow sense, the distinction between action and structure are blurred, 
an inference made from the historical instances of social action rather than a dichotomy 
imposed upon.
This does have implications for the analysis of the international constitution of 
revolutions, as in the case study at hand, since the explanandum includes multiple actors 
intervening to the world that had conditioned themselves and since it is the priority of 
this thesis to expand the scope to the world rather than a national history. The 
connections between the meanings they attached, the actions they conducted and the 
multiple causes of these meanings and actions have to be not rigidly but clearly 
explainable. Hence, Mann’s Weberian insight that ideas versus material world 
dichotomy is neither productive nor reflective is one of the primary sources of 
theoretical inspiration, though of course Mann is neither the only one to produce this 
insight nor can we claim with safety that he did actually treat ideas and ideologies in an 
equal footing with the empirical investigation of the material. For example, Halliday
35 Mann, “Response: Sources of power revisited,” in An Anatomy o f Power, 346.
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argues that Mann’s attachment to structure is a heavy determinant for his approach and 
hence the approach is not productive in terms of providing us with the mechanisms of 
understanding the ideas and ideology.36 However, the fact that Mann, just like Weber 
before him is aware of the problematic theoretical and empirical status of this 
dichotomy gives us a justification to further expand the research on this topic and to 
connect it to the discussion of the ‘international’.
2.2.3 Theda Skocpol and the international
"Clarification o f  this issue o f agency, in theory and in regard to specific events, would not 
only serve the explanatory and normative Junctions mentioned earlier, but would also make 
a contribution to the broader debate within social science on structure and agency. It 
might, in so doing, deprive determinists o f their favourite source o f authority. The 
international would cease to be the realm o f necessity, but like the domestic, a domain 
where necessity and agency interacted. ”37
Theda Skocpol, in her grand work on the social revolutions examined the three 
classic revolutions by the use of comparative method. The work was an example of 
historical sociological studies and marked the discussion on revolutions for the decades 
that followed. In addition to having a well-laid framework for the study of the social 
revolutions, the book also entailed discussion on the nature of the state, the international 
and on other social scientific themes, such as structure/agency dichotomy. Here we are 
mostly concerned with how Skocpol located the international in revolutions and what it 
meant to have a structural account of social revolutions. There should be no harm in 
telling the last word in the beginning of the debate namely that Skocpol asserted that 
revolutions are not made, but rather they happen.38 In this way Skocpol stood against
36 “Resolutely attached to concepts of ‘system’, ‘structure’ and ‘recurrence’ as they are, Mann as much as 
Weber and Comte, Waltz as much as Morgenthau, cannot provide the tools for discussing how ideas and 
ideologies have shaped the modem world.” Halliday, “He Hasn’t Finished Yet,” 515.
37 Halliday, “For an International Sociology,” in Historical sociology o f international relations, 250.
38 Two qualifying statements on this judgement can be listed as: “Historically, no successful social 
revolution has ever been “made” by a mass-mobilizing, avowedly revolutionary movement. (...) In fact, in 
historical revolutions, differently situated and motivated groups have become participants in complex
36
what she termed the voluntaristic approaches to the study of revolutions. Although she 
stands in many debates close to Tilly’s model, her approach distinguishes itself by this 
structuralist emphasis.39 As opposed to Tilly’s political organization model40, Skocpol’s 
lens is fixated to see structures as the point of departure for the analysis. What interests 
us most for our discussion is Skocpol’s inclusion of the international as an integral part 
of her analysis:
“Social revolutions should be analyzed from a structural 
perspective, with special attention devoted to international contexts 
and to developments at home and abroad that affect the breakdown 
of the state organizations of old regimes and the build up of new, 
revolutionary state organizations.”4
Instead of the agent-based explanations of revolutions, Skocpol proposes and 
effectively shows in empirical data that one needs to look at the structures that define 
the world of the agents and these include the international. International from this 
structuralist account seems to lie on two legs: the political economy and the military 
conflict, in short economic and military competition that defines state behaviour and has 
a huge impact on their resources and capabilities. Among these two, Skocpol recognizes 
the historical character of modem capitalism. On the other hand she locates the 
international as “the transnational structure of military competition” throughout the 
‘modem world history’ with an “analytically autonomous level of transnational 
reality”42 She does recognize another layer of the international, that she calls ‘world­
unfolding of multiple conflicts. These conflicts have been powerfully shaped and limited by existing 
socioeconomic and international conditions.” Theda Skocpol, States and social revolutions: a 
comparative analysis o f France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 17.
39 Skocpol’s definition of social revolutions which is by now a classic is as follows: “Social revolutions 
are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in 
part carried through by class-based revolts from below.” Ibid., 4.
40 Tilly, From mobilization to revolution, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978)
41 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 5.
42 Ibid., 22.
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time’, what is also often called ‘world-historical moment’, which “affect both overall 
world contexts within which revolutions occur and the particular models and options for 
action that can be borrowed from abroad by revolutionary leaderships.”43 However her 
overall structure of analysis does not support the importance of this statement and her 
lens seems to be adjusted towards this ever-existing military competition -  a point she 
seems to partially share with Mann - in conjunction with capitalist economic system. 
And therein lays the problem of this structuralist account towards revolutions for our 
purposes, at the moment when it starts to analyze the international phenomena with a 
neo-realist logic. “Thus for Skocpol, states have no real choice but to conform to the 
survival imperatives of the international structure, because failure to do leads to the 
defeat in war and subsequent revolution.”44
This emphasis led to the reproduction of a conceptualisation of international 
system as an ahistorical anarchy, where states are in any period compelled to compete 
with one another producing an ever-lasting conflict. This autonomous and given 
structure of conflict shaped the modem state and in many ways became its producer.45 
Skocpol’s use of die international context is revealed by the paraphrasing of Dennis 
Smith from State and Revolutions: “International pressures were transmitted to national 
politics via the political regime, since the state apparatus had a major stake in both 
spheres” (Smith 1991, 70).
43 Ibid., 23.
44 John M. Hobson, “The Two Waves of Weberian Historical Sociology in International Relations,” in 
Historical Sociology o f International Relations, 70.
45 As George Lawson puts it, “Tilly, Skocpol, Giddens, Hall, Mann and others began to see geopolitical 
conflict, and in particular war, as fundamental to processes of state formation.” Lawson, “A Conversation 
with Michael Mann,” 481.
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This neo-realist like approach of Skocpol seems to stem from two of her 
assumptions. Firstly, despite the mentioning of the international political economy, it is 
the inter-state relations that are overplayed in the States and Social Revolutions, which 
of course leaves the state as the primary actor to investigate in the international context. 
Secondly, it is her insistence on taking the state’s relations with dominant classes in a 
society as the central conflict that leads to her to neglect any of the international links 
that ‘the rest’ may have.46 This on the other hand she shares with Mann as well. In an 
interview with George Lawson, Mann states: “I suppose I have been writing 
predominantly about the leading edge of power, and that therefore it is a consequence 
that I would tend to downplay the role of the losers!” (Lawson 2005, 493) This has 
many implications for a theory of social power.
For our purposes, the importance lies in the link between this approach and the 
possibility of a historical sociological approach to international relations, one that could 
rethink the international-domestic distinction. When the researcher centralizes the 
relations between the ruling classes and the international actors, it is most probable that 
he/she will end up with having an explanation of the inter-state relations rather than 
international relations that transcend the former. It is in the interaction between multiple 
layers of the international and domestic levels that we can identify the non-inter-state 
determinants on the history of a particular society or a particular international system. 
We will have the opportunity to further open up and detail what we mean by this 
multiple layers and their interaction in the analysis of the case.
46 For a criticism of Skocpol on these grounds, see Farideh Farhi, “State disintegration and urban-based 
revolutionary crisis: A comparative analysis of Iran and Nicaragua,” Comparative Political Studies 21, 
no. 2 (1988): 231-256.
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Skocpol’s contribution to the study of revolutions, to the comparative method 
and to historical sociology itself is of course invaluable. Yet it is not without its pitfalls. 
Halperin concludes as follows: “It [Skocpol’s work] is undermined by Weberian 
orientations toward the state and the international system which obscure the systems of 
local and translocal social relations within which states operate”47 The addition to this 
chapter of this observation is that there is qualitatively more to the ‘international’ than 
war and conflict, or in other words ‘war and conflict, and competition’ have 
consequences transcending their obvious effects. They, together with other international 
events go into the constitution of the domestic. In yet another formulation: the 
international is not a space which specific set of rules that the states fill in and act 
accordingly 48 Another imagination of the agency and the international might lead us to 
a different understanding regarding the international-domestic distinction. Skocpol, 
despite her meticulous work and despite her inclusion of the international still seems to 
be working with the former imagination of the international.49 And the reasons for the 
use of this imagination can be tied back to the point of Halliday in the quote at the 
beginning of this subsection, namely only a sound analysis of agency can rescue the 
international from being this realm of necessity and from being imagined this way. Now 
we move on to another framework which sets the international, the sociological
47 Sandra Halperin, “Shadowboxing: Weberian historical sociology vs state-centric international relations 
theory,” Review o f International Political Economy 5, no. 2 (1998): 328.
48 Nor is the international an intervening factor to the continuous flow of domestic politics: “The 
‘international’ is not something ‘out there’, an area of policy that occasionally intrudes, in the forms of 
bombs or higher oil prices but which can conventionally be ignored.” Halliday, Rethinking International 
Relations, 21.
49 This is also Hobden’s position as he examines the uses and misuses of HS in IR: “Skocpol’s work 
provides a sophisticated approach to theorising international systems, combining a number of features: 
economic, political and temporal. However, despite this cogent theoretical position, when it comes to a 
discussion of the historical material her approach is to reduce international systems to the presence or 
absence of warfare.” Hobden “Theorising the international system: perspectives from Historical 
Sociology,” Review o f International Studies 25, no. 2 (1999): 259. Another criticism directed in the same 
vein yet from another angle can be found in Buzan’s piece on the wisdom of realism and the attempts of 
HS in IR. Barry Buzan “The timeless wisdom of realism?” in International Theory: positivism and 
beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996).
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approach, the social change and revolutions in another picture, one in which they are far 
more connected.
2.3 Historical Sociology in International Relations
Firstly through Weber, but in later generations through scholars such as Charles 
Tilly, Michael Mann and Theda Skocpol, HS as a tradition had its impact on IR and also 
IR had influenced HS’ view of the international realm. As mentioned above HS had the 
emphasis on understanding modernity as a whole rather than an interest in narrow 
international histories. As such this HS effort to analytically grasp and explain the 
totality of the social world had to engage with the international and IR, in the midst of 
paradigm wars, had shown an interest in this effort of locating specific social events and 
their comparisons within an international context. “The term ‘historical sociology’ itself 
is in one respect too condensed, for it contains two distinct claims: the historicisation of 
the state on the one hand, and the location of that history within an international context 
on the other.”50
As we have seen in the criticisms directed towards the Weberian historical 
sociology by the IR scholars, the tendency that they saw in HS to reproduce the neo­
realist paradigm in their handling of ‘geopolitics’ and hence showing a reductionist 
attitude towards the ‘international’, coupled with the merits of the HS tradition, 
produced a historical sociological framework in international relations that is still in the 
making. These IR scholars despite their different research agendas on specific topics 
seem to have a direction: the historicisation of the international system together with the 
reconceptualisation of the fundamental social scientific debates, such as on the 
international-domestic and structure-agency binaries, in the light of this historicisation
50 Halliday, “For an International Sociology,” 244.
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with an explanatory analysis. As George Lawson vigorously underlines, the aspect of 
HS that was the most needed in IR was this new usage of history, not as a field to be 
used randomly to justify the repetitive nature of the international but as the history of 
the social totality which can be only be seen in layers rather than composed of different 
realms of social life which then have external relations with each other. “A reminder of 
the need to study “ in” history rather than “ outside” history is a useful corrective to the 
tendency of scholars in IR to misapply abstract, timeless variables to ill-fitting 
contexts.”51
These recent attempts in creating another vein in the IR discipline that might 
lead to a self-reflective historical analysis stress all but one point: the need for an 
understanding of the ‘totality’ of the social reality. Benno Teschke, and Justin 
Rosenberg produced such accounts of the formation of the modem international 
politics. There is a direction. Both Teschke and Rosenberg attempted from different yet 
mutually enforcing angles to historicise the modem international system, not with the 
formal history of 1648 and not from the repetitive anarchic circle but from relations of
52production, with Teschke’s insistence on social relations of production. Both scholars 
have the uneven and combined nature of development thesis built in their social 
scientific approach and as such their call is to fundamentally transform the mainstream 
IR. For example, Justin Rosenberg’s The Empire o f Civil Society53 is at once a powerful 
critique of one of the most dominant paradigms in IR, realism and the assertion of an 
alternative, namely historical materialism. The attack is to the very foundations of
51 Lawson, “The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations,” International Studies 
Review 8, no. 3 (2006): 416. For Lawson’s use of historical sociological framework and his application 
of that framework with an institutionalist angle see Lawson, Negotiated Revolutions.
52 Teschke, The myth o f1648.
53 Rosenberg, The Empire o f Civil Society.
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realism starting with the positing of international as separate from domestic. And from 
that criticism an alternative emerges: “Something more fundamental would in fact be 
required: a reconceptualization of the historical process itself — one in which the 
geopolitical dynamics of ‘international’ behaviour are rediscovered as internal to the 
overall process of social development.”54
Indeed, this very fundamental need was the objective both scholars have 
attempted to accomplish. As such, their accounts bolster the historical sociological 
tendencies in IR and open up new angles of research for IR scholars. As it was 
mentioned above, the creation of new and productive research questions is indeed a vital 
criterion of research paradigms. And judged by this, both scholars have shown success. 
This thesis is inspired by their insistence on the wholeness of social development and on 
the intemality of international and domestic processes. Nonetheless, the central 
problematic of this thesis is not how to historicise the international system as an integral 
part of social development but rather how to locate specific social phenomena in 
international context. The former renders the latter possible but not necessarily provides 
it in full-fledged empirical and theoretical analysis. For the tools of the latter, scholars 
such as Fred Halliday and George Lawson come to the fore, since with their special 
interest in revolutions, agency and ideas combined with their determination to adhere to 
the difficult task of grasping these processes in their international dimensions, they 
provide more detailed research question that guided the main direction of this thesis.
In a work that gathered together the discussion on the HS in IR, Hobden argued 
that for a sound future of HS in IR first and foremost the following question should be
54 Rosenberg, “Why is There No International Historical Sociology?” European Journal o f International 
Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 313.
43
investigated: “A starting point might be to argue that phenomena that are considered to 
be ‘domestic’ or ‘international’ are co-constitutive. However, it is the character of these 
processes of co-constitution that should be the focus of study”55 One of the fundamental 
ways to study the character of these processes of constitution is the study of specific 
moments of social, political, economic and ideological changes and revolutions are 
indeed rapid transformations when the crisis are crystallized within a turmoil and these 
crisis always occur in an international context.56 As such, the study of revolutions has a 
lot to offer to the study of the international-domestic distinction within an HS tradition 
in IR. Halliday sums up this relation between the international and revolutions as 
follows:
“Revolutions are themselves necessarily international events—in 
cause, ideology, consequence and outcome. The very recurrence of 
international dimension not just in the policies and beliefs of 
revolutionaries, but also as cause, is often understated in studies of 
particular revolutions.”57
Hence, both the study of revolutions and the study of international change in IR 
neglect the constitutive link between the two. Those who study revolutions within this 
bigger problematic of IR and social science in general, namely trying to explore how the 
international plays a constitutive role in the emergence, development and outcomes of 
revolutionary situations and how revolutionary situations shape back the world within 
which they emerged have this two-fold challenge. The challenge is to demonstrate these
55 Hobden, “Historical sociology: back to the future of international relations?” in Historical sociology o f  
international relations, 43-44.
56 As a result of the theoretical blindness to the domestic-international interaction, IR as a field has only 
recently engaged with revolutions as international events that require causal explanations at the 
international level. Two notable exceptions are Halliday, Revolution and world politics, and Lawson, 
Negotiated Revolutions. For a discussion on Halliday’s work see this issue: Review o f  International 
Studies 27, no. 4 (2001).
What Halliday had concluded then seems still partially valid: “Neither the historical importance, nor the 
theoretical importance of revolutions are as yet given their minimal due within academic IR.” Halliday, 
“The great anomaly,” 698.
57 Ibid., 693.
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actual processes in a causally explanatory and theoretically consistent -  yet not rigid -  
way. The demonstration is intended to reveal the fact that the international is not only a 
structural determinant that operates in an ‘either/or’ fashion -  namely it is not the 
international structure versus state autonomy (states taken here as the primary actor in 
the international realm). When one makes the transition to the view that these are 
constitutive, then one can see Hobden’s point in proposing to use a ‘both/and’ logic: 
“By applying this ‘both/and’ logic, we can (re)view the nature of structures (both 
domestic as well as international and global) as double-edged, such that they ‘enable’ as 
well as ‘constrain’ states.”58 How international structures can increase, decrease or 
change the features of state’s capacities, resources and actions will indeed be one of the 
questions of the following chapters on the case study. This is so because the specific 
location of the state within the power networks has a direct bearing on the revolutionary 
actors and situations. Further elaboration on the links between the international 
structures, the states and the revolutionaries will be provided after a thorough analysis 
of the case with these and similar questions in mind.
Another theoretical insight that is linked to this ‘both/and’ logic is the fact that 
not only the international structures but also ideas, actors and the contingencies that 
arise in the international field have this ‘enabling’/’constraining’ relation with the 
domestic actors. So ‘both/and logic’ does not only apply between international 
structures and states as actors but also to non-state actors and the meanings they attach 
to their actions. Issues of ideologies, that arise in world-historical moments and then go 
into the constitution of domestic social, intellectual and political development, such as 
nationalism and constitutionalism is a crucial example in this regard, again one that will 
go under an empirical investigation in the case study chapters. Through structures and
58 John M. Hobson, “The Two Waves of Weberian Historical Sociology in International Relations”, 75.
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actors; material and ideational factors, “the relation of the state to society is constantly 
affected by the international function.”59 And when this is the case, the need to study 
this international function in the emergence of revolutionary actors and situations 
becomes inevitable and indeed, necessary.
Once again, an intersection of issues is revealed, one that was mentioned in the 
first section of this chapter, within the discussion of Weberian historical sociology. The 
debate on the structure and agency is linked to the debate on the international and 
domestic distinction. The historical sociology as a paradigm gives us the sociological 
reflex of understanding the world history not one composed of external objects and their 
inter-relations and the historical reflex of being sensitive to structures and actors alike, 
despite the variations of different scholars in how to actually apply these reflexes on 
particular cases or on large-scale historical change. So, the question is at once 
ontological, epistemological and methodological: how to choose and reconceptualise 
the units/processes of analysis (the states and non-states actors; the international and the 
domestic); how to produce a theoretical framework that might best help to produce the 
knowledge of these processes (when and where to look with which lens, for example 
revolutions taken as indispensable moments of social change to be explained, by the 
help of which knowledge of longe duree processes can be attained); and finally how to 
produce meaningful ways to analyze these processes (comparative method, single case 
studies, as well as issues of periodisation).60 The purpose of this chapter was to
59 Halliday, “A second agenda,” 223.
60 Steve Smith, in a critical essay on HS and HS in IR argues that HS indeed has a different ontology, 
different from the rationalist International Relations where the international, the states that operate within 
and the domestic level are strictly separated from each other. However, in terms of how to look for and 
study this ‘international’ they resemble each other, namely epistemologically HS does have a tendency to 
reproduce the analytical distinction between international and domestic and also between structures and 
agents. “To reiterate, historical sociology differs from rationalist international relations in terms of its 
ontology; but for me this is less important than what is shared, namely the assumptions about
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acknowledge the existence and development of and the continuing need for the 
exploration of these insights.
Historically and sociologically minded scholars of IR has been debating and
empirically investigating these theoretical insights for at least two decades now. Richard
Little had warned IR scholars in 1994 that the structure and agency debate is
intrinsically linked to the development of a historical approach in IR:
“If the work of historical sociologists and world historians is to be 
successfully incorporated into IR, then it is essential that the 
significance of the debate is effectively internalized within the 
discipline. The first steps in this direction have already been taken, 
and it is likely that the issue will become one of the central areas of 
concern in IR.” 61
The issue remains one of the vital issues in the discipline. After this brief 
overview of the HS in IR, which does not do justice to the growing richness of the 
debate nor to the actual size of the literature and going back to the initial intuitions of 
this chapter, we can now safely argue the following: The central question of this thesis, 
namely how to study the international dimensions of revolutions (in our case the 1908 
Revolution in the Ottoman Empire) is indeed a question that crosscuts the imaginations 
of both HS and HS in IR. As such, the multi-causal account of Weber which allowed 
the sociologists to come to see the world as the mess it was and still is, the historical 
emphasis that started with Weber and Marx alike, and the effort to not let go of the 
causal explanatory tools that a social scientists can and should develop remain the most 
general yet indispensable directionality of this question. Since this is the widest lens that 
is adjusted to see the multi-layered nature of the question on the international and
epistemology and methodology.” Steve Smith, “Historical Sociology and International Relations Theory,” 
in Historical sociology o f  international relations, 243.
61 Richard Little, “International Relations and Large Scale Historical Change,” in Contemporary 
international relations: a guide to theory, ed. Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1994).
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revolutions, recognizing the inter-connectedness of the phenomena on the ontological 
level and trying to reflect this at the epistemological and methodological levels as well 
will be the guiding principles of this investigation.
Michael Mann and Theda Skocpol gave us somewhat sharper tools and a more 
adjusted lens, yet this move also brought its own unique pitfalls. Mann’s emphasis on 
the un-bounded nature of societies; on the overlapping and intersecting nature of 
different sources of power; on the importance of military power as distinct from the 
political power, and his underlying assumption that it is primarily through the means of 
power (mostly crystallized through the state) that we can reveal and make sense of 
social change, of how, why and when it occurred remains also indispensable for 
developing suggestions as to how the study the international-domestic co-constitution in 
revolutions. Only when the social world is seen not as a reified and repetitive history 
but as a totality composed of un-bounded processes and social spaces, we can truly 
speak of international-domestic co-constitution. Skocpol on the other hand, made a 
further and more specific step towards the intuition of the central question. She, through 
her comparative study, linked the emergence of revolutions in a fundamental way to the 
international context. From a strictly structuralist angle and not in a multi-dimensional 
way, but she did integrate the international to the revolutions in a theoretical and 
empirically detailed way.
Yet where she seemed to fall into the trap of ‘neo-realist understanding of the 
international’ is precisely where HS in IR has picked on. Namely through the opening 
of a more focused discussion on the nature of the international, on how to historicise it, 
how to link it to the major processes of change and how to locate it vis-a-vis the 
domestic processes. IR scholars with HS reflexes seem to agree on these needs, some
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more from a historical materialist reading of HS and some more from the Weberian 
tradition. Still, they had a direction, and a shift occurred: “what may previously have 
been seen as discrete, isolated, national histories, now appear much more clearly as the 
result of international processes, of imitation, competition, defensive modernization and 
influence.”62 Fred Halliday specifically produced accounts of revolutions, of agency, 
ideas as well as socio-economic processes from this angle, while Lawson emphasized 
the role of institutions in these processes. Hobson summarizes the logic of Halliday in 
this multi-layered analysis as follows: “Halliday employs a feedback loop, invoking an 
international—national-international chain of causality. (...) This trinitarian conception 
offers an organizing principle around which WHS can reconfigure IR.”
If this trinitarian lens is the one we will be using, what Little had argued remains 
now crucially relevant to the central question of this thesis: how to internalize the 
structure-agency debate within the historicisation and internationalization of the social 
phenomena? Indeed this debate will be one of the sub-themes in this thesis, yet will 
only surface in accordance with the narration of the case study, namely as much as 
empirical facts and the more analytical question that are imposed on them and arise 
from them necessitate it. The fact remains that these historical sociological reflexes 
seem to be the most appropriate and productive method to approach the study of the 
international in revolutions.
62 Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, 120.
63 Hobson, “Debate: The 'second wave' of Weberian historical sociology - The historical sociology of the 
state and the state of historical sociology in international relations”, Review o f International Political 
Economy 5, no. 2 (1998): 298.
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2.4. Conclusion
“There is a fundamental difference between mitigating the comparative method by having 
recourse to auxiliary hypotheses about the temporary significance o f the international, and 
a general and systematic attempt to elevate the international from the start to constitutive 
component o f  any theory o f  history, revolutions included. ”64
The main effort of this thesis is intended to be a contribution to this systematic 
attempt to render the international as an integral part of the theories of social change and 
to do so with the tools and insights inspired from the HS tradition and from the studies 
of IR. This chapter endeavoured to justify the theoretical framework of this thesis, a 
task only to be accomplished with the actual investigation of the case study and the final 
combination of the findings of the case in the face of these theoretical directions. The 
historical sociological reflexes themselves direct us to a path where the true value of a 
study can only be found in the colliding of the social phenomena to be examined and in 
the ways of the scholars to examine them. The clarity of and the actual need for the 
theoretical directions intuited in this chapter will only make social scientific sense when 
they are justified, opened up and modified by the events under investigation. Yet and in 
parallel with the theory-ladenness of studies of this kind, the investigation of the case is 
to some extent already shaped by this direction.
The following chapter will reveal that the historical sociological principle of 
staying ‘in’ history made this investigation start with an overview of the long nineteenth 
century of the Ottoman Empire and of the way this related with the age of revolution in 
Europe. This will be an exploration of the ways in which the Ottoman Empire interacted 
with the world around it. This interaction constantly constituted the rapidly changing 
social realities of the actors in and out of the Empire, hence gave a direction -  though
64 Teschke, “Bourgeois Revolution, State Formation and the Absence of the International,” Historical 
Materialism 13, no 2 (2005): 10.
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not definite -  to the events to come. This investigation of the long-term international 
context of the 1908 Revolution will also give us an opportunity to identify the critical 
juncture wherein the main actors and the pre-existing yet evolving conflicts of the 
revolution to which they responded emerged. This critical juncture also sets the end of 
the time-period for the next chapter and the start of the one that follows, namely the 
start of the Hamidian era, the era of the sultan defeated by the revolutionaries, also the 
era of the introduction and suspension of the first constitutional regime in the Ottoman 
Empire, and finally the era of a specific Ottoman interaction with the world, that had 
continuing and differing aspects from the previous periods. Throughout this chapter and 
the ones that will follow the focus will be specifically on the constitutive process 
between the international and domestic -  though the position of the Ottoman Empire 
within the international politics of the nineteenth century forces one to focus more on 
the international’s constitution of the domestic rather than the other way around. A 
special consideration will be the different layers/processes within this constitution: it is, 
as this chapter on the theoretical debates has demonstrated, not enough to merely state 
this co-constitution as a given fact. The value that this thesis will endeavour to provide 
will be to show how these processes actually occur, by whom they are instigated, 
through which ideas they are mediated or initiated, and through which conflicts they are 
crystallized. This requires a more detailed look into these processes of co-constitution 
whenever possible.
If the central conclusion of this chapter can be stated as the need to internalize 
historical sociology in IR and the need to internalize the international in historical 
sociology, the best way to contribute to this task is to challenge this assumption at the 
theoretical level by an actual case in point. It is the assertion of this thesis that the case 
at hand, 1908 Revolution in the Ottoman Empire, will prove to be challenging to these
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theoretical tendencies and will benefit from being challenged by this historical 
sociological approach to the ‘international.”
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CHAPTER 3 THE OTTOMAN-EUROPEAN INTERACTIONS OF THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY: POLITICS OF REFORM
3.1 Introduction
In the summer of 1908, Macedonia, a geographically small but crucial province 
of the Ottoman Empire, became the scene where the revolution that was to change 
Ottoman politics started. Introducing a new way of ruling a multi-ethnic Empire and 
shaping to a great extent the path to transformation into a nation-state, this Revolution 
was a sea-change in the realm of Ottoman politics, extending well beyond the borders of 
the future Turkish Republic, one of the many nation-states formed after the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Carried out by a group of Young Turks in exile 
and a substantial opposition movement within the army and joined by some segments of 
the people, especially in Macedonia, this revolution succeeded in abolishing the regime 
of Abdiilhamid II, the last Ottoman sultan to reign and rule (for three decades). After the 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908, no Ottoman Sultan managed to acquire a significant 
degree of power in the palace. The civilian and military bureaucracy from whose ranks 
almost all the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, the dominant 
faction within the Young Turk movement) originated declared its triumph once and for 
all. Although the Young Turks never radically questioned the presence and status of the 
sultanate, the revolution they carried out opened the path to state rule without the 
dynasty. In some respects, they went on to lead the transformation of the nineteenth 
century to its conclusion: a centralized state rule on new principles. In other respects, 
they broke away from this already advanced path of modernization by introducing party 
politics and by making the sultanate obsolete. These initial observations of course do 
not do justice to nineteenth century developments or to the Young Turk revolution of
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1908. The preparation of the latter will be analyzed chronologically in the next three 
chapters. The former will be briefly outlined in this chapter.
The period that this chapter will focus on extends from Selim III, the Sultan of 
the turn of the century, continuing with Mahmud II, to the era of centralization, and 
lastly includes the Tanzimat era. Selim III and Mahmud II laid much of the 
groundwork for Ottoman reform, starting with the Rose Chamber Rescript of 1839 
when a new understanding of state-society relations was declared by the Ottoman state 
in interaction with the international context of the time. The Hamidian regime was 
defined by some crucial highlights of this period. The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 
1838 was a watershed in trade relations, and the Tanzimat reforms that were initiated 
with the Rose Chamber Rescript transformed the state structure of the Empire. The 
Crimean War (1856) was an important part of Ottoman history, but also a fundamental 
part of 19th century European politics. The Paris Treaty (1856) that followed marked the 
Ottoman entrance into the Concert of Europe. Around the same time, the Ottoman state 
was integrated to a considerable extent into the financial system of Europe and acquired 
its first foreign debt (1854), which would lead to its bankruptcy (1875) in only 20 years. 
The Ottoman reforms, in conjunction with the European political and economic order, 
led to a certain type of transformation, which in turn paved the way for a struggle within 
the elite. The result was the formalization of the Constitutional Regime, which lasted 
only two years. Three decades later, the Young Turks would succeed in the 
proclamation of the Second Constitutional Era.
The immediate politics of the Young Turks is no doubt to be unravelled in the 
Hamidian era and indeed that will be the main task of the following chapters. However, 
a sound grasp of the main tendencies in the way Ottoman actors, whether in power or in
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opposition, interacted with the world around them, and the evolving nature of European 
politics can only be achieved after at least a brief overview of the longer history of 
Ottoman transformation. The Young Turk Revolution is both a part of and a break with 
this history, and its long-term causes/conditions of emergence lie within this history. In 
this sense, at least a brief examination of these decades is both chronologically 
meaningful and necessary for the purpose of explaining the coming of the Revolution in 
its international dimensions.
With regard to the main theme of this thesis, namely international/domestic 
interaction in periods of change, this chapter will seed the opportunity for comparison 
with the main period covered by the thesis (1876-1908). One of the advantages of 
studying a single case is that this kind of comparison within one case enables us to 
observe the changing nature of international-domestic interaction and protects us from 
falling into the trap of reifying this interaction, while trying to escape the reification of 
its parts, i.e. the state and the international. The events of this period are very fertile for 
the purpose of observing this interaction between two realms that are in constant 
transformation while mutually influencing one another. Moreover, the way the Ottoman 
Empire was integrated into the European system in this period set a pattern for the 
following decades, although it did not predetermine the course of events. In this sense, 
this period highlights the difficulty and the rewards of studying at once politics at 
international and domestic levels and diverse yet mutually reinforcing issues.
With the aim of drawing empirical and theoretical insights from this era, this 
chapter will be composed of two sections. The first section will outline the beginnings 
of the transformation, before the Tanzimat era, in conjunction with the emergence of the 
Concert of Europe. The second section will focus on the Tanzimat era, the international
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causes and consequences of these reforms and the peaks in international-domestic 
interaction, such as the Crimean War.
3.2 The Long Nineteenth Century
"By filtering one o f the classic narratives o f socio-political change and revolution through 
an unfamiliar lens, the Ottoman ancien regime prods historians to turn questions o f socio- 
organizational change both inward and outward: inward, toward the complex social and 
economic relationships between a center and its many peripheries; and outward, toward 
ever greater integration o f historical polities within and among adjoining, converging or 
colliding, cultural and political systems1,65
As the quote above from Salzmann demonstrates, the history of the Ottoman 
transformation in the 19th century is portrayed as the oscillation between two kinds of 
realms, the external and the internal realms. The international relations of the era were 
marked by an important event at the beginning of the century, the Congress of Vienna 
(1815), and the consequent emergence of a new European diplomacy. “What emerged 
after 1815 was a system of collective Great Power supremacy and security designed to 
contain international violence and to prevent another hegemonic threat -  the so called 
Concert of Europe.”66 The Concert of Europe brought the long peace of Europe, which 
was to be interrupted by the Crimean War (1856) and later by the processes of German 
and Italian unification. This European peace was not necessarily translated into the 
Ottoman-European interaction. The Empire continued to suffer territorial losses (most 
notably Greek independence in 1828, Serbian autonomy and the Egypt affair under 
Mehmet Ali) and experienced overt and covert pressure, formulated as “reform or 
perish”. Besides, the Ottoman century had opened with dramatic events, such as the 
clash between the urban notables (Ayans) and the central government, the coming of 
Mahmud II, the Sultan who held the balance between the centre and centrifugal forces,
65 Ariel Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modem State (Leiden: Brill,
2004), 9.
66 Antony Best et al., International History o f the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 2004), 13.
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the abolition of the Janissary corps (1826) and the transition to a whole new model of
army.
In the political analysis of the specific interaction between these external and 
internal threats and the responses of the Ottoman Sultan and bureaucracy, an 
opportunity arises to conceptualize the long-term international-domestic interaction. 
The European system of the first half of the 19th century and the developing relations of 
the political economy had their impact on the Ottoman Empire, as on other peripheries 
and colonies of European states. Although not to the same extent, the impact of the 
Ottoman Empire on European politics is also tangible. Here lies the nuance between an 
exaggeration of this relationship and not acknowledging its existence at all. What 
Halliday argues for the Middle East is surely also valid for the history of Ottoman- 
European interaction: “The Middle East has not, therefore, been a distant, or passive, 
participant in the history of Europe, but neither has it been a constant ‘enemy’ against 
which Europe has defined itself.”67
Only if we see how the particular characteristics of Ottoman politics went into 
that interaction and transformed this relationship, as well as transforming themselves in 
the process, can we achieve a sound historical-sociological background against which to 
locate the Young Turk Revolution and Ottoman and international politics in the last 
quarter of the 19th century. With this latter purpose remaining the main consideration, 
we now turn to the details of external and internal pressures and Ottoman responses to 
these.
67 Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 78.
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The late eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth indeed saw a sea-change 
in European politics. The French Revolution of 1789 and the Napoleonic Wars that 
followed gave shape to the already ongoing process of modernization of international 
relations. European diplomacy took a new form with the formation of the Concert of 
Europe at the Congress of Vienna. Although the Concert did not work, perhaps was 
never intended to work as initially planned, it was an important international institution, 
one which the Ottoman Empire would resort to and finally enter in the aftermath of the 
Crimean War. The peace settlement of 1815 seems to be based on a mutual fear of 
revolution. “The long nineteenth century in Europe has a coherence — a dynamic — 
that stems from the diffusion of political innovations associated with the French 
Revolution.” And it was these political innovations that threatened Great Britain, 
Austria, Prussia and Russia in various ways. So the peace they reached “is not 
incidental, but it is a by-product of the desire to avoid revolution.”69
While Europe was experiencing the turn of the century as a combination of 
revolution and war and later as an ostensible peace, the Ottoman Empire was struggling 
with the threats that this European conjuncture was posing, alongside the long-term
7ftconflicts within the Empire itself. Post-revolutionary France occupied Egypt in 1798. 
In this specific instance we can observe the intersection of two threats. An external
68 Hudson Meadwell, “The long nineteenth century in Europe,” Review o f International Studies 27, no. 5 
(2001): 169.
69 Ibid., 172.
70 Findley lists the two most traumatic external threats in the eighteenth century that informed the rulers 
of the nineteenth as follows: “For the Ottomans, the need for new ways to defend the empire became 
unmistakable with a series of crises in the last decades of the eighteenth century. The Ottoman-Russian 
War of 1768-74 definitely established Russia as the empire’s most dangerous enemy; ended the Ottoman 
monopoly of the Black Sea and Ottoman suzerainty over the Crimea, which Russia soon annexed as a 
result; and raised doubts among Muslims everywhere about the sultans’ ability to defend Islam. The 
Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 showed that the danger was not limited to the European peripheries 
of the empire.” Carter Vaughn Findley, The Turks in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), 157.
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threat from France led to the emergence of the semi-independent regime of Mehmed Ali 
Pasha in Egypt. “Napoleon’s occupation encouraged two processes, of indigenous 
autonomy, later Egyptian independence, from Istanbul, and of European competition for 
the spoils of the Ottoman Empire.”71
Within this European competition, which was not yet at the level of fierceness it
was to reach towards the end of the century, Great Britain and Russia emerged as the
most formidable powers. Great Britain was the traditional power, with commercial
hegemony and a strong navy. Russia, on the other hand, profited from the ways in
which events unfolded during and after the Napoleonic wars and from its military
power, which masked the internal conflicts and weaknesses for the time being.
Anderson explains the emergence of Russia as the power in the continent as follows:
“The destruction of Napoleon’s Grande Armee in 1812, the 
advance of Russian armies across Poland and Germany in 1813 
culminating in their triumphal entry into Paris with the forces of 
the other allies in April 1814, seemed to mark Russia as a power 
whose military strength, and therefore whose political 
potentialities, were of a different order of magnitude from those of 
the other states of Europe.”72
Unlike Great Britain, Russia constituted a more crucial geopolitical threat to the 
Ottoman Empire. All these were alarming political and military developments. These 
years, with intense intra-European rivalry and with the rise of local notables in the 
provinces, were to inform the choices of Ottoman rulers, the Sultans and bureaucrats, 
for decades to come. The need to master the art of diplomacy, an aspect of politics that 
the Ottoman Sultans had not until then felt the need to master, would compel the 
Sultans, from Selim III onwards, to give due weight to this and to restructure Ottoman
71 Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations, 79.
72 M. S. Anderson, The Ascendancy o f Europe 1815 -1914  (London: Longman, 1985), 6.
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foreign policy accordingly.73 This occurred in parallel with a second development: the 
need to master the art of modem warfare. The Ottoman Empire had been losing most of 
its recent wars and the battles it engaged in with rebels in the provinces; with the usual 
consequence of loss of territory. Issues of prestige aside, territory loss also meant huge 
damage to revenue flow to the capital. Acquiring the ability to halt this retreat meant 
even closer engagement with Europeans, as the new armies were to be designed on 
successful European models, mostly under the leadership of European commanders 
brought into the Empire. Hence, Ztircher argues, these two necessities brought by the 
new European age, forced the Ottoman Sultan to open new channels of communication 
with Europe.
“More important, perhaps, than Selim’s actual measures, were the 
increased opportunities he created for the flow of Western ideas 
into the Ottoman Empire. The European, mainly French, 
instructors attached to the different army corps that Selim had 
founded or reformed produced one channel of communication.
(...) The new Ottoman embassies in Europe provided a second 
major channel of communication. (...) Now Selim for the first time 
established permanent Ottoman embassies in London (1793),
Vienna (1794), Berlin (1795) and Paris (1796).”74
Indeed, this change in the nature of Ottoman-European diplomatic interaction is 
among the several long-term causes of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The 
establishment of permanent embassies in Europe and later exchange of students, 
university teachers and military trainers would create an atmosphere whereby future 
generations of the Ottoman bureaucracy -  whose ascendancy would mark the Tanzimat 
era -  would be intrinsically linked with European developments in various fields, most
73 For the classical system before the diplomatic revolution see: “Chief among the factors that rendered 
the classical system inadequate was the inability of the Ottoman Empire in obtaining intelligence about 
Europe and other countries and in acquiring sources of intelligence; in other words, lack of 
communications. (...) Until the year 1793, it did not have permanent representation in the capital cities of 
other countries. (...) The sources of knowledge were, the exceptional representatives, the travelling 
Muslim merchants, the translators which came from Phanariot Greeks, etc.” Ali Akyildiz, Osmanh 
Biirokrasisi ve Modernle§me (Istanbul: Ileti§im, 2004), 21.
74 Erik J. Ztircher, Turkey: A Modem History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 23.
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notably science, philosophy and politics. This diplomatic revolution also marks a shift 
in Ottoman attitudes towards the surrounding world. Hanioglu captures this revolution 
as follows:
“Ottoman behaviour under Selim III illustrates the strategic 
premise that a meaningful alliance with a major European power, 
however unpleasant, was necessary to secure the future of the 
empire. As Bonaparte’s attack on Egypt in 1798 underscored, the 
Ottoman state, in order to survive, would have to harness European 
power and turn it against any potential attacker.”75
From this observation it follows that the opening of embassies, the increased 
communications with Europe were part of this wider process of adjusting to a new 
Europe and hence adjusting the Empire’s ways of interpreting international politics, as a 
result of the new European realities that the Empire could not escape. So, as we will see 
below, from institutional build-up to cultural exchange, the turn of the century and its 
transformative effect on the already changing Empire would be constitutive of Ottoman 
politics in the time to come, as new reflexes in politics (such as this kind of alliance- 
building) began to emerge. Indeed, this European “age of revolution” is a causal factor 
in the Ottoman transformation in various fields. Both Selim and his predecessor, 
Mahmud II, were informed by and reacting to a new world, one that was marked by 
‘alien’ relations of production, warfare, culture and diplomacy.
An analysis of the international scope of the constitution of that long Ottoman 
century is beyond the limits of this thesis, since its focus remains on the international’s 
role in the coming of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and its theoretical 
repercussions. Nonetheless, the recognition of the international -  not as an ‘outside’ 
force, but as part and parcel of all major domestic changes and ruptures, is indispensible 
for our purposes. This should not mean that the international is viewed as autonomous
75 M. §ukrii Hanioglu, A Brief History o f the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008), 48.
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from the domestic actors and structures that essentially form its content; and secondly it 
should not be taken to mean that there should be a hierarchy in the analysis of 
international-domestic interaction. These dichotomies mask and fracture the co­
constitution of the two realms.
The Deed o f Agreement (1808)
In the context of the international conflicts and tensions that merge with internal 
ones, the Deed of Agreement (Sened-i Ittifak) (1808) stands out as the culmination of a 
long-lasting internal tension that occurred at the end of Selim’s regime and the coming 
of Mahmud II. More importantly, it marked the centralization process in the Ottoman 
Empire. Here two tensions may be observed: firstly Selim IE’s response to the 
European encroachment, in the form of his attempts to modernize the army and his 
consequent clashes with the traditional military structure, the Janissaries, and the 
reactions of the Janissaries to Selim’s solution, which was to establish a new military 
unit. Secondly, the decentralization in the 18th century, when the way the tax system and 
the administrative system had evolved had led to the empowerment of the provincial 
notables, the ayans. In the Deed of Agreement, these two tensions merged and the 
revolt of the Janissaries, backed up by the ulema was confronted by the powerful 
Alemdar Mustafa Pasha “who was a typical example of the provincial notables from 
Rumelia that had emerged in the 18th century of the Empire.”76 He was not able to 
reinstate the defeated Selim III, but did succeed in enthroning Mahmud II and in halting 
the process of reaction to reform. However, this moment of the Ayan's entrance to the 
capital also revealed the increasing influence of the provincial notables and hence left 
Mahmud II with the task of reinforcing the Porte’s control alongside the attempts at
76 liber Ortayli, imparatorlugun En Uzun Yiizyih (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2001), 33.
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reform. This incident marks a particular moment in the integration of the Empire’s 
internal conflicts with those of the international political realm. From then on, 
centralization, reform and the context of European-Ottoman interaction can be seen as 
constitutive elements of Ottoman politics that contradict or mirror each other at times, 
but never cease to be in symbiotic relationship.
3.2.1 Centralization and modernization in the Ottoman Empire
Mahmud II’s reign started with the Deed of Agreement that enabled him to take 
power. Consequently his policies cannot be grasped except in the context of this 
beginning that had shown the weakness of central power. This was even more evident in 
the mere fact that the Palace had entered into an agreement with the provincial notables, 
promising to preserve their status and the status of their families in exchange for their 
promise to contribute to the safety and integrity of the Empire. In this way Mahmud’s 
reign tackled the issue of diminishing their powers for the following three decades. 
Among other areas of politics where the Sultan had to produce a response were the issue 
of the Serbian and Greek revolts, the rising power of Mehmed Ali Pasha in Egypt, the 
delicate dealings with European powers such as Russia and Great Britain and the 
ongoing reforms as a potential remedy to all these issues. Sultan Mahmud II was more 
successful in some of these areas than others, but overall it was his reign that created the 
political, institutional and ideological conditions for the Tanzimat era that followed. He 
established certain Ottoman responses to the problems that Selim III had identified and 
tried to manipulate matters in an international atmosphere of increasing European 
economic penetration. The end result was that: “Sultan Mahmud II thus established a 
neo-absolutist regime of a sort that had been absolutely unknown to his predecessors in
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the 17th and 18th century.”77 The Palace, the bureaucracy, the urban notables, the 
military and the ulema were all undergoing a deep transformation that was to be a long 
and in many respects not a linear process. But the neo-absolutism of Mahmud 
demonstrates the stream of change in the Sultanate which connects the long nineteenth 
century to Abdulhamid II, the sultan targeted by the Young Turks and defeated in
781908. The following quote from Hanioglu gives us a perspective on the understanding 
of reform in the reign of Mahmud II and demonstrates this continuing link, despite 
many oscillating tensions and differences, within the Ottoman nineteenth century. 
Westernization and modernization of the state and the elites that were raised to govern it 
had indeed started in the preceding century, but Mahmud II took these to a new level of 
policy-making:
“The institutionalization of Westernization under Mahmud II 
differed considerably from previous attempts to confront European 
ideas. For the first time, Westernization appeared as a formal 
policy linked to extensive bureaucratic reform and implemented 
with brutal force. The new schools provided the necessary 
manpower, while a government newspaper supported the effort 
with appropriate propaganda. These important changes had a 
lasting effect on the new generation that came of age under 
Mahmud II, and provided the foundation for the cadres of the later 
Tanzimat movement.”79
The contingent elements of historical personalities notwithstanding, this 
difference in the pace and content of Westernization and centralization under Mahmud 
II’s reign seems firstly to stem from the failures of the reformists of the previous era, the 
deposition and death of Selim III being the most obvious component. The previous era
77 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire: A Short History (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2009), 
114.
78 “The autocratic regime of the 19th century looks to its subjects not as a flock of herds like the 17th-18* 
century monarchies but as a group necessary to be controlled, yet also as having earned the rights to live 
under the security of law and order and to be exposed to humanely treatment. These words of Sultan II. 
Mahmud imply a lot: ‘I want the sultanate to be a support to the ‘millet’ (nation) rather than a source of 
fear and horror’.” Ortayli, Imparatorlugun En Uzun Yiizyih, 41.
79 Hanioglu, The Late Ottoman Empire, 63.
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revealed the failure of non-structural reform. Secondly, this also had roots in 
international politics, including the start of the revolts in the European provinces and 
Russia’s growing influence in Europe and especially in the periphery of the Ottoman 
Empire. In a sense the need for structural change was more urgent than before, as 
Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution was only accelerating its political, 
military and economic encroachment. It was now, in the way the Serbian, Greek and 
Egyptian revolts unfolded and in the shape of international affairs around these revolts, 
more clear than ever that the new way of politics was there to stay. Hence, 
Westernization was linked to Ottoman state reform, as the Empire in all its aspects was 
establishing new links to Europe, forced or otherwise.
The Serbian Revolt (1804-1817)
The Serbian and Greek revolts revealed this new relationship between Ottoman 
and European politics. The Serbian revolt originally started in 1804 as a reaction to the 
repressive ways of the Janissaries. “From the moment in the fall of 1805 when the 
Janissaries were defeated to a great extent, the revolt turned into a rebellion against 
Ottoman administration.”80 Even then, it seems hard to link this revolt strictly to a 
national awakening. We can perhaps link it more appropriately to the desire for 
autonomy in an Empire that was disintegrating as the economic structure deteriorated. 
The difficulties with the agricultural administration, combined with a certain level of 
repressive policies, seem to have triggered this first revolt of the Balkan peoples, under 
Black George (1760-1817).81
80 M. S. Anderson, Dogu Sorunu (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlan, 2001), 65.
81 This long quote from Hobsbawm is demonstrative of the lack of nationalist elements at the turn of the 
century in this Balkan revolt: “Nothing was more natural than to revolt, where necessary or desirable, 
against a local administration or a weakening Turkish Empire. However, little but a common economic
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As Mahmud was enthroned, the attitude of the Serbian rebels was changing. 
What was to be a pattern until the First World War and an integral part of Ottoman 
politics thereafter emerged: the tendency of the rebels to ask for the support and 
intervention of the Great Powers. Black George even himself wrote to Napoleon, asking 
for the help of France. Help came only, and in a very limited way, from Russia. More 
than a decade of rebellion had produced a kind of understanding between the Serbs and 
the Ottomans whereby Serbs shared power with the Ottoman representative in Belgrade. 
“In 1817, although very weak and primitive, a Serbian state was in the making.”82
The Auspicious Event (1826)
A crucial event which occurred during the long Greek revolt -  which will be 
elaborated upon below -  that had an impact on the subsequent course of events was the 
bloody abolition in 1826 of the Janissary troops by Mahmud II, who had long been 
planning this move. The immediate effect was a temporary weakening of the Ottoman 
forces during the revolt and therefore Mehmed Ali’s support became even more vital -  
this resort to Mehmed Ali would have its own consequences regarding Mehmed Ali’s 
own battle against the Ottoman state in later years.. The long-term effects of the 
abolition of the Janissary troops on the other hand reached further than the Greek revolt. 
It both symbolized and solidified the modernization of the Empire, as a new
backwardness united what we now know as the Yugoslavs, even those in the Turkish Empire, and the 
very concept of Yugoslavia was the product of intellectuals in Austro-Hungary rather than those who 
actually fought for liberty. (...) The first of the Balkan peoples to rise in the nineteenth century were the 
Serbs under a heroic pig-dealer and brigand Black George (1760-1817) but the initial phase of his rising 
(1804-1817) did not even claim to be against Turkish rule, but on the contrary for the Sultan against the 
abuses of the local rulers. There is little in the early history of mountain rebellion in the Western Balkans 
to suggest that the local Serbs, Albanians, Greeks and others would not in the early nineteenth century 
have been satisfied with the sort of non-national autonomous principality which a powerful satrap, Ali 
Pasha ‘the Lion of Janina’ (1741-1822), for a time set up in Epirus.” Eric Hobsbawm, The Age o f  
Revolution: 1789-1848 (London: Abacus, 2006), 173.
82 Anderson, Dogu Sorunu, 67.
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professional army was in the making and the educational and administrative reforms 
needed for the establishment of such an army would be transformative of many internal 
balances within the Empire’s ruling elite. This was one of the crucial turning points 
leading to the emergence of the Young Turk opposition, whose nucleus was in the 
academies established for the training of the cadres necessary for the new politics. 
Paving the way for military and educational reforms was not the only long-term effect 
of this event (also known as Vaka-i Hayriye -  The Auspicious Event). The Janissaries 
also had relations with the guilds and their specific position within commercial 
activities, coupled with their military power, made them also opponents of free-trade 
policies. In this sense, “1826 eliminated the most powerful and best organized 
advocates of protectionism. Thus, the 1826 event paved the way for the subsequent 
evolution of Ottoman economic liberalism.”83
Hence, in the Auspicious Event we can observe the intertwined nature of 
Ottoman reforms. The developments in the international field and the pressures from 
localities forced the Ottoman state to revise its military organization. The specific 
location of the military cadres within the social formation enabled their choice for 
protectionism, which was countered by pressures from European merchants and 
diplomats for a more liberal trade regime in the Empire. Additionally, the new military 
forces reduced the dependence of the Sultan on the soldiers of the provincial elites, 
furthering centralization. Consequently, “it regained for Istanbul a greater share of the 
economic surpluses from the urban and rural economics.”84 This stream of related
83 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914,” in An Economic and Social History o f  the Ottoman 
Empire, Vol. II: 1600-1914, ed. Halil inalcik with Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 764. Protectionism here is mostly used to refer to the economic mentality that revolves 
around state monopolies, the effort to keep the raw materials within the Empire and generally against 
free-trade policies.
84 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914”, 768
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developments was to continue throughout the nineteenth century and within it the 
presence of international, the specific choices of international actors; thus the tense 
nature of Ottoman politics and the choices of those in power converged.
Also to be mentioned among the long-term effects of the Auspicious Event is its 
total elimination of coercive powers on the part any possible opposition from within the 
Ottoman establishment. From now on, “those with vested interests in the old order 
could resist only with words, but not with the kind of violence and force that had 
disrupted all previous Ottoman reform initiatives.”85 As such, the abolition of the 
Janissaries stands out not simply as the elimination of an unsuccessful military unit, but 
as a moment within the longer process of Ottoman transformation and is linked by 
causes and consequences to the international conjuncture. It connects with the 
emergence of the opposition from the young military cadres in later decades and why 
these were largely unsupported by any other source of coercive power. As such it 
partially reveals the road from the first quarter of the century to the last.
The Greek Revolt (1821-1832)
The Greek Revolt that started in 1821 was a more multi-layered event than the 
Serbian revolt before that and very revealing for the purposes of deciphering the pattern 
of international-domestic interaction in the Ottoman nineteenth century. Although every 
event has its own unique parameters, the following characterization of the pattern by 
Quataert is appropriate, not only for the Greek revolt but for many to come, some of 
which would have a direct bearing on the Young Turk Revolution:
85 Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kuran Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey, Vol. II 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21.
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“The overall pattern in the Balkans is confusing in its detail but 
clear in overall direction. Often a local revolt would meet success 
or the Russians would drive very deep into the southern Balkans.
But then a troubled international community, fearful of Ottoman 
disintegration or Russian success, would convene a gathering, 
undo the worst results but allow some losses to ensue.”86
Indeed, such a gathering in 1830 resulted in the London Treaty which
recognized the independence of Greece after years of rebellion. The actual process
entailed not only the involvement of the Great Powers, but also another important threat
to the Empire which in the 1820s was still a source of support against the Greek rebels,
namely Mehmed Ali Pasha,87 who after the French invasion of Egypt had established
control and was on his way to expansion. He had also helped the Empire in its struggle
against the Wahhabi occupation of the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, in 1812-1813.
“The operations against the Greeks in Crete who had revolted in solidarity with their
brothers in the Greek peninsula in 1822 was being trusted to the control of Mehmed Ali
Pasha. In February 1824, the Morean peninsula was also under the control of Mehmed
Ali.”88 Part of the initial success of Mehmed Ali lies in his successful establishment of a
new military force in Egypt, a point envied and resented by the Ottoman capital.
Another part is the lack of foreign support in the initial phases of the revolution, similar
to the absence of this in the Serbian revolt.
This absence of foreign support was due to the state of affairs in Europe after its 
successful alliance against Napoleon and to the divisions and emerging ways of 
interpreting issues such as sovereignty, intervention and balance of power. Despite
86 Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 56.
87 Ztircher summarizes the rise of Mehmed Ali Pasha as follows: “Mehmet Ali was an Albanian from 
Kavalla (now in northern Greece), who had come to Egypt as an officer in the Albanian contingent in the 
Ottoman expeditionary force against the French. In 1803 he had become the leader of that corps and had 
established himself as the de facto ruler of Egypt. In 1808, he was officially recognized as governor of 
Egypt by the sultan.” Ztircher, Turkey: A modem History, 32.
88 Anderson, Dogu Sorunu, 76.
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Russia’s apparent interest in forcing the Greek issue to its conclusion, any intervention 
had to be calculated within the bigger scheme of politics. Supporting a rebellion against 
a multi-ethnic empire had foreseeable repercussions for other empires and for the whole 
European order. It makes perfect sense in this context that Mettemich did not applaud 
the Greeks and that Russia was late to act.89
Militarily vulnerable and surrounded by threats from the Greeks and from 
Russia, the Ottoman Empire was dealing with yet another new political phenomenon, 
that of nationalism and public opinion around it in Europe. The Greek revolt was 
different in this respect from the Serbian revolt. There was a strong will displayed for 
total independence and the Greek cause received much sympathy in European circles. 
Bromley identifies this as the second phase in Ottoman-European interaction and in 
what was increasingly called the Eastern Question. “A second phase was opened with 
the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, representing the spread of ‘nationalist’ 
ideas into the European parts of the empire and the entry of public opinion (in the form 
of the Romantic nationalism of revolutionary Europe) into Western decision-making.”90 
This, combined with the rather unexpected advance of Ottoman troops on Athens, 
finally brought about the foreign intervention that the international character of the 
revolt had been demanding from the start.
89 Anderson, explains the attitude of Alexander, Tsar of Russia within the parameters of European 
politics. The same reasoning holds for Mettemich as well, though in a more rigorous and hostile manner. 
“No matter how righteous a war against the Sublime Porte could be, it would be a war supporting the 
rebels against their legitimate mlers and hence would weaken the fragile, conservative order founded in 
Europe in 1814-1815 and as such would allow the anti-systemic, revolutionary forces centred in France to 
wipe off the continent once more.” Ibid., 80.
90 Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics: State Formation and Development (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1994), 63.
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The Empire under Mahmud II was not completely unprepared for this new realm 
of negotiation with the Great Powers, a negotiation on the nature of Ottoman 
administration of an Ottoman province. Mahmud II had paid more attention than Selim 
III to ‘foreign relations’. In 1821, he had established the Translation Bureau91, a service 
crucial to the conduct of diplomacy and one that had hitherto been entrusted to the 
Phanariot Greeks in the capital, the traditional dragomans. So, at the very beginning of 
the revolt, Mahmud II had taken these measures. He continued to invest in the 
infrastructure of Ottoman diplomacy in the 1830s and in 1834 officially founded the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Greek revolt ended officially in 1830 under these international and Ottoman 
conditions. The crucial development that led to a settlement was the Battle of Navarino 
between the allied fleets and the Ottoman fleet joined by Ibrahim Pasha, the son of 
Mehmed Ali Pasha. This battle “completely destroyed the new Ottoman fleet, cut 
Ibrahim Pasha off from reinforcements and supplies from home, and assured the Greek 
rebels of ultimate victory.”92 Defeated yet uncompromising, the Empire found itself at 
war with Russia and in an extremely weak situation. The war led to the Treaty of Edime 
in 1829. The treaty recognized important territory losses to Russia, but perhaps more 
crucially established the autonomy of Serbia and of Greece. Later, at international 
conferences in London, Greek independence and the future monarch and government 
were to be decided by the Great Powers.
91 Quataert explains the crucial position of the new cadres of Ottoman diplomacy within the bigger 
bureaucratic structure of the Empire: “Personnel of the Translation Bureau rose to become among the 
most important bureaucrats of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, as it increasingly integrated into 
the international state system of continuous diplomacy.” Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922, 81.
92 Shaw and Shaw, 30.
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The Greek revolt and road to independence reveals many themes of the 19th 
century and sheds light on the developments that will be of key importance in 
explaining international-domestic interaction in the coming of the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1908. The Russian advances in the war of 1829 did not lead to a total 
occupation, due to European balances, but were themselves brought about by the 
situation that the Greek Revolt had created. Great Britain and France did not allow 
Russia to take total control of the situation, but also did not let the Ottoman Empire be 
rewarded for its military resistance which was created first and foremost with the help 
of Mehmed Ali Pasha - another international crisis in the making.93 The Greek revolt, as 
explained above, also triggered further administrative reforms and in the immediate 
context of these events Ottoman diplomacy and military structure underwent radical 
change. This pattern of combined development in Ottoman politics - combined at the 
global, imperial and local levels - will be seen again in 1876-1878, at the critical 
juncture that this thesis will identify for the emergence of the Young Turk opposition. 
The presence of this pattern does not constitute a pre-determination, but rather a chance 
to observe the fluctuations in international-domestic interaction, once its constitutive 
effect is recognized. Another example worth mentioning is the war waged by Mehmed 
Ali against Ottoman central authority in the 1830s, to which we now turn.
The Ottoman-Egyptian Wars
One of the intriguing aspects of Mehmed Ali Pasha’s Egypt is the hostility it 
provoked in the Ottoman Empire and in the Great Powers alike (with the exception of
93 Ztircher demonstrates the Great Powers’ insistence on manipulating the situation, mostly due to their 
uneasiness with the Russian advances: “That the Greece that emerged on the map was only a very small 
state, and fell far short of the designs of the Greek nationalists, was only due to the fact that Britain, 
France and Austria preferred a malleable Ottoman Empire to a strong Greece dominated by Russian 
influence.” Ztircher, Turkey: A modem History, 35. The former countries, with the addition of Germany, 
were to have a very similar attitude towards Bulgaria at the Berlin Congress of 1878, for similar reasons.
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France, which saw Egypt essentially as a French ally and was seen as such by Mehmed 
Ali himself.) That his outright call for independence would create Ottoman enmities 
was only to be expected. Faroqhi also points to one of the reasons for the tension 
between Europe and Egypt at the time: “The industrialization of Egypt posed a threat to 
European, especially British, markets and sources of raw materials. Moreover, many 
Europeans were dismayed at the notion of an “Oriental” ruler, who ought to be “put in 
his place”,94 competing for equal power and status. As such, Mehmed Ali was posing 
both an economic and a political threat and this despite his obvious attempts at reform 
and Westernization -  more successful most of the time than those of the Ottomans. He 
was a source of both envy and hostility from the capital. Having shown his ability to 
found a modem army both against the Wahhabi occupation and against the Greek 
rebels, Mehmed Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim Pasha demanded more from the capital 
in terms of governing positions in key provinces such as Crete and Syria. Facing the 
unwillingness of the capital to grant these positions, he launched his attack on the 
Ottoman Empire. There were to be two phases of the war he waged and both of these 
would cost the capital dearly, not only in terms of military losses but perhaps more 
importantly in creating the urgent need to ask for the support of first Russia and then 
Great Britain.
The chain of events that started when, in 1831, Ibrahim Pasha advanced as far as 
Konya, well into the centre of Anatolia, was to last for a decade. It is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to give a detailed account of the many delicate oscillations within these 
ten years. Two elements of the narrative stand out for our purposes: the attitude of the 
Great Powers and the two consequent treaties signed with Russia and Great Britain in 
exchange for their support against Mehmed Ali Pasha’s troops: the Treaty of Unkiar
94 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire: A Short History, 115.
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Skelessi (Hunkar Iskelesi - 1833) and the Anglo-Turkish Convention (Baltalimam 
Anla§masi -  1838). There is a reason for this specific sequence. Russia was not the 
obvious first choice on which to call for help. However, “The British government whose 
whole attention was drawn to Iberia and Netherlands was surprisingly disinterested in 
the events in Syria 1831-1832.”95 The landing of “15,000 Russian soldiers to the shores 
of Bosporus”96 was traumatic at best and only undertaken out of necessity. It also 
proved to be only a temporary solution to the Egyptian problem, as Mehmed Ali Pasha 
managed to attain the governorships that he desired and was stopped, but not destroyed. 
It also proved to be costly, as the 1833 Unkiar Skelessi Treaty confirmed the influence 
of Russia over the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, it was not the immediacy of the Egyptian 
situation but this emerging treaty favouring Russia that would trigger Great Britain’s 
involvement. “Britain was outraged: the 1830s saw the genesis of a mass Russophobia 
which created the image of Russia as a sort of hereditary enemy of Britain. Faced with 
British pressure, the Russians in turn retreated, and in the 1840s reverted to proposals 
for the partition of Turkey.”97
Great Britain was indeed the protector of the Empire in the second phase of the 
Ottoman-Egyptian war, when Mahmud was defeated in 1839, a year after the Anglo- 
Turkish Convention of August 1838, the importance of which will be highlighted 
below. Mahmud II passed away in 1839 and Abdulmecid was enthroned the same year. 
Ibrahim Pasha was to retreat to Egypt and his family would have to be satisfied with the 
governorship of that country. The two repercussions of this, namely the 1838 Treaty and
95 Anderson, Dogu Sorunu, 97.
96 Ortayli, imparatorlugun En Uzun Yiizyih, 55.
97 Hobsbawm, Age o f Revolution, 134.
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the 1839 Rose Chamber Edict (Gtilhane Hatt-i Humayunu) that started the Tanzimat era 
in Ottoman politics, require a closer examination.
The Anglo-Turkish Convention (1838)
"The bureaucracy, in the narrow space that it possessed made such a manoeuvre that was 
favouring capitalist integration model which could render this possibility real: the ability o f  
the state officials to continue to uphold their class privileges. ”98
The 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention was signed in the face of a political and 
military crisis on the part of the Ottoman Empire, as outlined above. The Convention is 
crucial in many aspects. It “prohibited all monopolies, allowed British merchants to 
purchase goods anywhere in the Empire without payment of any taxes or dues other 
than import or export duty or its equivalent in interior duty.”99 This convention was 
followed by other trade treaties of the same kind with other European countries. As 
Stefanos Yerasimos argues, together with internal developments of the 19th century, 
these treaties enabled the industrial revolution in Europe to have its impact in a deeper 
way on the Ottoman economy.100 By abolishing all the limitations facing the activities 
of foreign merchants, these treaties enabled the further commercialization of agriculture 
and had a devastating impact on some manufacturing activities.101 They caused some 
latent tensions in the Empire to rise to the surface and new types of conflicts, intra-class 
and inter-class, emerged. The free trade regime bolstered the position mostly of the non- 
Muslim merchants, and hence created another pressure on the flow of surplus to the
98 £aglar Keyder, Tiirkiye 'de Devlet ve Siniflar (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2000), 44.
99 Charles Issawi, The Economic History o f Turkey 1800-1914 (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1980), 74-75.
100 Stefanos Yerasimos, Azgeli§mi§lik Siirecinde Tiirkiye (Istanbul: Beige Yayinlan, 2001), 63.
101 “Geographically speaking, the expansion of agricultural commodity production and the decline in 
handicrafts-based manufacturing activities remained limited to the coastal areas” §evket Pamuk, The 
Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
12 .
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Palace treasury. The opportunities of these merchants were even furthered by the offer 
of citizenship of Russia, England and France, which meant not only protection from the 
authorities but also considerable degrees of tax exemption, as a result of the trade 
concessions given to the European powers.
In sum, “when looking at the long-term effects, we see that this treaty 
diminished the chance of an independent foreign trade policy of the Ottoman 
governments.”102 Yet it would be incorrect to assume that the Ottoman bureaucrats had 
no clue about the repercussions. Here, we should turn to the quote from Keyder at the 
beginning of this section, and note that the bureaucracy paid this price, perhaps not fully 
aware, but for a partial purpose, namely that of strengthening their own position. 
Indeed, the Tanzimat era that followed this treaty would witness the reign of the 
Sublime Porte, as opposed to the Palace. That was the mode of Ottoman integration. It 
was mediated through the bureaucracy and this had its impact both on the bureaucratic 
structure and on the nature of the Hamidian regime that was to follow the Tanzimat era. 
To reiterate this point, Keyder argues: “The bureaucracy accepted a version of 
reformism which accommodated its class nature by allowing it to be the principal 
intermediary of incorporation, while they sacrificed, rather too readily, various social 
groups privileged in the traditional order and the overall integrity of this order.”103 That 
the bureaucracy was the main intermediary of this integration is also the position of 
Pamuk:
“The societies in question were often characterized by a struggle 
between the central bureaucracy and those social classes favoring 
more rapid and direct integration into the world economy, namely 
merchants and export oriented landlords. (...) As a result of this 
particular configuration of power, greater integration into the
102 Pamuk, Osmanli-Turkiye iktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914 (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2005), 209.
103 Keyder, State and Class in Turkey (London: Verso, 1987), 28.
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world economy could not proceed through an alliance between 
dominant interests in the center countries and those social classes 
in the periphery whose interests lay in the same direction. Instead 
this process could advance only through an accommodation 
between the former and the central bureaucracy”104
And herein lies an important aspect of the linkage between the international and 
the domestic. The political economy of the era is, as one can see even in this single 
example of the 1838 Treaty, not a separate current flowing parallel to the political 
realm. On the contrary and similarly to the relation that this thesis asserts between the 
international and the domestic, the political economy of the nineteenth century is 
constitutive of the political world into which the Young Turks will come and which 
they will reshape. Moreover, the political economy is also a crucial network of 
relationships that constitutes the very relationship between the international and the 
domestic. It is no coincidence that the long nineteenth century of Ottoman 
transformation is also the long process of Ottoman integration into Western capitalism. 
Political economy gives the international-domestic interaction a substantial content, so 
much so that it is inherent in that interaction, but neither subordinate to it nor 
autonomous from it.
3.2.2 Tanzimat: Reform and War
In exchange for the protection of its privileged position, the ever-growing 
Ottoman bureaucracy actually became the champion of the integration process, though 
not without hesitations and ambivalences. Their reformism came to be known as the 
Tanzimat [Reorganization] reforms [1839-1876]. The intentions of the Tanzimat 
bureaucrats were ambitious in many respects, however the actual implications of their 
proclaimed aims were a completely different matter. It was an extensive programme of 
centralization through tax reform, land reform, trade reform and reform in the
104 Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-191, 6.
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ideological legitimation of the state itself, coupled with modem techniques of statecraft 
such as censuses, property registration, the increasing importance attributed to 
diplomacy and to playing the internal as well as external challengers to the 
bureaucracy’s position against one another in order to consolidate their status within the 
fluent dynamics of the nineteenth century. It is no coincidence that the Rose Chamber 
Edict of 1839 was announced in the middle of the war against Mehmed Ali Pasha and 
that it was preceded by the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention. Although this was part of 
the ongoing transformation process, its timing and direction was calculated according to 
the needs of contemporary international politics.105 As such, and similarly to the Greek 
Revolt, it was to enter the list of Ottoman diplomatic reflexes. A similar timing and 
similar concerns were present in the Imperial Rescript (1856) and in the proclamation of 
the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire (1876). The latter will be part of the critical 
juncture identified for the emergence of the Young Turk opposition; the former will be 
briefly outlined in the following pages.
Designed by the ascending Ottoman bureaucracy, the Rose Chamber Edict was 
different from the earlier reform movements, at least with regard to the change in 
political will. Also, as Ortayli notes, it was a plan for the future rather than an attempt to 
return to the glories of the past. “For the first time in Ottoman history, this edict was 
reflecting the rulers’ vision, which was planning the future; as opposed to the classical 
reformists, it was not envisioning a restoration but a whole new order.”106
105 “To an extent, the edict was directed at European ears. Its architect, Mustafa Re§id Pasha, was well 
known to be the foremost proponent of Ottoman accession to the European Concert. In a sense, the 
document served as an assurance to the Great Powers that demanded domestic reforms in return for future 
recognition of the Ottoman Empire as a member of the Concert of Europe.” Hanioglu, The Late Ottoman 
Empire, 73.
106 Ortayli, imparatorlugun En Uzun Yiizyih, 100.
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At its core, the Edict was changing the relationship between the Sultan and his
subjects, whereby the Sultan was now guaranteeing their security, honour and property.
It also included promises of reform of the tax system and the military system, including
conscription. It embodied the idea of equal rights for all citizens. As such, it would be
the ground upon which modernizing Ottoman politics, with its conservative and more
liberal factions would rise.107 The edict provided the Palace, the bureaucracy, die ulema
and the urban notables with a new paradigm of politics. It brought a new stream of
thought which, when followed, leads to the first constitution of the Empire, another sea-
change which would render the Young Turk opposition possible after 1878. The content
of the Edict and what was actually realized in the decades that followed are of course
not identical. Some provisions could not be realized: there were not yet enough state
cadres to apply and control them. Some others were lost in the internal and external
political struggles. Perhaps one of the most concrete effects of the Edict is the way it
transformed the struggles within the state, with bureaucracy on the winning side.
Zurcher’s notes are illuminating in this respect:
“The call for guarantees for the life, honour and property of 
subjects, apart from echoing classic liberal thought as understood 
by the Ottoman statesmen who had been to Europe and knew 
European languages, also reflected the Ottoman bureaucrats’ 
desire to escape their vulnerable position as slaves of the 
sultan.”108
In this regard, the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838 and the Edict of 1839, 
though at different levels, served a specific purpose, that of strengthening the
107 Anderson underlines the conservative character of the Edict, which does not take away from its novel 
character within Ottoman history, but locates it within European history. Indeed it is a sound intervention: 
“What Re§id Pasha and those like him actually wanted to do was to increase the status and efficiency of 
the Ottoman bureaucracy. Their aim was to create a more talented, more educated and most importantly a 
more independent civil servant class than what had existed in the Ottoman Empire. This was actually a 
very limited and in some aspects a very conservative aim. In this respect, it is very meaningful that 
Mettemich was the first European statesman to congratulate Mustafa Re§id Pasha on the Rose Chamber 
Edict.” Anderson, Dogu Sorunu, 126.
108 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 51.
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bureaucracy’s position. The bureaucracy found itself and located itself in a mediatory 
position within this wide network of reform acts, economic regulations, diplomatic 
moments and wars. The Tanzimat era is an integral and important part of Ottoman 
transformation and a thorough analysis of the era is not the intent of this chapter or 
thesis. What is significant for the narrative leading up to the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908 is the strengthening of the bureaucracy amidst the internal and external turmoil, 
and the intuition here is that it is that turmoil and the specific combination of 
international and domestic elements that created the conditions of this bureaucracy. Two 
aspects follow from this: firstly, it supports the central theme of this thesis, that the 
relation between the international and the domestic is one of constitution, rather than of 
mere restriction, facilitation or detachment. Secondly, and with regard to the case study 
at hand, it bolsters the intuition of the framework used in this thesis, that of a historical 
sociological approach to international relations, and gives us the clue as to where to 
look for the bits and pieces that created the world in which the Young Turk opposition 
and revolution was possible: namely in the specific moments when the international and 
the domestic merged in a certain fashion. These will be outlined in detail in the next 
three chapters. Now we turn to the repercussions of Tanzimat and to another cmcial 
event in European and Ottoman history, the Crimean War.
3.2.2.1 1856: Crimean War, Paris Treaty and Imperial Rescript
The Crimean War of 1854 is considered as a break from the European peace of 
the nineteenth century. Involving the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Great Britain and 
France, it entails several international issues, such as the status of the Holy Places, but 
also the wider balance of power in Europe, and the Eastern Question. Although it is an 
event of great magnitude for European history, our limitations lead us to focus on the 
repercussions of the war on the Ottoman Empire, which included the Paris Treaty
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whereby the Ottoman Empire was accepted into the Concert of Europe and the Imperial 
Rescript of 1856 which is another turn in the Ottoman transformation.
The Crimean War is linked to the 1848 revolutions in Europe. As the rebels in 
Hungary were suppressed by the Tsar, they took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. The 
Danube Principalities also witnessed rebellion and “as the Ottomans were no happier 
about this than was Czar Nicholas, the sultan accepted the latter’s offer to suppress the 
Wallachian revolt, which his troops did as they marched against the Hungarian 
revolutionaries. (...) Hundreds of revolutionaries now fled into Ottoman territory, not 
only from Hungary and Wallachia but also from Poland, leading to a major international 
crisis.”109
Though this crisis did not turn into a major war, it laid the ground for the 
tensions half a decade later. Britain and Russia experienced more open conflict and 
when these factors merged with the dispute over the Holy Places, the result would be 
the Crimean War. Even this crisis over the 1848 revolutions shows how linked the 
Empire was to European affairs, not only overtly diplomatic affairs, but all those with a 
transformative historical character. In fact, from the French Revolution to the 
Revolutions of 1848, the Ottoman Empire was in a genuine interaction with the world 
around it and at several levels, including the military110, the political, the economic and 
the cultural.
109 Shaw and Shaw, 136.
110 Quataert’s following note is enlightening as to the nature of the conflict between the Ottoman Empire 
and Europe: “It certainly was one characterized by war: between c. 1463 and 1918, the Ottomans fought 
at least forty-three wars, and thirty one of them were with the various European states.” Quataert, The 
Ottoman Empire 1700-1922, 85.
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The dispute over the Holy Places had at least a two-decade-long history and is 
considered as the final trigger of the Crimean War. The details of the dispute are 
irrelevant for our purposes, suffice it to note that it was over the protector status of the 
Ottoman Christians of various sects and involved France on the Catholic side and 
Russia on the Orthodox side. Both powers competed for concessions from the Ottoman 
Sultan in order to bolster their religious status over that of the Christian population. In 
between the two powers there was another formidable force, Great Britain. British 
refusal to cooperate with Russia on this matter formed the crucial antagonism of the 
conflict. The status of the Danube Principalities was also part of the negotiations 
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Shaw notes that there was strong anti-Russian 
public opinion in the Empire and this was at least partially backed by Great Britain.111 
The war was declared in the midst of several diplomatic negotiations and was joined by 
France and Great Britain. M. S. Anderson underlines the ‘accidental’ element in the 
start of the war, noting that it was based on misunderstandings and mistakes rather than 
on a clear intent of war on the part of all parties.112 Nonetheless, it is easy to observe 
that the war was rooted in the tensions of the Eastern Question, in the discussion over 
the fate of the Ottoman Empire and in Russia’s differing opinion from the other powers, 
under a Tsar who had coined the term “Sick Man of Europe” for the Ottoman Empire.113
In the battle that lasted for almost two years, Russia lost and had to negotiate 
with the allied powers at the Paris Peace Conference (February 1856). The Conference
111 Shaw and Shaw, 138.
112 “Therefore, the Crimean war was more a result of a series of miscalculations, misunderstanding, 
failures, sillyness, pride and stubbornness than the result of malicious intent. It was more accidental than 
many of the big wars of the modem times.” Anderson, Dogu Sorunu, 149.
113 “In conversation with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, on January 9, 
1853, he famously characterized the empire as the “Sick man of Europe,” and indicated that Russia and 
Great Britain should prepare for its peaceful partition in the near future.” Hanioglu, The Late Ottoman 
Empire, 79.
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is famous for recognizing the Ottoman Empire as a European power and it is in this 
Conference that die Empire became an official member of the Concert of Europe. It fits 
into the longue duree pattern of international conferences over Ottoman military and 
political affairs. The Berlin Conference of 1878 will be identified as the critical moment 
that partially constituted the conditions of the Young Turks’ opposition. The Paris 
Treaty that followed the Conference did not involve a great deal of territory exchange. 
“All sides agreed to evacuate territory taken during the war. The Russians left eastern 
Anatolia and the allies surrendered the Crimea and areas of the Black Sea coast.”114 So, 
it was not the territorial disputes but the political importance of the Conference that was 
to leave its mark on the transformation of the Empire. Two other aspects of this crisis 
are important: firstly, the burden of the war forced the Empire to resort to foreign debt, 
thereby instigating a chain of events that would lead to bankruptcy and to the 
establishment of the Public Debt Administration in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. Secondly, the crisis played a role in the declaration of the Imperial Rescript of 
1856. During the conference “the sultan communicated the text of his Reform Decree, 
and the powers declared their full support, with no provision being made for individual 
or joint intervention to secure Ottoman fulfilment of these promises.”115
This collision of the Paris Treaty and Imperial Rescript of 1856 is not 
unprecedented, as it was seen in the Rose Chamber Edict and the Anglo-Turkish 
Convention and will be seen in the Declaration of the Constitution of 1876 and the 
Istanbul Conference. Even the temporal coincidence of these events is evidence of the 
need to investigate the international-domestic interaction in the Ottoman Empire in an 
in-depth and theoretically informed fashion and to make this an object of research
114 Shaw and Shaw, 140.
115 Ibid., 140.
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within the discipline of International Relations. As was seen in the beginning of 
Tanzimat, here in 1856, it is clear once again that the issue of foreign debt, the issue of 
war, the issue of diplomacy and the complex phenomenon called domestic 
transformation are intrinsically linked. To notice the multi-layered character of this 
linkage is an important prelude to our investigation of the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908, which this thesis will attempt to see in the light of this linkage, between the 
global, the imperial and the local.
The Imperial Rescript of 1856 confirmed the Rose Chamber Edict of 1839, 
introduced the option of conscription or payment in exchange for conscription for the 
non-Muslim population, underlined the equality of all subjects and promised further 
administrative, economic and political reforms. “The process of integration, which 
began originally as a drive towards administrative centralization, was broadened to 
become concerned with the basic question of political loyalty.”116 As the Empire was 
admitted to the Concert of Europe, it was expected to adjust its transformation 
accordingly. The Rescript is presented in the literature as the moment in the Empire’s 
history that is linked to European demands in the most extraordinary fashion. It was 
able, however, to prevent neither the contingent nor the structural tensions with Europe. 
It also failed to halt the disintegration process of the Empire itself. “After 1856, the 
quest for centralization clashed with the reality of progressive dissolution. Several 
regions, provinces, and principalities remained nominally within the Ottoman world, but 
increasingly loosened their ties to the center.”117 It did, on the other hand, further 
accelerate the ascendancy of the Ottoman bureaucracy, as it played the key role in
116 Kemal Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908,” International Journal o f 
Middle East Studies 3, no. 3 (1972): 261.
117 Hanioglu, The Late Ottoman Empire, 85.
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managing this network of interactions, while the non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie 
played the key role in managing foreign trade. Thus began the reign of Ali and Fuad 
Pashas, the two Pashas of the late Tanzimat era, against whose reign the Young 
Ottomans would direct their opposition during 1860s.
3.2.2.2 The Young Ottomans
"Although Abdiilhamid II found little o f use in the Islamic constitutionalism o f the Young 
Ottomans, as will be seen, their ideas dominated Ottoman intellectual life for decades. 
Theirs was an original response to the challenges o f Western modernity that was to inspire 
future Muslim constitutionalist movements, such as that o f Iran. "IIS
The Young Ottoman movement is a novelty in Ottoman politics in many 
respects and their ideas, although an amalgamation of several political trends rather than 
a clear cut programme, inspired several later developments, including, of course, the 
Young Turk movement. The writings of Namik Kemal especially stand out in this 
context. In their opposition to the Tanzimat era, we can observe not only the 
characteristics of this new tradition of political opposition in a novel form, but also the 
characteristics of Tanzimat itself. The seminal work on the Young Ottomans is by §erif 
Mardin: The Genesis o f Young Ottoman Thought}19 Here this work will be used 
extensively, as it is a study both of Young Ottoman thought and of the political world 
that produced it and was shaped by it in the 1870s. The main conflict between the 
Young Ottomans and the Ottoman government was formulated as a regime discussion, 
where the Young Ottomans demanded constitutional rule, which they in part based on 
the Islamic tradition of consultation. The justification for the demand, on the other hand, 
was the accelerated dissolution of the Empire and what they perceived as the inability of 
the Tanzimat regime to reverse that process, a failure solidified in the personalities of
118 Ibid., 104.
119 §erif Mardin, The Genesis o f Young Ottoman Thought: A study in the modernization o f  Turkish 
political ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).
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Ali and Fuad Pashas.120 Their collective political efforts started in 1865, at a picnic in 
Istanbul attended by six young men.
The 1860s were a time when despite the two Rescripts, perhaps even in part
because of them, the Ottoman Empire was facing continuous rebellions in its Western
territories, including the Danube Principalities and later Romania. As summarized by
Mardin, “In general, the early 1860’s were a time when the Ottoman Empire was
beginning to feel the increasing tug of Balkan nationalism and when more and more its
international relations were conducted under the surveillance of the Concert of
Europe.”121 It was also very probable that this surveillance by the Concert of Europe
would be blamed on those who made the Paris Treaty and all the other binding
agreements, namely the men of Tanzimat. Also, internal revolts and the many failures of
centralization resulted in a huge state machine with insufficient resources to allow it to
function. The Young Ottomans emerged at the culmination of the centralization process,
when all its inherent inconsistencies and contingent and structural failures were
revealed. Hanioglu explains the paradox of Tanzimat as follows:
“Paradoxically, the very reforms designed to create a more 
coherent society unified by a common ideology, and a more
centralized polity founded on universal, standardized laws, had the
effect of exposing and deepening the fissures within the Ottoman 
state and society. Local resistance to the center’s determined 
attempts to penetrate the periphery accentuated the fragmentation 
of identity throughout the empire.”122
120 “What united these young conspirators was a common knowledge of European civilization and an 
equal concern at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Responsibility for the accelerated pace of the 
decline of the Sick Man of Europe was now laid by them at the door of a small group of statesmen headed 
by Ali Pa§a and Fuad Pa§a.” Ibid., 11.
121 Ibid., 16.
122 Hanioglu, The Late Ottoman Empire, 107.
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So the emergence of the Young Ottoman movement, similarly to the emergence 
of the Young Turk movement -  though they were never as coherent, as well equipped 
or as successful as the Young Turks -  can be located at the intersection of European and 
Ottoman politics, at the changing logic of international and domestic politics when each 
transformed the other and when the Empire to which they belonged was troubled in a 
visible way. As the quote at the beginning of this section notes, theirs was an original 
response123, one that was not exactly followed but which inspired. Theirs was a 
patriotic, Islamist-minded modernism towards politics that questioned the ‘tyranny’ of 
the leading men in the bureaucracy. Politically they could not achieve much and after a 
certain time in Europe they all turned back to the Empire, especially after the death of 
Ali Pasha, a figure of genuine hatred in their eyes. Despite their personal (the exclusion 
from the bureaucracy with which they had literally been brought them up) and political 
reasons, they did not have what the Young Turks later would have: a revolutionary 
mentality and revolutionary resources and capabilities; with the help of the Hamidian 
educational reforms and an increased degree of European interaction, a much more 
refined analysis of political problems, international and otherwise; a Sultan who 
facilitated their rise with his failures and successes alike, and finally an example of a 
Constitutional Regime that, despite its short life of two years, provided a clear-cut 
objective around which to unite. However, the Young Ottomans had a profound 
influence on Ottoman politics and only through this political knot that they had tied can 
we grasp in part the political world of the Young Turks. Mardin brilliantly explains the 
specifics of this knot:
123 This originality is also reflected in the need for a new political vocabulary to express the new political 
ideas. Zurcher has listed the following, with regards to Namik Kemal, the most influential of the Young 
Ottoman writers: “To expound his ideas to an Ottoman public, Kemal created a new vocabulary giving 
old words new meanings corresponding to the terminology of nineteenth-century liberalism. Vatan, the 
Arabic word for one’s birthplace, became the equivalent of French patrie, hiirriyet (being a free man, not 
a slave) that of liberty, millet (community), that of nation. This new terminology would be the ideological 
instrumentarium for later generations of Muslim liberals and nationalists.” Zurcher, Turkey: A modem 
history, 68.
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“The most important result of their propagandist efforts was not 
so much the proclamation of the Ottoman constitution as the 
establishment of the belief that Sultan Abdiilhamid had perpetrated 
a crime in suspending it. It is this belief, which would not have 
been widely held before the appearance of the Young Ottomans, 
which fed the underground opposition to the sultan between 1878 
and 1908.”1M
The next chapter will attempt to understand both the Hamidian response to the 
international context, the Tanzimat era and the political inputs of the Young Ottomans 
and the Young Turk reaction to the Hamidian regime and to the world around them. 
Meanwhile it will try to reveal the international’s constitutive role in making these 
responses possible in the first place.
3.3. Conclusion
The long nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire in its world-historical 
context is an excellent example of the combination of the ‘international’ and the 
‘domestic’, a combination without which the subsequent transformation could not be 
explained. The mere intuition of this combination was the only aim of this chapter. Any 
discussion of the century beyond this aim is the topic of great works on the Empire and 
more detailed future research. What interests us most in this period, between the reign 
of Selim III and the coming of Abdiilhamid II, is its explanatory power in the narrative 
of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. It was historical-sociological directionality that 
led this narrative to start with these basic observations on the nineteenth century. To 
reiterate, the long-term causes of the 1908 Revolution are to be found in the mode of 
Ottoman integration into the Western political, economic and cultural context; in the 
mode of Western encroachment into the Empire; in the Ottoman responses to the 
international context and what these responses meant for and how they transformed the 
already existing tensions within the Empire; in the ascendancy of new social forces,
124 Mardin, Genesis o f Young Ottoman Thought, 403.
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such as the bureaucracy and the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, and finally in the emergence 
of the nucleus of modem opposition to the Ottoman government. These streams will be 
followed in the coming chapters, which will have their focus not necessarily on any 
single one, but on the intersections and interactions among them. These will be referred 
to as the linkages between the global, the imperial and the local.
This history of the nineteenth century up until the last quarter provides the 
background for many of the reflexes of the Ottoman actors in die latter period, of those 
in power and of those in opposition, and for the past of Ottoman-European interaction, 
which will be of value to both the Ottoman and the European actors. Nevertheless, only 
after a thorough analysis of both periods will we have a genuine opportunity for 
comparison within a single case and a real chance to approach this constitutive relation 
between the international and the domestic. An explanation of the international 
dimensions of the coming of the Young Turk Revolutions will bind this chapter to the 
next three chapters on the period between 1876 and 1908.
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CHAPTER 4 THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE: THE POLITICS OF THE LATE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will try to examine both the actions of the regime and of the Young 
Turks and the interaction between them and the wider world, before concentrating in the 
next chapters on the immediate revolutionary process As such it will be part of this 
thesis’ attempt to do what very few works on the causes of the Young Turk Revolution 
have done, to put the Revolution into its international context with reference to its 
emergence and success.125 Although the rather small bibliography on the causes of the 
Young Turk Revolution presents a detailed picture of the ideational development of the 
Young Turk leaders, their internal struggles and factions, their transformation into a 
more rigid and efficient political organization and their relations with the military, it 
lacks the kind of treatment given by world history to other revolutions, no matter what 
their scale: the investigation into the linkages between the world and the revolutionary 
process.
125 The most important works in this area are: §erif Mardin, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895 -  1908 
(Istanbul: lleti§im Yayinlan, 1983); M. §ukrii Hanioglu, The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995); M. §ukrii Hanioglu, Preparation For a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902 - 
1908 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Aykut Kansu, The Revolution o f 1908 in Turkey 
(Leiden: Brill, 1997). Mardin presents an excellent analysis of the political ideas and sometimes the lack 
of them that drove the Young Turks in the emergence, evolution and transformation of their political 
organization. The works of Hanioglu are larger in scope, based on an extensive use of primary sources, 
and are works of perfection in terms of attention to details and covering the Young Turk activities in the 
periods examined. Kansu’s work is more argumentative in style and investigates not only the revolution 
but also its place, importance and distorted image in official historiography. Also to be mentioned are the 
two articles by Donald Quataert that focus on the economic and social situation in the Empire before the 
Revolution and link these to the coming of the Revolution. “The Young Turk revolution: Old and New 
Approaches” and “The Economic Climate of the ‘Young Turk Revolution’ of 1908” in Workers, Peasants 
and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire 1730 -  1914, ed. Donald Quataert (Istanbul: tsis Press, 
1993). Perhaps a notable exception is Nader Sohrabi’s unpublished PhD thesis, as he investigates the 
Iranian, Russian and Ottoman Constitutional Revolutions in the context of an international 
constitutionalist revolutionary wave: Nader Sohrabi, “Constitutionalism, Revolution and State: The 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 with Comparisons to 
the Russian Revolution of 1905” (PhD diss., the University of Chicago, 1996). Also to be mentioned is 
the work of Mehmet Hacisalihoglu, Jon Turkler ve Makedonya Sorunu (1890 -  1918) (Istanbul: Tarih 
Vakfi Yurt Yayinlan, 2008).
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4.1.1 The Themes
Throughout this chapter, the international elements that influenced the Young 
Turks’ choices and their continuous political, ideological and cultural transformation 
will be highlighted. That should not mean that the emphasis here is on the external 
determinants at the expense of crediting the Young Turks with the appropriate 
characteristics of agency. On the contrary, this chapter will argue that it was the 
international elements which enhanced and enriched their political powers as agents. 
These elements will vary from the escape of a substantial group of Young Turks to 
Europe to the international diplomacy that contributed deeply to the special political 
importance of the Ottoman military, especially the III Army in Macedonia. Yet, even 
before their escape to Europe, and indeed this was the reason for it, these young 
students had already started their political activities and the army’s position in the 
political dynamics of the Empire rested on a long history. As we will see, the 
international setting interacted with the existing, yet constantly evolving, political and 
social cleavages in the Empire. As such, it was a constitutive factor in the emergence of 
a Young Turk agency that was to topple the Hamidian regime and open a new era in the 
Ottoman Empire. Hence the underlying theme of this chapter is the interaction between 
the international and the domestic in the emergence of the Young Turks as the 
predominant group in opposition to Abdiilhamid II and the way in which the Young 
Turks were themselves part of that interaction, especially in later years.
Another theme of this chapter is that to view ‘external determinants’ as a 
constraint on ‘internal agency’ -  whether one holds one or the other as stronger -  is 
misleading and creates an illusionary dilemma. The agency that surely arose both in 
Ottoman central rule - in the actions of Abdiilhamid II and the bureaucrats who 
conducted his policies - and in the Young Turk opposition to his regime was the product
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of the world-historical moment in the late 19th century126. That these historical agents 
have made choices in a rather tight realm of manoeuvring constitutes a challenge but not 
a problem for analysis. In his excellent study of education in the Hamidian era, 
Benjamin Fortna argues the following: “Restoring the notion of agency is vital to the 
overcoming the misperception that outside influences determined the ‘fate’ of the late 
Ottoman Empire.”127 This is a much needed warning to Ottoman historiography in 
particular and to all political analysis of non-European peoples and states in general. 
Nonetheless, juxtaposing ‘outside influences’ to ‘domestic agency’ from the start of the 
analysis is not the intent of this thesis. Indeed, this chapter will try to highlight the fact 
that it was a specific combination of outside-inside interaction that constituted the 
construction of late Ottoman agency.
4.1.2 A brief account of the events
The overview of the 19th century provided in the previous chapter revealed 
many of the crucial elements of the causal relationship between the international setting 
and the developments in the Ottoman Empire that led to the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908. However, the Revolution cannot be grasped without first laying out the world in 
which the revolutionaries, military and civilian alike, were brought up and politicized. 
Secondly, the task in this chapter is to find the more immediate international causes of 
the Revolution of 1908. This task should be conducted both by looking at the most 
crucial international interventions and other sorts of linkages to the Ottoman Empire
126 Indeed, with regard to the category of Ottoman agency, one should not neglect to add all the Ottoman 
subjects who demonstrated their political choices, including the Muslim and non-Muslim minorities such 
as the Albanians, Arabs and Armenians and also the remnants of those peoples who had gained their 
independence, such as the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks, whose activities will be especially important in 
the Macedonia issue. Although the main focus of the case study is the opposition of the Young Turks (a 
group which included many non-Turks and non-Muslims) Ottoman agency should be enhanced to include 
all the actors, not necessarily only those that became part of the post-empire Turkish Republic, such as the 
Muslim Turks.
127 Benjamin Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the state, and education in the Late Ottoman Empire 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3.
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and by investigating the reactions and choices of the Ottoman state and the Ottoman 
opposition in this context. The impact of Western capitalism and the way in which the 
Empire was integrated into a still emerging and evolving European state system were in 
a sense ‘out there’. So are the repercussions of the dissemination of new political ideas, 
such as nationalism, constitutionalism and liberalism -  mostly as a result of the French 
Revolution and of the modernization in the imperial education system.128 However, for 
the purpose of this chapter -  and indeed one of the purposes of the thesis -  the argument 
should go beyond the obvious and establish a causal relation based on the political 
history of the late 19th century. Concurrent with the years of the revolutionaries’ 
upbringing and also the years of their main politicization is the Hamidian era (1876 -  
1909). The first part of the Hamidian era will be the limits of the time period of this 
chapter, since it seeks the causes of the 1908 revolution as it intersects with the wider 
world. However, it will stop before the end of the Hamidian era, so that a special focus 
on the revolutionary years can be provided in the next chapter.
This time period is one of the turning points in the political history of the 
Ottoman Empire: its exclusiveness can be seen in its label, no other period in Ottoman 
history is named after the sovereign sultan. Abdiilhamid II is still a topic of debate not 
only among historians, but also in contemporary political circles in Republican Turkey. 
Comments vary from the ‘red sultan’ to benevolent modernizer, though the last three 
decades of Ottoman historiography produced more objective work on his reign.129 It is 
also a time of change in Europe and in intra-European relations. The period witnessed a 
unified Germany under Bismarck joining the world scene after the Franco-Prussian war
128 For an outstanding study of the modernization of the education system under Abdiilhamid II. see 
Fortna, Imperial Classroom.
129 Franfois Georgeon, Sultan Abdiilhamid (Istanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2006); Selim Deringil, iktidarin 
Sembolleri ve ideoloji (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlan, 2002); Nadir Ozbek, Osmanli Imparatorlugu’nda 
Sosyal Devlet, Siyaset, iktidar ve Me§ruiyet, 1876-1914 (istanbul: ileti§im Yayinlan, 2004).
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of 1870. Ottomans experienced European diplomacy under the influence of Bismarck at 
first hand. After the devastation of the 1877- 1878 war against Russia came the Berlin 
Congress of 1878. Indeed, the Hamidian period is shaped in a post-Berlin-Congress 
world and it is these rapidly changing European political, military and diplomatic 
alliances that Abdulhamid reacted to and that the Young Turks came into.
The politicization of the Young Turks continued in an environment heavily 
charged with European and Ottoman diplomacy over crucial issues such as the 
diplomatic crisis of the Armenian revolts and the Ottoman suppression of these 
upheavals, the emerging issue of European public opinion -  mostly finding the Empire 
uncivilized and barbaric, the issue around Crete and the Greco-Ottoman war and, last 
but not least, the Macedonian issue. The Young Turks were not simply observers of 
these international moments but engaged, if not major, actors in these processes, 
actively involved in the growing network of European politics (media, secret and overt 
organizations, ministries of foreign affairs, etc.), as well as still in communication with 
Ottoman statesmen and sometimes even with the Sultan. They were also part of the 
wider world of the Ottoman Empire, with branches in the Balkans, Cairo, Syria, Beirut, 
and part of a more extended political map, with their appeals to the Anglophone, 
Francophone and Arabophone press. Nonetheless, they were not transnational actors. 
They were symbiotically tied to Ottoman politics and to an Ottoman agenda and were 
players in a game that was mostly laid out by the policies of the Great Powers and of 
Abdulhamid II.
This chapter will try to concentrate on the politics of the late nineteenth century 
as it affected both the Ottoman state and the Ottoman opposition. It will not delve into 
the details of all the international incidents of the period. It will capitalize on the peaks
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of the international crises that have conditioned the conduct of the Hamidian regime and 
the emergence and transformation of the Young Turks as political actors. The 
Constitution of 1876 and its suspension by Abdulhamid II set the stage for all the 
factions of the Ottoman opposition, while the Russo-Ottoman war and the Berlin 
Congress that followed set the stage for the main themes of international politics of the 
Eastern Question in the last quarter of the 19th century. These two events were 
devastating to the Empire and to the new Sultan’s authority and prestige.
Following the Congress and the perceived humiliation of the Empire in the eyes 
of its young professionals, an opposition was sparked in the Royal Medical Academy 
and, while exploiting the crises around the Armenian issue and the Greco-Ottoman war, 
it recruited members from varying backgrounds in the Empire. As the Sultan managed 
to prevent another wholesale European intervention in the Empire’s politics, mostly due 
to his success in the Greco-Ottoman war, he found the perfect timing for a wholesale 
attack on the opposition. The 1897 arrests forced a further wave of opposition members 
to flee abroad, mostly to Europe. Aided now by the Sultan’s brother-in-law, Damad 
Mahmud Pasha,130 and by two Princes (Sabahaddin and Lutfullah), the years until 1902 
were years of conspiracy, plotting and negotiations with the Sultan, all of which were 
conducted in a European diplomatic setting and in interaction with a range of European 
political activists, from Italian anarchists to Armenian revolutionaries. Although these 
were years of disarray for the organization in Europe, the conditions for its future 
success were seeded within the Empire, most notably through the Westernization and 
modernization of the Sultan -  who preferred to view himself as an ‘enlightened despot’.
130 Damad Mahmud Pasha (1853-1903): The brother in law of Abdulhamid II. He was a very critical 
statesman and escaped to Europe in 1889 with his two sons (Sabahaddin -  later known as Prince 
Sabahaddin -  and Lutfullah). He and his sons were involved in the Ottoman opposition movement 
abroad. He did not return to Istanbul and died in 1903 in Brussels. Ya§amlari ve Yapitlariyla Osmanlilar 
Ansiklopedisi, Vol. H, s.v. “Damad Mahmud Pasha.”
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So, while the opposition in exile was debating the issues of foreign intervention, 
decentralization and the issue of minorities and international politics in general, the 
congress of Ottoman Opposition in 1902 crystallized these different factions and 
resulted in a split in the organization. The split occurred between the majority group 
under the leadership of Prince Sabahaddin131 who had advocated a pro-interventionist, 
pro-decentralization stance with attempts to collaborate with the minorities, most 
notably the Armenians, and the minority group under the leadership of Ahmed Riza,132 
who had anti-imperialist tendencies with a strong positivist outlook. It was the latter that 
would actually hold the monopoly of the opposition and merge with the revolutionaries 
within the military in later years. This chapter will try to follow the story of the 
emergence of this opposition and the involvement of the international setting in this 
emergence.
131 Prince Sabahaddin (1878-1948): the Grandson of Sultan Abdtilmecid and the son of Damad Mahmud 
Pasha. He received an education in French, Arabic and Persian in Istanbul and was brought up in an 
intellectual environment. He was in voluntary exile in Europe from 1889 until 1908. He joined the 
Ottoman opposition abroad and helped to convene the 1902 and 1907 Young Turk Congresses. He 
founded the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization. As he did not achieve the success that he 
expected from politics, or that would have been commensurate with his abilities, Prince Sabahaddin 
increased his social scientific activities. After the revolution, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) 
was rather annoyed by his presence and he found himself in forced exile between 1913 and 1920. During 
the Independence War (1919 -  1923) and the establishment of the Republic, he was residing in Istanbul 
and was one “of the chief members of the royal family who had given an overt support to the National 
Struggle.” Mehmet O. Alkan, preface to Prens Sabahaddin (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlan, 2007), 11. 
However, this did not save him from being forcibly exiled again, as all the members of the royal family 
were now banned from the Republic. He spent the rest of his life in Europe in economic and intellectual 
hardship. Osmanhlar Ansiklopedisi, s.v. “Sabahaddin (Prens).”
132 Ahmed Riza (1858-1930): his father, nicknamed ‘English’, was a member of the Provincial Council 
and his mother was an Austrian who had converted to Islam. He was educated in Galatasaray ( Lycee de 
Galatasaray), a Francophone school that was educating pupils for service in the Palace. He then studied 
agriculture in France and upon his return to the Empire he took a post in the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Disappointed in the Ministry and convinced that progress could only be achieved through education, he 
became an educator in Bursa province. However, his expectations were not fulfilled there either and he 
went to Paris in 1889 and decided not to return. (This is also the year when the nucleus of the CUP was 
formed in the Royal Medical Academy in Istanbul, which was to establish contact with Ahmed Riza 
later). After writing several letters with reform proposals to Abdulhamid II, he started to publish the 
journal Me§veret and its French supplement (Mechveret) in 1895. The details of his life thereafter will be 
analyzed in this and the following chapters. Mardin, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 129-162; Osmanlilar 
Ansiklopedisi, s.v. “Ahmed Riza.”
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4.2 1876 -1897: The world in which the Young Turks were politicized
“The relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers was 
dialectical in nature. On the one hand, this relationship was destructive and corrosive 
in its impact on traditional Ottoman society; on the other hand, it provided the very 
basis for its renewal so as to enable it to cope with a world in rapid change. ”133
4.2.1 A new era
The 1870s were a decade of fundamental change both in Europe and in the 
Ottoman Empire and also in their relations among themselves. Starting with the 
Franco-Prussian war and the unification of Germany, European politics had entered a 
new era with the entrance of a new Great Power under the guidance of Bismarck, 
who was to influence international diplomacy heavily until the year of his resignation 
(1890). With the rise of a unified Germany, the interval to the long peace of the 
nineteenth century had ended and the years between 1871 and 1914 were to be 
described as the second period of peace in Europe134. The interval consisted of the 
Crimean War and the wars that paved the way for the unification of Germany as well 
as Italy. The ‘peace’ on the other hand signifies the lack of large-scale military 
conflict among the Great Powers, mainly England, France, Germany, Austria- 
Hungary and finally Russia. The ‘peace’ also denotes the continuation of the 
‘Concert of Europe’ that came into being after 1815 with the Congress of Vienna. 
However, ‘peace’ does not necessarily translate into an absence of conflict 
worldwide. Well summarised by a distinguished international historian, the ‘peace’ 
referred to a specific European arrangement: “The nineteenth century international
133 Feroz Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire,” in The Great Powers and the End o f the Ottoman 
Empire, ed. Marian Kent (New York: Frank Cass, 1996), 26.
134 Antony Best et al., 5.
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system, it is true, did not stop European powers from expanding at the expense of the 
non-European world; it did stop them from fighting one another in the process, and 
this involved real restraints.”135
The military, as well as diplomatic, conflicts that were spreading out to other 
parts of the world, gained a new layer of importance with the rise of ‘new 
imperialism’ . The Far East, Africa and the Americas were the new regions over 
which the Great Powers quarrelled and these quarrels had consequences for the 
periphery of Europe, such as the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Indeed, acquiring 
any legal or commercial rights to any piece of soil anywhere in the globe had become 
a matter of prestige, a sine qua non for the definition of ‘Great Power’.137 This was to 
be of great importance in the post-Bismarck period of German politics, where the 
statesmen under William II would map out a Weltpolitik for the German state 
coupled with the later Drag Nach Osten policy. This ‘new imperialism’ is also 
significant in representing the political spirit of the age. “Every great European 
people was now thinking, more naturally and consistently than ever before, in terms 
of a world political and economic balance, in those of world strategy and worldwide 
interests.”138 So, the ‘peace’ of Europe was impregnated with diplomatic and military
135 Paul W. Schroeder, “How Russia was Restrained,” in Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on 
the International History o f Modem Europe, ed. David Wetzel, Robert Jervis, and Jack S. Levy (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 123.
136 Although colonialism was an old phenomenon and so was the Great Power rivalry that surrounded 
it, the imperialism of the late nineteenth century had unprecedented connotations to it. Chief among 
them was the link between imperialism and the economy. “The word (...) first entered politics in 
Britain in the 1870s, and was still regarded as a neologism at the end of that decade. It exploded into 
general use in the 1890s. (...) It was at any rate, felt to be new and was discussed as a novelty.” Eric 
Hobsbawm, The Age o f Empire: 1875-1914  (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 60.
137 Ibid., 67
138 Anderson, The Ascendancy o f Europe, 39.
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conflicts over political and economic issues in the non-European world. It was also a 
period of armament. The armed forces of the Great Powers were doubling and 
trebling, paralleling the development and enhancement of war technologies.139 
‘Public opinion’ had entered into all political calculations and the ‘public image’ of 
governments and dynasties was a concern shared by many Empires, including the 
Ottoman Empire.140 The ‘press’ became a political tool, open to manipulation by 
rival governments and agendas and effective on ‘public opinion’ worldwide.141 The 
modernization of education made it accessible to the masses at a level unknown 
before. This had both desired and adverse consequences for the regimes which had 
facilitated it. Although it was certainly constructive in terms of disseminating the 
official outlook and in terms of the centralization efforts, especially in the latecomers 
to ‘modernization’, it also created the conditions for an educated opposition outside 
the ranks of the official, traditional elite. In terms of public opinion and in terms of 
outright opposition to government, domestic politics and international politics were 
now intertwined at unprecedented levels. “To an increasing extent international 
affairs became the concern of ordinary people.”142
139 C. J. Bartlett, The Global Conflict: The International Rivalry o f  the Great Powers, 1880 — 1990 
(London: Longman, 1994), 7.
140Selim Deringil points to an ‘international competition’ among the dynasties in terms of their public 
image. “The ceremonies started to get standardized as part of the process of increasing international 
competition. They began to resemble ‘long live the Queen!’ in Great Britain or Tenno heika bonzai! in 
Japan.” Deringil, 39.
“The Ottoman Emperor, the Meiji Emperor, the Russian Tsar and the Habsburg Emperor all entered 
the 20th century at a different pace but generally through the same paths. All tried to create a state 
mythology that was equipped with new predicaments. (...) All were observing each other to see how 
their counterparts were playing out the role of civilized monarch.” Ibid., 216.
141 “Not only Ottoman society, but also all the smaller states were manipulated by the press of the 
Great Powers which was now the biggest tool of international diplomacy.” Orhan Kologlu, 
Avrupa’nm KiskacindaAbdiilhamit (Istanbul: Ileti§im, 2005), 9.
142 James Joll, Europe Since 1870 (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 25.
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Parallel to these developments, the republican and constitutionalist spirit was 
also on the rise. This can be observed in the constitutional monarchies that were 
established in the newly independent states of the Balkans and in the First 
Constitutional Era in the Ottoman Empire. Although it did not last long (two years), 
the Sultan never really officially annulled the constitution. Not only had the spirit of 
the constitution, but also its enactment had international dimensions. So intertwined 
was the constitutionalist wave with international politics that “while the 
unprecedented institution of constitutional rule stemmed from changing internal 
dynamics of the Ottoman Empire, its announcement was timed with international 
objections in mind.”143
In the section below, the connections between a new era in Ottoman politics 
and a new era in world politics will be investigated. Broadly, this period starts with a 
Balkan crisis that had an indirect impact on the Young Ottomans, a group of 
bureaucrats and intellectuals who were advocating a constitutionalist monarchy for 
the Ottoman Empire. The specific combination of an international crisis and the 
Sultan’s and the Young Ottomans’ actions at the time allowed for the dethronement 
of Sultan Abdiilaziz (1861-1876) - the Sultan of the late Tanzimat era who in his 
later years had sought to regain the supremacy of the Porte over the bureaucracy. 
While Sultan Murad (May -  August 1876) was brought to power mainly for his 
known liberal tendencies, he was unable to remain in power long. An unlikely 
candidate, Abdulhamid, was enthroned by the senior reformist bureaucrats with the 
condition of his agreement to the constitution. This all coincided with the efforts of
143 Benjamin Fortna, “The Reign of Abdulhamid II,” in Cambridge History o f Turkey: Turkey in the 
Modem World, ed. Resat Kasaba (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 45.
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the Great Powers to find a solution to the upheavals in the Balkans, mainly in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and in Bulgaria. The timing of the declaration of the constitution 
was deliberately arranged so that it was announced during the Istanbul Conference, 
where the representatives of the Great Powers were present. It was hoped that this 
overlap would result in the prevention of further foreign intervention in what was 
conceived to be an Ottoman affair. However, the following Russo-Ottoman war and 
the consequent St. Stefano and Berlin treaties would prove that the politics of the 
Ottoman Empire was a European affair, as the Ottoman opposition would be in the 
years to come. The details and specific impacts of these events will be explained 
below. It should suffice for now to state that, although the Berlin Congress had 
frozen the Eastern Question to a certain extent, no peace had arrived in the Balkans 
or in the Ottoman Empire as a whole.
The activities of the Ottoman opposition in general would also increase 
concurrently with these events and indeed would be embedded in these international 
affairs to a certain point. In 1889, the nucleus of the later Committee of Union and 
Progress would be established by four students at the Royal Medical Academy and 
they did succeed in recruiting various members of the Ottoman elite, until the all-out 
attack of Abdulhamid on Committee members in 1897 and their exile to Tripoli 
(Libya). Overall, this section will try to explore the interactions between international 
diplomacy and politics, the establishment of the Hamidian regime and the opposition 
to it.
The period from the 1870s to the 1890s was a new era for the Ottoman Empire and 
the wider world. It is in these new beginnings that the Ottoman opposition began to
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take a particular shape which in the following decade culminated in the 1908 
Revolution.
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4.2.2 The Constitution and the Istanbul (Tersane) Conference (1876)
"International politics provided the milieu within which empires were threatened. ”144
As was the case with many international crises in late Ottoman history, the 
events that caused the chain reaction leading to the Berlin Congress were triggered 
by the upheavals in the Balkans. The Balkans constituted a special province of the 
Ottoman Empire in many respects. Their heavily Christian population; their 
complicated agricultural system which had differed from those of other core Ottoman 
areas for many decades now; their dense political, economic and cultural interaction 
with Central Europe; their Slavic characteristics that rendered them open to 
influences from Russia as the ‘Elder Brother’ with the rise of pan-Slavism, but 
perhaps most importantly their diversity in terms of ethnicities, sects and languages, 
turned the region into a battleground for the political, commercial, religious and 
national interests of the Great Powers as well as those of the smaller governments of 
the Balkans themselves.145 Its geopolitical position also meant that this was a vital 
area, not to be left to the total control of one’s rivals.
144 Karen Barkey “Changing Modalities of Empire: A Comparative Study of the Ottoman and 
Habsburg Decline,” in Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making o f the Modem World, 
ed. Joseph W. Esherick and Hasan Kayali (London: Rowan and Littlefield, 2006), 193.
145 “Before the reforms of the nineteenth century could take root, however, capitalist accumulation had 
already created its own autonomous space in most of the Balkans, thanks to the inability of the centre 
to improve its precapitalist logic. (...) That most of these newly enriched groups in the Balkans were 
non-Muslim was a significant factor in attracting the protection, encouragement and support of 
various European powers, who both helped to prepare the political and intellectual case for 
nationalism, and provided crucial diplomatic and military assistance. This is the story of Greek, 
Serbian and Bulgarian nationalisms.” £aglar Keyder, “The Ottoman Empire,” in After Empire: 
Multiethnic Societies and Nation-building: the Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg 
Empires, ed. Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 33. This rather 
lengthy quote from Keyder not only supports the importance of the Balkans for European and 
Ottoman politics, it also hints at the reason why for most of the period under examination the Balkans 
(with the notable exception of the Armenian issue) were the main intersection point of European- 
Ottoman interaction at many levels. Perhaps its close rival in terms of their respective weight in 
international affairs is the Straits question, though the latter remained dormant for most of this time. 
Of course, again as hinted at in the quote from Keyder, the reasons for this importance cannot be
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The possible collapse of the Ottoman Empire that arose in diplomatic 
discussions among the Great Powers in these decades always included a possible 
partition plan for the Balkans, in which all the Powers took special care that no large 
Balkan state would come to dominate the others. So the general tendency, especially 
after the Berlin Congress, was to uphold the status quo in the Balkans. Since Balkan 
politics, especially and most importantly Macedonia’s, would be an immense factor 
in the politicization, political planning and methodology of the Young Turks, and 
would be the recruiting ground for the Young Turks among the Ottoman army 
officials in Macedonia, and since it would be where the revolution started and was 
declared, it is essential for the purposes of this chapter to achieve a clear grasp of the 
political and military process that led to and followed the Berlin Congress.
As important and shaky as the Balkan territories were, the Ottoman Empire 
actually put very little effort into integrating the conquered peoples and territories. 
However, the second half of the nineteenth century, as exemplified in the Austrian 
case, was hardly the time to leave the imperial elements in peace. Multi-ethnic 
empires like Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, and also Russia to a certain 
extent, were dealing with pressures from both their centres and their peripheries and 
one of the fundamental debates was that of centralization and reform. This had 
economic, political and ideological repercussions. In the words of Barkey: “Empires 
are dominant so long as they can maintain the combination of an ideological/cultural 
form of legitimation, with appropriate mechanisms of rule over cultural diversity and
reduced to diplomatic or even economic affairs. They should be extended to the struggles of the 
various Balkan peoples, some examples of which will be provided below.
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modes of appropriation of political and economic resources.”146 As the Ottoman 
Empire was losing its dominance in all the aspects of Barkey’s description, the 
Balkan upheavals became an international affair. The 1875 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
upheavals and the 1876 Bulgarian upheavals were cases in point.
Contrary to upheavals in the previous centuries, the rebellions in the Balkans 
now started to produce an almost automatic response from the Great Powers, which 
demanded more radical reform from the Ottoman state. Hence, upheavals usually led 
to suppression by the Ottoman Empire and various kinds of international gatherings 
to discuss what was to be done and to a note or a memorandum to be imposed on to 
the Empire. The mid 1870s experienced exactly this kind of an event sequence. 
Moreover, this sequence had far-reaching implications both for European diplomacy 
and for the course of Ottoman politics thereafter. As the demands of the Balkan 
peoples for the Great Powers to be forced to intervene in the political crises 
increased, they found themselves heard, though not always in ways to their liking. 
They succeeded in having the Great Powers involved and they learned from each 
other in terms of how to achieve this involvement. The result was, in the words of 
James Joll, that: “It was their aspirations which caused many of the international 
crises of the period between the Franco-Prussian and the First World Wars.”147
When the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina were followed by the rebellion 
in Bulgaria, the Ottoman state acted harshly and in April 1876 used coercion not only 
on the rebels but also in a large part of the country area. “Approximately 60 villages
146 Barkey, 175.
147 Joll, 22.
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had been destroyed and 12-15.000 people had been massacred.”148 One of the 
consequences of this harsh act was the change in public opinion in Great Britain, one 
of the traditional allies of the Ottoman Empire and a protector of Ottoman territorial 
integrity. The opposition within Great Britain acted quickly and Gladstone published 
in September 1876 his pamphlet, entitled “The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question 
of the East”, which sold over 200,000 copies.149 When Austria-Hungary and Russia 
decided to force the Ottoman Empire into general reform in the Balkans and when 
they came up with a formula under the name of The Andrassy Note150, this created 
frustration both on the side of the rebels and on the side of the reformist bureaucracy. 
The reformist wing of the bureaucracy was struggling with Sultan Abdulaziz, who 
was trying to regain the powers of the Sultanate from the bureaucratic establishment 
of Tanzimat. So great was the frustration that the Young Ottomans had sent a public 
statement to European diplomats and statesmen urging general reforms that would 
encompass all ‘citizens’ of the Empire and not only the non-Christian population in 
the European territories.151
In May 1876, the Austrian and Russian diplomats (most famously Andrassy 
and Gorchakov) had come together and issued the Berlin memorandum. Two weeks 
after this gathering, Midhad Pasha and Huseyin Avni Pasha succeeded in their
148 Anderson, Dogu Sorunu, 200.
149 Ibid., 200. The Prime Minister at the time was Disraeli, a conservative and much more sympathetic 
to the traditional strategy of preserving Ottoman territorial integrity than Gladstone, who had served 
and would serve again as the Liberal Prime Minister and was not particularly fond of the Ottoman 
Empire.
150 The Note was suggesting a reform that would include: “complete religious freedoms, the abolition 
of iltizam, and improvements in agriculture (...) yet were rejected by the rebels as they did not 
envisage autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Fikret Adanir, Makedonya Sorunu (Istanbul: Tarih 
Vakfi Yurt Yayinlan, 1996), 83.
151 Ibid., 84. “The demand for general reforms, had remained as a distinctive characteristics of the 
Muslim bourgeoisie that was on the rise up until the 1908 Revolution.” Ibid., 84.
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conspiracy to dethrone Sultan Abdiilaziz. They also succeeded in enthroning their 
favourite candidate, the liberal-minded Sultan Murad, who had Masonic tendencies. 
This incident, and the declaration of the constitution which was enabled by this 
dethronement, form one of the cornerstones of the critical juncture that occurred in 
the late 1870s in the Ottoman Empire. This juncture would reach its full presence 
with the replacement of Murad by Sultan Abdulhamid II. Since these incidents were 
symbiotically tied to the situation in the Balkans, as well as to the state of European 
diplomacy and politics, they are important clues to the empirical as well as the 
theoretical analysis of this thesis. The elements of this critical juncture that led to the 
emergence and success of the Ottoman opposition came into sight in the years 
between 1875 -  1878: The constitutional regime, although suspended shortly 
afterwards in 1878; the new Sultan who found himself enthroned -  perhaps even to 
his surprise; the alliance o f bureaucracy and intellectuals, which tasted victory and 
then faced resentment and which thought and acted always in a dialectical 
relationship with Europe; the peoples and their political organizations in various 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire who were both affected by and pushed European 
and Ottoman public opinion, as well as the respective governments, to acknowledge 
and solve their problems; and last but not least the international political scene, 
which carried within itself a new impetus for imperialist rivalry that was to endure 
until the First World War.
This ‘critical juncture’ and its repercussions will be revisited throughout this 
chapter. When we return to 1876, two major events can be detected. One is the 
Istanbul Conference -  also known as the Tersane conference -  convened by the 
representatives of the Great Powers with Ottoman participation in Istanbul to discuss
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and solve the Balkan issue. The second is the declaration of the First Ottoman 
Constitution (Kanun-i Esasi), which coincided with this meeting. The Sultan who 
signed the constitution was Abdulhamid II, who owed his throne to his agreement 
with the reformist bureaucracy that had dethroned his uncle, Sultan Abdiilaziz, just 
months previously. After promising to rule the Empire as a constitutionalist 
monarchy and to commit himself to the necessary reforms, he was brought to power 
by Midhad Pasha when the constitutionalists concluded that his brother Murad was 
unable to rule due to diminished mental capacity.152
The entirety of 1876 was a testament to the importance of one of the sub­
themes of this thesis: the need to include the international realm, not merely as a 
restraining, but rather as an inherent, element in considering the rise and 
conditioning of domestic agency. The Young Ottomans and their political campaign 
had been operative for at least two decades in the Empire; however, it was the 
international crisis in the Balkans that merged with the internal power struggle 
between the Palace and the bureaucracy and thus facilitated the dethronement and 
enthronement of Sultans. Abdulhamid’s approval of the declaration of the 
constitution had much to do with the fact that this came as a condition of his 
enthronement, but the urgency and the timing that lay behind the declaration were 
shaped by the Balkan crisis and the Istanbul conference convened in December 1876
152 Abdulhamid II is known for the general fear of his life, his power, and it is usually claimed that all 
this had reached the level of paranoia. In the recent literature it is acknowledged that he had some 
justified reasons for all that fear, most notably regarding the circumstances of his enthronement. He 
himself lists those reasons in his memoirs, published by Ali Vehbi Bey: “They are accusing me of 
cowardice as I am not enthusiastically participating in the national reform movements. They must be 
forgetting the catastrophes that I had to endure! Firstly, the dethronement of my uncle Abdiilaziz, then 
the way he committed suicide in a rather strange way; and later the insanity and imprisonment of my 
brother Murat.” Sultan Abdulhamit, Siyasi Hatiratim (Istanbul: Dergah Yayinlan, 1999), 49. Also, on 
his ‘shy’ and ‘secretive’ personality, he commented that “When I came to power after my brother, I 
was surrounded by people who wanted to hold me hostage in a net of conspiracies. (...) If, as alleged, 
I am running away from people, it is a natural consequence of my life experiences.” Ibid., 155.
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in Istanbul. The reformists, and probably the Sultan as well, approached the issue of 
the constitution not only in terms of internal affairs but also in terms of the 
international political milieu. The Great Powers were pressing for reforms and it was 
obvious that the rebels in the Balkans were asking for even more than that. Also the 
constitutionalist movements in the recently formed Balkan states, including 
Romania, Serbia and Greece, were of interest and inspiration to the Ottoman 
reformists.153 There is a nuance between the earlier reforms and the constitution, 
observed by Biilent Tanor, which is supportive of the conclusion here. “The external 
element here, unlike the 1856 Imperial Script, does not appear in the form of an overt 
‘coercion’ or ‘imposition’. Hence phrases such as ‘to inspire confidence’ or 
‘appeasement’ of foreign powers are more appropriate, given the conditions of the 
situation.”154 In conclusion, the constitution was tied from its inception to provincial, 
imperial and international affairs. This in no way takes away from the fact it was a 
genuine action on the part of the Ottoman agents. It is in the context of this ‘critical 
juncture’, composed of a new Sultan, a new wave of reformism, a new wave of 
rebellions and a new composition of international affairs, that we can begin to 
understand Ottoman agency in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
As to the underlying theme of this thesis, namely the constitutive character of 
the international in domestic changes, such as a revolution, and the importance of the 
interplay between the two, this critical juncture is again relevant. In 1876 the nucleus 
of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was seeded. The Sultan in the context of
153 Biilent Tanor, Osmanli-Tiirk Anayasal Geli§meleri (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlan, 2008), 128. 
Also Mount Lebanon had formed an assembly in 1864 and Tunis already had its constitution in 1861. 
Hanioglu, The Late Ottoman Empire, 113.
154 Ibid., 128-129.
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whose policies they would emerge as political actors and whose policies and 
personal power they would fiercely oppose, Abdulhamid II, came to power. It was 
his policies of modernization combined with ideological suppression that created the 
particular brand of student in the Royal Schools who would form the in 1889 
Committee that would later come to be known as the Committee o f Union and 
Progress. The dynamics around which international relations would evolve were set 
in motion after 1870, along with the specific repercussions for the Ottoman Empire, 
which were already to be observed but would become clearer with the Berlin 
Congress of 1878. The structural conditions of the Ottoman Empire’s diminishing 
financial, but also political, capacities were also ‘there’, especially in the declaration 
of bankruptcy in 1875 and later in the establishment of the Public Debt 
Administration. And the continuous but growing separatism and internal strife in 
the Balkans, together with political developments throughout the Empire, were 
threatening the Empire more than ever. The juxtaposition o f these elements was to 
make the Young Turk movement possible in the first place.
4.2.3 The Russo-Ottoman war (1877-1878) and the Berlin Congress (1878)
"It would be during this long final half century, from the 1856 promulgation o f the 
Tanzimat to the demise o f the Sultanate in the wake o f the First World War, a phase 
replete with contradictions between progress and violence, national and imperial, that 
‘Europe ’ would take shape in contrast to the ‘Balkans ’ and the ‘Middle East. ’ ”155
While Russia was preparing its war against the Ottoman Empire at the 
beginning of 1877, neither the Istanbul Conference nor Midhat Pasha’s attempt to 
outfox the Great Powers by the declaration of the constitution produced any 
conclusive results for the situation in the Balkans. It was hoped that, with the
155 Christine Philliou, “The Paradox of Perceptions: Interpreting the Ottoman Past through the 
National Present,” Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 5 (2008): 669.
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constitution, there was nothing to discuss in the context of the reform in the Balkans, 
as reform was coming from within the Empire. However, the foreign representatives 
were not impressed. They were also far from being unified. The British had their 
own internal quarrels regarding the future of the Ottoman Empire. The Conservative 
government of Disraeli wanted to soften the pressure on the Ottoman government for 
reform, whereas the Liberal opposition led by Gladstone was campaigning for the 
rights of Christians in the Balkans.156 The parties to the Dreikaiserbund agreement 
were in an even more difficult position, as one of the parties to this was the 
aggressive party. Germany under the leadership of Bismarck, with its concerns to 
prevent a European war, endeavoured to contain Russia’s aggression, not by stopping 
it but by limiting it. “Bismarck was probably seeing war as inevitable, and was 
hoping to minimize its scale and consequences. As for Germany and a near Eastern 
war -  this would not be worth ‘the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian 
musketeer.”157
As the new Ottoman government, under the new Sultan Abdulhamid II, 
rejected the reform plans, Russia waged its war on the Ottoman Empire that was to 
last almost a year and result in the camping of the Russians just a few kilometres 
away from the Old City of Istanbul, in Ye§ilkoy. The Ottoman army, especially the 
navy, put up a significant defence, but was defeated nonetheless. The war started in 
April 1877 and the Treaty of St. Stefano (Ayastefanos) was signed in March 1878. 
This devastating defeat was to have international and domestic consequences. One of 
its early results was the way in which Abdulhamid II used this defeat in February
156 Joll, 16.
157 C. J. Bartlett, Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814-1914 (London: MacMillan, 1996), 104.
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1878 as a pretext for suspending the Parliament that was formed after the declaration 
of the constitution. The Parliament would only reassemble after the 1908 revolution, 
although it was never officially abolished as an institution.158 Also, at the height of 
the crisis, Abdulhamid exiled Midhad Pasha, who had already dethroned two Sultans 
before him. So, while the Empire was at war, the Sultan was waging his own war in 
his bid for power and his three-decades-long reign is testimony to his success at this 
task. It was his success in diminishing his bureaucratic rivals in the power struggle 
that paradoxically led to the emergence of the opposition to his rule. The Russo- 
Ottoman war and the Berlin Congress gave Abdulhamid II the means to achieve his 
ends. It is rather early to discuss the emergence of the opposition. However, this 
point reiterates the argument that 1875 -  1878 was the critical juncture that made 
the Young Turk movement possible.
As the war gave Abdulhamid the pretext to do as he pleased, “it was 
Abdulhamid 11’s success in quashing the independence of the Sublime Porte that led 
to the centralisation of power in the court and inadvertently paved the way for the 
revolutionary rise of a new and more dangerous rival for power -  the military.”159 By 
eliminating the bureaucracy and the newly founded parliament as political power 
centres, Abdulhamid II was in fact facilitating opposition to his own rule. The war
158 Zarinebaf attracts our attention to the impact of the First Constitutional Regime in the Ottoman 
Empire on the Iranian revolutionaries. “Despite its shortcomings and short life (one year), the first 
Ottoman constitution had a major impact on political developments in the empire by inspiring not 
only the Young Turks who engineered the 1908 revolution but also the Young Iranians who came into 
contact with Ottoman political thinkers in Istanbul and played a major role in the constitutional 
revolution in Iran.” Fariba Zarinebaf, “From Istanbul to Tabriz: Modernity and Constitutionalism in 
the Ottoman Empire and Iran,” Comparative Studies o f South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 28, no. 
1 (2008): 167.
159 Hanioglu, “The Second Constitutional Period 1908 -  1918,” in Cambridge History o f Turkey: 
Turkey in the Modem World, 45.
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with Russia and the shifting system of alliances that was undermining the trust 
placed in the Ottoman Empire by the 1856 treaty (under the terms of which Great 
Britain, Austria and France had promised to protect the territorial integrity of the 
Empire) led to renewed investment in the army. The events of 1875-1878 triggered a 
chain reaction which, combined with certain choices of the actors involved, paved 
the way for the possibility of a military-based reaction to the regime. This was one of 
the consequences of the war.
Another consequence was the Treaty of St. Stefano, which was disastrous in 
terms of territory loss for the Ottoman Empire. It turned out to be not so 
advantageous for Russia either. The creation of a large Bulgarian state under Russian 
protection that had borders in the Aegean was unacceptable to Austria and to 
England. These powers found the need to correct the Treaty of St. Stefano and saw 
this not as a burden, but as an opportunity. This diplomatic attitude towards the 
Empire was to have its impact on Hamidian policies for the rest of his reign. The way 
the powers handled St. Stefano exacerbated Abdulhamid II’s suspicions and his 
increasing tendency to lean on Germany.160
The diplomatic crisis over the Treaty of St. Stefano and the Balkans in 
general were discussed at the Berlin Congress convened in the summer of 1878. This 
treaty was to determine the course of Balkan politics for the next two decades yet it 
rejected the demands for participation by the representatives of the Balkan peoples 
themselves. “The proceedings were brusquely opened with the frank comment, ‘We
160 “By turning to Germany, Abdul Hamid hoped to counter the Russian threat by means other than 
support from Paris and London. At the same time, he hoped to challenge what he saw as the Anglo- 
French monopoly over Ottoman affairs.” Ahmad, 11.
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are not here to consider the happiness of the Bulgarians but to secure the peace of 
Europe’.”161 In this context, it is no surprise that both the leaders of the national 
movements in the Balkans and the Ottoman opposition inside the Empire and in exile 
were trying in later years to locate their causes in a European context, more 
specifically in a European diplomatic context. As the Russo-Ottoman war and the 
overriding of its concluding Treaty by the Great Powers in Berlin shows, “the 
international diplomacy did not allow these two countries to solve their problems on 
their own.”162
The resolutions of the Berlin Congress, chaired by Bismarck163 himself, were 
to cause further grievances in the Balkans. The Congress decided to divide the 
greater Bulgaria created by St. Stefano into Bulgaria and East Rumelia, with the 
latter to be given back to the Ottoman Empire. This was to cause further rebellion in 
the 1880s. Austria was given the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia 
gained territory in Caucasia, most notably Kars, Ardahan and Batum. Finally, two 
important international issues that are still of great relevance in the contemporary 
Middle East emerged: the Cyprus issue and the Armenian issue. Great Britain was 
handed Cyprus before the closing of the Berlin treaty, in exchange for protection 
from Russia. This suited Britain’s increasing interest in the south Mediterranean, as it 
formed a link to Suez and was all linked to the protection of India. The Armenians,
161 Bartlett, Peace, War and the European Powers, 105. The comments belong to Bismarck the chair 
of the Congress.
162 S. F. Ore§kova, “Rusya ve Osmanli imparatorlugu Arasmdaki Sava§lar: Sebepleri ve Kimi Tarihi 
Sonuflan,” in Diinden Bugiine Tiirkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kulturel ili§kiler, ed. Giilten 
Kazgan and Natalya Ulfenko (Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlan, 2003), 27.
163 Bismarck, by various humiliating comments, made clear that he did not respect the representative 
of the Ottoman Empire. Georgeon, 118.
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who had also sent delegates to the Congress, were appeased with the 61st clause of 
the Berlin Treaty which was on reforms to protect the Armenians against Kurdish 
and Circassian threats.164
In addition to rendering the fate of vast regions from the Balkans to Cyprus 
and Eastern Anatolia a subject of international diplomacy, the Berlin Treaty 
envisaged the changing of borders in the Balkans. This was to cause resistance for 
the decade to follow. In this way and in many others, the Berlin Treaty caused 
resentments for most of the parties involved, starting with the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia. Although it succeeded in freezing the Balkan question for the time being, it 
created new questions, such as the Bulgarian and Macedonian issues. As one of the 
last international treaties of the ‘European peace’, it constitutes the last part of our 
critical juncture. As the Great Powers were unwilling to allow Russia to conclude its 
own peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, they intervened in a wider political issue. 
“The events of 1877-8 had emphasised once again, and with unparalleled clarity, that 
the issues involved were inextricably intertwined, of general European concern and 
incapable of solution simply by Russian pressures against the Porte.”165 The idea that 
Ottoman problems could only be solved by international intervention was to leave a 
deep mark on Ottoman politics. It would be no coincidence then that the Young Turk 
leaders would send letters explaining themselves to European diplomats or that the 
Armenian militants would conduct political protests in order to attract the attention 
of the Europeans.
164 “This clause which rendered the signatory states of the Berlin Treaty intervening parties was to be 
the basis of the future Armenian demands.” Ibid., 121.
165 Alan Bodger, “Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire,” in The Great Powers and the End o f 
Ottoman Empire.
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Overall, the Berlin Treaty confirmed a situation, as it emerged in the second 
half of the 1870s, whereby Ottoman politics, from domestic reform to financial debt, 
was indeed international politics. Abdulhamid II for the rest of his reign reacted to 
this situation in various ways (from suppression to further Westernization). The 
Sultan was not the only one to react. The Ottoman bureaucratic and intellectual elite 
transformed its Weltcmschaung accordingly and so did the various ethnic and 
religious communities throughout the Empire. Each of these actors developed their 
own techniques for handling the situation. Although there exists the argument that 
the fate of the Ottoman Empire was in the hands of the foreign powers and it was 
their decisions that made it survive as long as it did166, it was not clear to the 
Ottoman actors that the fall and partition of the Empire was inevitable, nor that the 
nation-state was to be the only viable option for communities within the Empire.167 
So the fact that Ottoman politics was an international affair did not stop them from 
pursuing their own politics within this affair and influencing it a great deal along the 
way. The politics of the peoples of Macedonia and of the Armenians emerged from 
this intersection among the global, the imperial and the local.
166 “If the Empire survived for almost another century and a half, that was due more to the rivalries of 
the Great Powers and their failure to reach an agreement on how to divide the ‘sick man’s’ legacy than 
to the patient’s will and determination to survive.” Ahmad, 5.
167 As Re§at Kasaba concludes, the Ottomans did partake in the many attempts at reform with the 
intent of staying in the Empire. This shows firstly that a retrospective reading from the several 
nationalist discourses that emerged after the collapse is rather misleading for the period before the 
collapse. Also, crucially, it shows that the Ottomans indeed showed will and determination for the 
continuity of the Empire, despite or perhaps because of their grievances. “The idea that people should 
only live with and be ruled by people of their own ‘kind’ would be alien to most of the subjects of the 
empire. Therefore, many urban notables, merchants and local intellectuals actively participated in the 
new experiments of the nineteenth century and helped give them substance. They emerged as the main 
delegates or electors in the six parliamentary elections that were held in the Ottoman Empire between 
1876 and 1919.” Re§at Kasaba, “Dreams of Empire, Dreams of Nations,” in Empire to Nation: 
Historical Perspectives on the Making o f the Modem World, ed. Joseph W. Escherick, Hasan Kayali, 
and Eric Van Young, (London Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 211. For a comparative account, also 
see C. A. Bayly. “The fall of the Ottoman Empire, or at least its core provinces, seems more and more 
like a contingency of war rather than a consequence of the inevitable rise of nationalism.” Christopher 
Bayly, “Distorted Development: The Ottoman Empire and British India, circa 1780- 1916,” 
Comparative Studies o f South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27 (2007): 334.
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The story so far has been the background political history which surrounded 
the Hamidian era and the Young Turk’s political education. The various struggles of 
these peoples, on the other hand, will provide a view of the context in which the 
Young Turks actually became politically active. We now turn to the surfacing of the 
Young Turk opposition, which was conditioned but not pre-determined by this 
critical juncture fully materialized by the Berlin Treaty in 1878.
4.2.4 The Hamidian era and the establishment of the CUP
The political organization, which after years of internal divisions and mergers 
and a great deal of transformation, would declare the constitutional revolution in the 
Ottoman Empire, was founded on June 2, 1889, by four students of the Royal 
Medical Academy in Istanbul under the name of the Ottoman Union Society (ittihad- 
l Osmani Cemiyeti). It was neither the first opposition group nor the most 
important at its inception. Nonetheless it was to be the most successful and would 
lead to the end of an ancien regime. However, it took almost a decade for the 
founders of the Ottoman Union Society to turn themselves into an organization 
formidable enough to attract the repressive policies of Abdulhamid II. In 1897 most 
of the members were arrested and exiled and the headquarters were moved to 
Europe. “A careful examination of the evidence shows that the CUP did not become 
a prominent actor until 1894 -  1895, and its prior activities were quite 
insignificant.”169
168 Hanioglu, Young Turks in Opposition, 71. The students were Ibrahim Temo, Abdullah Cevdet, 
Mehmed Re§id and ishak Siikuti.
169 Ibid., 33.
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In line with the purposes of this chapter, this section will start with the 
politics of the Hamidian era, with an emphasis on the international connections, and 
continue by locating the actors within the larger picture of international politics. The 
first section will deal with Hamidian policies prior to the establishment of the 
Ottoman Union Society and the second section will deal with their activities until 
1895.
4.2.4.1 The Hamidian Era in the aftermath of the Berlin Congress
The literature of recent years has undermined the view of Abdulhamid II as 
the reactionary, fanatically religious and incapable Sultan and has brought a new 
perspective on his policies at home and abroad. His infamous politics of Pan- 
Islamism is now interpreted as a pragmatic, strategic move rather than as evidence of 
his backwardness. The Sultan who the Young Turks would come to oppose had 
inherited an Empire in disarray. The Berlin Congress caused more problems than it 
solved and led to new conflicts. The intent was to ‘freeze’ the Balkan situation, but 
with new borders and reform packages the situation became impregnated with new 
rebellions and wars. Most of the Balkan peoples and governments were dissatisfied 
and the Ottomans had to deal with their dissatisfaction, as in the case of Albanian 
resistance and Greek border issues. Also, Cyprus was now handed over to Great 
Britain without any resistance on the part of the Ottoman Empire. The Armenians 
were recognized in the treaty, which did not meet their demands but acknowledged 
their cause to some extent, and the Armenian issue would become one of the big 
crises in the Hamidian era and one in which the Young Turks would be involved. 
Abdulhamid II also inherited an Empire that was bankrupt. The creditors, mostly 
from France and Great Britain, established a Public Debt Administration in 1881.
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Despite this gloomy picture, it is argued that Abdulhamid actually succeeded in 
bringing about economic improvements and, like almost all of his policies, this 
facilitated the formation and strengthening of an opposition to his rule. One such 
explanation is given by Akarli: “Rising economic prospects in certain parts of the 
Empire fanned the desire for autonomy from a government incapable of protecting 
local economic interests against foreign ones.”170
As the struggle for economic and political advantage intensified in the 
provinces, Abdulhamid found himself in the position of a negotiator between foreign 
powers, between the newly independent states, and in a space cutting across all of 
these. It was his policy choices in international and imperial matters that fuelled the 
opposition , along with his style of government, which included strict censorship, the 
encouragement of espionage within the Empire and a secret intelligence service -  
which was to prove itself efficient against the Young Turks.
Despite his image as a reactionary and a despot, Abdulhamid II made many 
of the Tanzimat reforms his own, including the administrative, financial, military and 
educational reforms. He supported the existing plans to rationalize the administration 
of the Empire, though he himself did not want to be subject to the same 
rationalization. He continuously changed sadrazams and other high ranking 
bureaucrats, moved the high military officers around the Empire and, most 
importantly, he wanted to insure the loyalty of his subjects. While the new 
educational and administrative understanding was based on the idea of merit,
170 Engin Deniz Akarli, “The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and 
Problems of Westernization—an Overview,” Comparative Studies o f South Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East 26, no. 3 (2006): 357.
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Abdulhamid’s rule was based on the idea of ‘loyalty’. As summarized by Hanioglu, 
“Because he promoted western technology and education, ‘modem’ bureaucrats 
emerged throughout the Empire, and this new group, known as the Young Turks, 
found that they were unable to rise within the bureaucratic ranks because of the 
sultan’s neopatrimonial regime.”171
As he was attempting to accumulate patrimonial powers, Abdulhamid II had 
to cope with the disintegration of the Empire because the Balkan peoples were 
objecting to the Berlin Treaty. Abdulhamid II recognized the fact that Britain could 
not be trusted alone with the territorial and political integrity of the Empire. The 
shifting alliances in Europe, coupled with the new imperialist rivalry and the 
international financial control of the Empire, was calling for a more independent 
solution. Despite all his shortcomings, the Court under his leadership endeavoured to 
come up with such a solution, one element of which was the newly emphasised role 
of the Caliph as a glue for the Muslim population as well as a form of international 
political leverage. Another was the way he chose to deal with non-Muslim 
communities such as the Armenians. He chose to form a special military unit 
composed of Kurds, called Hamidiye Alaylan, to tackle the emerging Armenian 
militants. This was a move not only towards the Armenians, but also towards the 
Kurds. Indeed, integration or reintegration of the elements of the Empire was one of 
his basic concerns. He even wondered about the solutions adopted in other multi­
ethnic empires.172 Censorship, repression of the opposition or any kind of alternative
171 Hanioglu, Young Turks in Opposition, 25.
172 “I wonder whether the situation is better on the Russian territories, on the other side of the border. 
Is there any mobilisation among the Armenians similar to our situation?” Abdulhamid, 59.
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political voice went hand in hand with his need to legitimize the regime and justify it
in the eyes of the international community and of public opinion in the Empire.173 All
in all the problems that the Hamidian regime faced were unique in some aspects and
in others common to the other multi-ethnic empires. His solutions were to make an
impact, not only on the Young Turks but directly and indirectly on the Balkans and
the Middle East, for decades to come. This is well underlined by Akarli:
“Heterogeneity of the Ottoman population, the poor state of the 
economy and government finances, and vulnerability to external 
pressure rendered the political integration of the Ottoman 
Empire a gigantic task, if not an impossible one. The Ottoman 
leadership recognized these problems. Although the Ottoman 
state in die end proved unsalvageable, the solutions it sought 
have had important repercussions for the people living in 
Ottoman lands.”174
So this was the paradox and the creativity of the Hamidian era. The 
international pressure coupled with the insurgencies within the Empire was such that 
the Sultan had to create spaces in which he could manoeuvre. Reforms in all these 
fields were in a sense intended to provide such spaces, and were to a great extent 
innovative and autonomous -  autonomy not in the sense of complete independence, 
but in the sense of not being pre-determined. Education especially, as brilliantly 
analyzed by Fortna, was one of these crucial fields. And it is in the field of education 
that one encounters the seeds of the Young Turk movement.
173 Bayly, in a comparative work on British India and the Ottoman Empire, emphasises that most 
governments in this era invented new ways and discourses for regime legitimization:
“Yet the late-nineteenth-century autocracies did not rely solely on a brief technical superiority over 
their internal and external enemies. They also honed a more powerful set of propaganda tools. 
Benjamin Disraeli’s Crystal Palace speech of 1871 announced a “new imperialism.” In the hands of 
conservative viceroys of India, this took the form of an emphasis on feudalism, ethnic separation, and 
the British inheritance of India’s past.” Bayly, 341.
174 Akarli, “The Tangled Ends of an Empire,” 358.
121
Although from a superficial reading of the Ottoman modernization it may 
seem as if the successive Ottoman governments throughout the nineteenth century 
simply ‘borrowed’ from the West, the works of Fortna and Somel prove that the
1 75issue was more complicated. As the penetration of the West took on new forms, 
such as missionaries, the newly independent states neighbouring the Empire and the 
Western-influenced Christian subjects of the Empire, education became a field of 
competition.176 It reflected both symbolic and actual power. Fortna claims that the 
Ottomans did not simply stand by and let the other agents operate, they did ‘fight 
back’. “A wariness of Western encroachment of all kinds translated into a more 
combative approach to the West in general and a more reflective adaptation of its 
institutions.”177
Fortna insists on using the term adaptation rather than adoption. And perhaps 
the Hamidian policies were oscillating between these two. As he had a more 
combative approach to educational reform, he was ready for a direct transfer from 
the West when Von der Goltz arrived in the Ottoman military and developed the 
concept of ‘general staff officers’ in the army, who were to have a special education 
and would be the ‘ruling’ elite of the military.178 Old schools were reformed and new
175 Selfuk Ak§in Somel, The Modernization o f Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: 
Islamization, autocracy, and discipline (Leiden: Brill, 2001).
176 Fortna also points out the fact that all the powers were indeed in a competitive state of mind in 
terms of education. This is in parallel with the competitive state of affairs that Deringil finds in the 
field of legitimation of the big powers. As Fortna sums up: “The complicated relationship with the 
West, both a major source of emulation for the Ottoman educational system and a threat to the very 
existence of the Empire, can only be appreciated in light of the competition milieu.” Fortna, Imperial 
Classroom, 48.
177 Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 9.
178 Sacit Kutlu, Milliyetgilik ve Emperyalizm Yuzyilinda Balkanlilar ve Osmanh Devleti (Istanbul: 
Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlan, 2007), 138.
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schools founded for these and other purposes. The ideas of positive sciences and 
progress were the cornerstones of this education policy.
Clearly, the scientific reasoning behind the Hamidian education policies had a
deep impact on the Young Turks who, despite many internal disagreements and
changes of heart throughout the period until the revolution, did not give up their
commitment to the idea that science was the key to progress and progress the key to
saving the Empire. But the new schools also had other adverse affects that in turn
fuelled the seeds of opposition from within. §erif Mardin, in his cardinal study of the
political ideas and origins of the Young Turks, argues that the new schools also fed a
kind of discrimination and division among the students. Despite their training,
Abdulhamid II hesitated to assign responsibilities to the commanding officers, a fact
that the students took note of -  he was establishing the Yildiz Palace as the command
centre, in line with his centralization policies. Additionally, there was a limit to the
rationalization and meritocracy in these institutions and, as the number of students
from the provinces increased, those students from notable families still enjoyed the
benefits of their social status and were promoted ahead of the others. Mardin
demonstrates that there was a division between those from Istanbul and those from
the provinces; between the better off and the less privileged. Mardin traces the
leaders of the Young Turks to the latter groups:179
“One of the signs of how this dualism wounded the hearts of the 
Young Turks is the articles on promotion regulations that 
appeared in their political programmes from time to time.
Another sign is that all those who were promoted this way 
[because of their family connections] were degraded after the 
proclamation of liberty [the revolution of 1908].”180
179 Mardin, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 56-58.
180 Ibid., 58.
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These students from various academies were to establish the Ottoman Union 
Society or, as it was later named, the CUP, and would be exiled. It was another wave 
of students from the military academy that would accumulate in Macedonia in the 
1900s and then join the CUP in 1907. So the critical juncture of 1875-1878 led to the 
paradox of the Hamidian era: the policies designed to deflect enemies from both 
outside and inside in fact built up the opposition from within. Abdulhamid II and the 
Ottoman bureaucracy fought back - against the international situation as a whole and 
against specific problems that were either international or had international causes or 
outcomes -  but at the same time, the opposition to their choices emerged.
The critical juncture identified in the preceding sections resulted in a 
disastrously difficult international situation and in a Sultan whose prime objectives 
became to minimize the external damage and prevent internal strife of various kinds. 
It is in the unique solutions to this situation that one can observe the origins of the 
Young Turk movement. Ideologically, they were tied to various intellectual 
movements in the West, most notably positivism and a particular kind of 
materialism. Politically they feared the disintegration, but did not act on the idea that 
it was inevitable. Socially they belonged to a new group within the Ottoman elite 
whose social background and education was a curious mix. Their emergence 
occurred in the context of the Hamidian era, which itself was conditioned yet not 
absolutely determined by the international predicament. Of course, the successes and 
failures in this process were also factors in the outcome. As Hanioglu reminds us:
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“Indeed, it is often forgotten that Abdiilhamid II’s ambitious 
agenda of bureaucratic modernization at home depended on his 
ability to parry the external threats to the empire.” 81
4.2.4.2 The CUP and its affairs: a diplomatic crisis and the escape to Europe
The 1880s in Ottoman politics witnessed the unfolding of the critical juncture 
explained in the above sections of this chapter. Abdiilhamid II was accumulating 
power, but also struggling with various internal and external threats. In 1881, the 
Public Debt Administration was founded, which did not leave much room for 
financial independence. The Greeks, the Armenians, the Albanians and Kurds, the 
Muslim and non-Muslim communities of the Empire and the peoples of its 
independent neighbours were all in a rebellious mood. Albanians objected fiercely to 
the new border arrangements.182 Kurds, under the leadership of Sayyid Ubeydullah, 
rebelled against the 61st article of the Berlin Treaty, which envisaged the protection 
of the Armenians against the Kurds and Circassians.183 Greece was trying to achieve 
the maximum gain in the drawing of the new border and the Armenians were 
establishing revolutionary organizations in Tbilisi and Geneva.
The Ottoman state was not alone in its concern for the integrity and continuity 
of the Empire. The students from the various academies of the Empire, the Royal 
Medical Academy, the Royal War Academy, and the Royal School of
181 Hanioglu, The Late Ottoman Empire, 129.
182 Isa Blumi, “Contesting the Edges of the Ottoman Empire: Rethinking Ethnic and Sectartian 
Boundaries in the Malesore, 1878 -  1912,” International Journal o f Middle East Studies 35, no. 2 
(2003).
183 Hakan Ozoglu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, 
and Shifting Boundaries (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004). 74.
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Administration, as frustrated as they were with the grievances mentioned above, the 
discrimination, the patrimonial nature of the Hamidian regime, the procedures of 
promotion, etc., were also concerned with the future of the Empire. Erik J. Ziircher, 
in various articles, points out the fact that not much is known about the founders of 
the CUP and its increasing membership thereafter. The traits that he has gathered 
show us that they were not necessarily bourgeois in origin or outlook. “The 
generalization sometimes made that the Young Turks had a petty bourgeois 
background does not seem to be based in fact. The two characteristics which bound 
the Young Turks together were education and profession.”184 They were mostly from 
the Western regions of the Empire, urban and educated.185 They belonged to a young 
professional group. And remarkably they were not dominantly Turkish in origin. In 
fact of the students who founded the CUP in 1889 in the Royal Medical Academy 
none were Turk. It is no coincidence that Albanians and Kurds were in this group, as 
they came from the internationally and inter-religiously problematic areas of the 
Empire. Again, it is important that the small initial group grew particularly in size 
during the Armenian crisis (1894 -  1896), which was at once international and 
imperial in character.
184 Erik J. Ziircher, “The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic: An Attempt at a New 
Periodization,” Die Welt Des Islams 32, no. 2 (1992): 241-242.
185 Ziircher breaks down the origins of the first wave of Young Turks until the attack of the regime in 
1896 -  1897. “This is a group of 20 persons, whose origins were as follows:
Istanbul 2
Balkans 7 (this includes 2 from provinces lost in 1878)
Aegean 3 (Rhodes, Smyrna and Crete)
Arab provinces 2 
Kurdistan 2
Caucasus 4 (all from the Russian Empire)
Anatolia 0”
Ziircher, “The Young Turks -  Children of the Borderlands?” Turkology Update Leiden Project 
Working Papers Archive, Department of Turkish Studies, Universiteit Leiden, October 2002, 5.
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Since the Berlin Congress, Britain had been playing the role of protector
towards the Christian community in the eastern provinces. With the shifting
European alliances and the new British attitude towards the Ottoman Empire,
Abdulhamid II had distrust towards the British. The invasion of Egypt in 1882 did
not help, nor did the new Gladstone government in Britain, with the prime minister
infamous for his anti-Ottoman attitudes. So, when respective British ambassadors
were pressing for reform in favour of the Armenians, Abdulhamid II was stalling and
keeping the plans on hold. However, the Armenians, who had longstanding
grievances not only against the Ottoman state but also against the Kurdish tribes and
whose elite experienced a cultural renaissance in parallel to the increase in foreign
missionary activities in the East187, also showed political will and determination and
opted for armed action. At the beginning of the 1890s “Armenian revolutionaries
were mobilising and stockpiling arms in numerous areas.”188 Of course, the Eastern
provinces were impregnated with violent conflict, and one should also remember the
Kurdish revolt of 1881. The developments up until the 1894-1896 crisis are well
summarized by Bloxham, who puts these events into their larger context:
“It is no exaggeration to say that the Armenian question was 
bom as the international politics of the eastern question 
intersected with the agrarian question, the question of 
demographic change in Anatolia and the development of 
Armenian national consciousness, all at the inauspicious 
moment at which Abdulhamid was seeking to re-establish the
state’s control of its own destiny by a different and more
180religiously exclusive modernisation agenda.”
186 On the British-Ottoman interaction in this diplomatic crisis see Jeremy Salt, “Britain, the Armenian 
Question and the Cause of Ottoman Reform: 1894-96,” Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 3 (1990).
187 Bloxham, “Terrorism and Imperial Decline: The Ottoman-Armenian Case,” European Review o f 
History 14, no. 3 (2007): 303.
188 Ibid., 312.
189 Ibid., 305-306.
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This mobilisation190 and the circle of violence and counter-violence, coupled 
with further international intervention, culminated in the Sasun massacre of 1894191 
where Armenians were killed in masses by the Ottoman troops. And with the events 
of 1894-1896, which included urban192 and rural activities, the internationalization of 
the Armenian issue was complete. Both Abdulhamid II and the Young Turks were to 
react to the situation in their own ways. Abdulhamid II’s reaction was violent and 
harsh, whereas the Young Turks, as concerned as they were, saw at this moment as 
an opportunity for political expression and organizational enhancement. In fact their 
membership not only increased but also diversified and now included senior 
statesmen and ulema.
As the organization was expanding both among the Academies and among 
some bureaucrats, Abdulhamid II’s intelligence service obtained information about 
its existence and waves of arrests started. The arrests had two main results: the 
fleeing of students to Europe and hence the start of political activities in exile; and a 
new composition of the Istanbul group, which now was joined by bureaucrats who 
were conspiring to dethrone Abdulhamid II. Although arrests occurred, some of the
190 The two Armenian revolutionary organizations that were founded in the late 1880s were Hnchak 
and Dashnaktsutiun. Hnchak Committee was founded in Geneva in 1887 and Dashnaktsutiun in 
Tbilisi in 1890.
191 “The relationship between protection, agitation and gesturing to the outside world played itself out 
in a chain of calamitous events in the mid-1890s. The chain began with the first instance of large- 
scale, nationalist-influenced Armenian resistance in 1893-1894 in the Sasun region of Bitlis province, 
and ended in slaughter on a huge scale.” Bloxham, 307.
192 The Armenian militants became even active in Istanbul, most probably because demonstrations and 
protests at the Capital had a bigger chance of attracting international attention. The following two 
events are the highlights of these activities: “On August 26, 1896, a group of Armenians took over 
the main Ottoman Bank in Beyoglu. (...) Soon after a second group forced its way into the Sublime 
Porte, wounding several officials and threatening the grand vezir with a pistol. (...) Another bomb 
was thrown at the sultan as he was going to the Aya Sofya mosque for the Friday prayer, with more 
than 20 policemen guarding him being killed.” Shaw and Shaw, 204-205.
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students were pardoned by the Sultan, as the organization was not yet deemed to be 
important. It was when the students’ continuous activities merged with the 
international crisis in 1895 that the CUP was perceived as more than a simple student 
organization. “The sultan feared that high-ranking bureaucrats might capitalize and 
employ them as their tool.”193
Ahmed Riza’s joining of the CUP occurred around the same time. He was 
residing in Paris, having given up the hope of making a difference within the 
bureaucratic structure of the Empire. He was an adamant adherent of positivism, 
especially of the works of Auguste Comte. Ahmed Riza would prove to be an 
unyielding advocate of the constitutional cause and would establish his own faction 
in the aftermath of the 1902 Congress. In the mid-1890s he was approached by a 
Young Turk student194 and asked to publish the official organ of the Committee. In 
1895, he started to publish Me^veret195 and also its French supplement. He negotiated 
with the founders of the Ottoman Union Society to change its name. True to his 
positivist tendencies, he opted for the name of Order and Progress. However, the 
founders insisted on Union (referring to the Union of Ottomans) and the name 
Committee of Union and Progress was decided upon. While the Young Turk 
community in Paris was expanding, the Istanbul headquarters was involved in an
193 Hanioglu, Young Turks in Opposition, 75.
194 Dr. Nazim. Hanioglu points out the fact that Dr. Nazim in particular was not at all interested in the 
constitution nor in developing a programme for reform or revolution and cites §evket Stireyya 
Aydemir’s dialogue with him. Ibid., 32. After admitting that he did not know the contents of the 
constitution for which he was fighting, he also admits the lack of interest in a programme for the post- 
revolutionary period. “So, in that case, there was not any programme of action for the future of the 
committee? -  Don’t say that. I know there was a programme. I wouldn’t be able to explain it if you 
ask me, but it should have been a sizable one. But nobody was really interested in that.” §evket 
Stireyya Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2006), 277.
195 The title referred to the institution of consultation to evoke the demands for constitutional regime.
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attempted coup d’etat. Nonetheless, publishing and distributing manifestos, rather
than conducting a coup, would be the first public political action. As the British and
other powers were drawn into the Armenian crisis so were the Young Turks. They
commented on the Armenian activities and the Sultan’s policies in four ‘appeals’.
“A third one, written by the CUP organization in the capital 
focused on government corruption, and contrary to the first two, 
asked the Muslims and Christians to unite against the common 
enemy and accused the sultan of preferring foreign intervention 
to forming a consultative body of capable statesmen.”196
This appeal sums up the tendencies and paradoxes of the early years of the 
CUP. Despite the obvious lack of support for the Armenian cause, they shared with 
the Armenians a method of stepping up political activities: that locating politics in an 
international context. The appeal also demonstrated the unionism of the CUP and 
their confidence in the belief that ‘capable statesmen’ would be able to ‘save the 
state’, unlike a despotic Sultan. The issue of ‘foreign intervention’ would cause 
internal strife and later division in the CUP, which will be examined in detail in the 
next chapter. However, division and internal opposition had already started in 1895, 
with Ahmed Riza taking one stance and the ‘new central committee in Istanbul -  
composed of high-ranking bureaucrats, military generals and ulema”197 another 
stance on the issue of coup d’etat.
As the diplomatic crisis deepened new members joined, one of whom was 
Murad Bey, also known as Mizanci Murad after the name of the journal he 
published, Mizan. He was a former bureaucrat and a teacher at the Royal School of
196 Hanioglu, Young Turks in Opposition, 76.
197 Hanioglu, The Young Turks in Opposition, 79.
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Administration. He was to become an influential figure in the movement, both 
through his escape to Europe and later through the way he returned to the Empire, 
which will again be dealt with in the next chapter. On the issue of the coup d’etat and 
all the other issues that seemed to divide Ahmed Riza and the Istanbul committee he 
“became a balancing power between the Istanbul centre and Ahmed Riza”, who had 
started to publish Me§veret in Paris in late 1895 as the official organ of the CUP. 
Murad Bey also initiated several meetings with European diplomats and Ahmed Riza 
started issuing statements to the European press. As Hanioglu states, the Young Turk 
movement started to become a diplomatic affair.198
The diplomatic crisis over the Armenian issue died out, as none of the 
interested powers -  except Britain -  was committed to the cause. The Russian 
government in particular was worried that any international intervention on this issue 
would cause Russia harm, given the fact that Russia had its own Armenian 
community. Abdulhamid II in the end appeared victorious in the sense that he 
managed to deflect what he considered another blow to Ottoman sovereignty. With 
this and the later Greco-Ottoman war -  which the Ottoman armies won on the 
battleground - in the background, the arrests and exile of Young Turks intensified, 
leading to an almost complete elimination of the organization within the Empire. 
Details of the war and of the situation of the Young Turks in exile will be provided in 
the next chapter.
The years between 1889 and 1896 were the founding years of the Young Turk 
movement. These young students and their collaborators from different sections of
198 Ibid., Introduction.
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the state mechanism were aware of the imperial and international issues that 
transcended them. They were eager and ambitious in that they were trying to 
manipulate this wider world for their own political purposes. The Armenian crisis, 
recounted at length in the preceding pages, is a case in point. So would be their 
numerous attempts to manipulate European diplomacy while they were in exile, and 
this is also the essence of their activities in Cairo. Through their education and their 
interest in Ottoman and world politics, these students, the statesmen who joined them 
and later the increasing number of members from the army became actors in a game 
that was at once Ottoman and European. As alliances and political mentalities shifted 
in Europe, the Ottoman political actors were influenced by these, but were also 
presented with choices for how to deal with this changing world. The argument here 
has so far been developed in order to reveal the international as a constitutive 
element in the Hamidian regime and in the opposition against it. The next chapter 
will explain how both the Hamidian regime and the Ottoman opposition became 
actors on the international scene.
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4.3 Conclusion
"In HS [Historical Sociology], the causal argument is central, and causal propositions 
are tested and carefully selected rather than just arbitrarily introduced into the 
argument. This is where HS differentiates most clearly from many interpretivist or post­
modernist approaches that ultimately reject causal explanation. ”]"
A thorough study of the causes of the Young Turk Revolution, especially a 
long-term analysis, is not yet present in the literature. Studies of the ideational 
development of the Young Ottomans and Young Turks are available. So are studies 
of the two years before the revolution. The literature on the Young Turks focuses 
most extensively on the actual Unionist governments and the First World War years. 
Perhaps one reason for the lack of available studies of the causes is that this is a 
multi-layered story, with the layers stretching into multiple disciplines. This chapter 
has been part of an attempt to show that international relations as a discipline has 
much to offer in studying single cases of political change, such as the Young Turk 
Revolution, when it is properly informed by history and sociology. What is also 
called the historical sociological approach to International Relations has provided us 
with the means to look at the story of the beginnings of the Hamidian regime and the 
beginnings of the opposition from a fresh angle. These means were, first and 
foremost, the special attention paid to the peaks of die international political change 
itself. As such, the rise of Germany, the changing attitudes of Russia and England 
and the evolving tools of international politics were put on the spot. Secondly, the 
general spirit of the age, which can only be discerned if one looks through an 
international lens, was helpful in understanding what was constant in all this change. 
For the time period under examination, this was the ‘new imperialism’ and a world
199 Dannreuther and Kennedy, “Historical Sociology in Sociology,” 375.
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more than ever interconnected and in competition. Thirdly, historical sociological 
approach to IR directs us to the historical trajectory of certain issues, such as the 
Armenian issue, and, as we will encounter in the next chapter, the Macedonian issue. 
The roots and causes of these issues were traced to the 1870s and were linked. 
Fourthly, a historical emphasis asks us to find the causal links in explaining political 
change. Here, that task has been fulfilled by showing the impact of various 
international elements on a number of important domestic conflicts and 
transformations. The changing attitude of the Great Powers towards the Ottoman 
Empire built up the circumstances within which the Hamidian regime formed itself. 
The peculiarity of the Hamidian reforms and the tactics of foreign and domestic 
policy that the Sultan developed cannot be fully explained without showing their 
international causes. The same holds true for the rise of the opposition, in this case 
the Young Turks. This is indeed no surprise, as not only were potential opposition 
members affected by the Sultan’s policies which were part of and consequential upon 
the international situation, but opposition members also had an autonomous grasp of 
the international situation. These linkages will be particularly important when we 
move on to the questions of the why and how of the revolution.
A subsidiary theme of this thesis and a special concern of Historical 
Sociology is the question of agency. As it is a particularly multi-layered issue, and as 
the historical narrative of this time period requires it, a certain theoretical 
abbreviation with regards to the issue of agency has been made in this chapter. 
Especially on the issue of the Hamidian regime and on the years of Ottoman 
disintegration, the Ottomanists in the last decades have been drawing attention to the 
factually wrong and historically farfetched argument that it was external pressures
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that determined everything. It is the contention of this work that this is indeed an 
indispensable revision of the historiography of the late Ottoman Empire. However, 
there is a not so fine a line between determination and co-constitution. Ottoman 
agency, as it evolved in the final quarter of die nineteenth century, was not rendered 
futile by international pressures. It was, however, changing and rising (with reference 
to the combative approach of the Hamidian regime in certain respects and to the 
intensification of the Ottoman opposition) as an integral part of the wider world. The 
very conditions of its nature were symbiotically tied to international conditions. 
Several aspects of this symbiotic relationship have been explained above. A 
remarkable example of this is the competition among the emperors and monarchs in 
several aspects of their rules, such as education, symbols of legitimacy and even 
‘public image’. This chapter has mostly dealt with the high politics aspect.200 The 
contention of this work so far is that Ottoman agency was indeed as active and 
innovative as the Ottomanists claim. It was the international, at many levels, that 
gave rise to and facilitated that process of innovation. Two clear examples are 
worthy of further mention. The clear connection between the Berlin Congress and the 
various responses to it from the Ottoman actors - from active resistance, as in the 
case of the Albanians, to stalling and ignoring, as in the case of Abdulhamid II, and 
finally feelings of humiliation followed by the need to seek reforms in the Ottoman 
Empire itself, as in the case of the Young Turks. Another example is the Armenian 
crisis in the 1890s and the numerous ways in which this international crisis was
200 Another face of the issue is that of ideas, their international dissemination and their value in 
explaining agency in moments of change. This is largely omitted from this chapter and thesis, firstly 
because the ideational development of the actors in the case study is well studied in the literature. 
Secondly, that kind of investigation would steal the focus away from the main theme of the thesis, 
namely the international/domestic dichotomy. That should not mean, however, that the author 
contends that the ideational realm is not a legitimate topic of study for the theory of agency or that of 
the international. It is the limits of this particular study that holds the investigation back from delving 
into the other infamous dichotomy of the social sciences, that of the material/ideational.
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exploited by Young Turks and non-Young Turk Ottoman statesmen for their own 
causes. It was during this crisis that the students of the Royal Academies decided to 
issue their public appeals. The Ottoman Empire may have been cornered by several 
external threats, the Ottoman Sultan tried to abuse the inter-relations between those 
threats in order to create a space for himself and the Ottoman opposition was indeed 
given that space and rose within it.
136
CHAPTER 5 1896 -1906: A DECADE OF GLOBAL, IMPERIAL AND
LOCAL POLITICS
5.1 Introduction
“This race among the major powers to establish economic and political spheres o f 
influence and new dominions created a world loaded with confusion, tension, violent 
competition and nationalistic emotionalism. ”201
The late 1890s witnessed the total exclusion of the CUP as an organization in 
the Ottoman Empire and the flight of many members and sympathizers to Europe. In 
almost a decade and despite the odds against them, divided, reorganized and 
regrouped, they were to defeat one of the most powerful Sultans in Ottoman history. 
The years between 1896 and 1906 are hard to pin down in several aspects. There is 
no straightforward line of development, globally or imperially. The fluidity of the era 
and the specifics of the case are revealed in the following elements: the amount of 
change in the revolutionaries’ thinking and activities, the internal divisions, the 
shifting alliances in Europe and the Sultan’s various responses to the Great Powers 
and towards the opposition. With regards to the CUP, after the first shock of the 
defeat, came the moments of internal strife and the refining of the differences within 
this opposition group. The 1902 Congress of the Ottoman Opposition formalized 
these differences and led to the emergence of two camps: the majority (under the 
leadership of Prince Sabahaddin) and the minority (under the leadership of Ahmed 
Riza). Meanwhile, the incessant Ottoman-European interaction continued, while a 
major issue of international concern, the Macedonian issue, accelerated. The 
rebellions in Macedonia and the activities of the Armenian militants in the Empire
201 Akarli, “The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman 
Politics under Abdulhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions,” (PhD Diss., Princeton University, 
1976), 42.
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and in Europe took much away from the prestige of the Sultan who had won the 
Greco-Ottoman war in 1897. The Sultan also pursued the Young Turks in their exile 
in Europe through the Ottoman embassies as well as the foreign ministries of the 
hosting European countries and the Young Turks (Jeunes Turcs) became an item in 
the European public opinion. Other events followed: the Russo-Japanese war and the 
Japanese victory, the 1905 Revolution in Russia and the later the Iranian Revolution 
of 1906. The period ended with the reorganization of Ahmed Riza’s group under the 
name of CPU (Committee of Progress and Union) and their new tendency towards 
activism. Prince Sabahaddin also chose to increase the level of activism by 
collaborating with the Armenians and infiltrating in Eastern Anatolia and in the 
Black Sea Region. These developments culminated in the 1907 Congress, which 
constitutes the limits of this chapter, as the Congress, the Anatolian uprisings and the 
events that unfolded thereafter -  including the merger between Ahmed Riza’s group 
and the Ottoman Freedom Society, a primarily military committee -  can be 
considered within the contents of the revolutionary process which will be the focus 
of the next chapter.
When rereading the Ottoman history of the 1870s and 1880s in detail through 
the theoretical lens of the HS in IR, it appears clear that the international-domestic 
interaction is indeed multi-layered and operates in various directions. International 
treaties had far reaching consequences both in Ottoman politics and in the 
international political scene. From the late 1890s and up to 1905-6, the Eastern 
question was ‘put on ice’ and the Far East became the scene of international rivalry. 
While the European alliances shifted yet again, resulting finally in the Triple Entente 
between France, Great Britain and Russia, subtle but important changes occurred in
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the interplay between world politics and Ottoman politics. Added to this is the 
crucial transformation of the Ottoman bureaucracy and intelligentsia under the 
materialized influence of the Hamidian reforms, most notably in the field of 
education and in the military. As Abdulhamid was trying to find a place for the 
Empire within the shifting European politics and leaning towards Germany as an 
informal ally, the Young Turks in Europe were approaching the diplomats and the 
publics of Great Britain, France and Switzerland. And a latent wave of opposition 
was growing within the students and young officers of the army in the Empire itself, 
especially over the increasing violence in Macedonia. So, despite the ‘freezing’ of 
the Eastern question, the dynamics set forth in the ‘critical juncture’ of the late 1870s 
were in operation and transcended to a certain extent by the new choices of the 
emerging agents. One theoretical insight to be demonstrated in the decade before the 
revolution is the changing nature o f international-domestic interaction. That this 
nature is itself history specific and that there are no constant elements to be reified is 
of course an insight from Historical Sociology. The rather decreased levels of 
interaction and the increased amount of the variety of Ottoman politics vis-a-vis 
international politics, when compared with the two decades before is evidence for 
that insight. The decade before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 is witness to the 
importance of studying this changing nature of interaction and the further vitality of 
studying politics of change on a grand scale that transcends the later established 
national boundaries. As explained below, the changing nature of European 
imperialism coupled with its overseas interventions was constitutive in the further 
development of the Ottoman opposition, including its internal strife and the refining 
of their activist ideologies and revolutionary programme. Also influential were the 
other layers of international politics, such as the revolutionary experiences
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elsewhere, although at times it was just their success that was important rather than 
the content of their ideologies or their ultimate aims. As rebellions and wars within 
or near the Empire continued to feed the opposition in interesting ways, even the 
Russo-Japanese war had far reaching influences on the opposition movement, which 
will be dealt with in the pages below.
Exploring a single case study over a rather extended period of time has also 
the advantage of studying the changing nature of the agency within a given period of 
social change. What is significant for the purposes of this thesis is the fact that not 
only the formative years (as explained in Chapter 4) but also the refining years of the 
agency both in the sovereign body and in the opposition were in fact shaped a great 
deal by their stance in international politics. The years between the arrests in 1896- 
1897 and 1906 demonstrate the peculiar combination of domestic and international 
attitudes of the Ottoman opposition and how this combination defined and refined 
their revolutionary propaganda, revolutionary activities, and finally their political 
identity. The difference between this decade and the decade before gives us the 
chance to draw a valuable comparison. Indeed, ideologies were adapted to the period, 
peaceful evolution turned into revolution, the admiring attitudes toward Europe 
turned into a very rough anti-imperialist stance, high politics and conspiracies 
gradually gave their place to on the ground revolutionary organization and new yet 
influential members and groups emerged. Within the framework of this thesis, 
providing an explanation for this change and linking it to the wider change in 
international and domestic politics is crucial. The revolutionary turn is as important 
as the revolutionary success itself. Both points still remain largely unexplained in the 
literature and I believe that the reason for that lack is because these matters related to
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agency and process cannot be wholly grasped by an in-depth analysis of the 
ideational world of the agents but also and necessarily so, requires a reference to the 
material world in which these changes took place.
This brings us to another theoretical insight to be driven from and developed 
by an analysis of the decade before the revolution. As it was emphasised in the last 
chapter, the juxtaposition of international influences versus domestic agency was 
creating more perplexities than the amount of paradoxes it solved. By this I mean, 
viewing the relation between international factors and the emergence and 
development of agency in any given country as an either or relationship. The turn of 
the events in this period is a powerful reminder of the futility of juxtaposition: 
ideational versus material when explaining social change that was brought by 
intentional agents. I believe that the origin of this perplexity lies in the continuing 
connection built between every matter related on agency and the infamous structure 
versus agency debate. As structures do not always have to be material, so the agency 
is not necessarily composed of the ideational.
As is elaborated in the theoretical sections of this thesis, this problematic 
confusion around the issue of agency and pinning down the appropriate method and 
level of analysis to study stems from the confusion about what is actually understood 
by the agency. If one dares to turn back to the debate of structure versus agency, it 
would be helpful to remind ourselves of the infamous phrasing of Marx on this 
matter: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in 
circumstances they chose for themselves; rather they make it in present
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circumstances given and inherited.”202 Here agency is pointed out not only to the 
contemplating actors but perhaps more so to those who actually make history. That 
process is inevitably in the realm of actions and only to be referred to by their causes, 
processes and consequences. As the following analysis of the maturing and changing 
nature of the Ottoman agency composed of varying actors will make clear, ideational 
characteristics of the agency are only one aspect and only in relation to the actual 
deeds of the actors. Hence, although this study had to avoid a thorough analysis of 
the ideologies and mindsets involved in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908,1 would 
argue that showing the connectedness of the actors to their local, imperial and global 
world and disentangling the complex set of links in that world is a sine qua non of 
any explanation in this regard. It is only through their relations to the world around 
them that agents create themselves and intervene in their surroundings. Hence, it is 
only through these relations, which we, as observers, can account for their behaviour 
and its consequences. Indeed, their behaviour consists of nothing but these relations.
So, the following narrative of the decade before the Young Turk Revolution 
of 1908 will try to first disentangle who the actors are, what their actions were, 
coupled with their causes and consequences. As the central argument goes, this 
narrative will require the identification of crucial international inputs into that 
process. The chapter will follow a chronological order and encapsulate international 
issues, such as the Macedonian issue, imperial issues such as the course of the 
Hamidian regime and the opposition against it, and local issues when relevant.
202 Karl Marx, “The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in Marx: Later Political Writings, ed. Terrel 
Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 32.
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5.2 A Period of Political Transformation
“They [the Young Turks] were surprisingly ignorant o f political economy, and o f all 
third world revolutionary movements theirs was the least anti-imperialist. The Young 
Turks saw themselves as players in the European arena rather than as nationalists 
voicing resentment against the West. ”203
In the years between the en masse arrests of the Young Turks and their 
sympathizers and the Congress of 1907 in Paris, the transformation of the Young 
Turks went in the opposite direction of the tendencies that Keyder observed in the 
quote above. The Sultan, buttressed by his triumph in the Greco-Ottoman war, but 
also damaged by the way the Great Powers handled his victory and deprived the 
Ottoman state of making any real advances following the victory, attacked the CUP 
organization in the Empire. Many of the students and young bureaucrats and 
professionals were arrested and/or exiled. Regardless of the places of exile, the 
Young Turks began to accumulate in a few cities: Paris, London, Geneva, and Cairo. 
Also some took refuge in the Balkans. As can be seen from the location of these 
cities, the political network within the borders of the Ottoman Empire proper was 
crushed. Only after a decade would the Young Turk factions be able to return to 
political activity in the Empire itself. That decade was going to be spent abroad204 
and the issue of anti-imperialism, at least anti-interventionism was going to be a vital 
dividing line among the Young Turks in exile. Proto-nationalist sentiments and awe 
towards the “European civilization” would clash. Although plots and conspiracies 
continued in the background, it is around these matters and matters of more local and
203 Keyder, “The Ottoman Empire,” 37.
204 “The 1896-1897 arrests and trials destroyed the organizational structure within the Ottoman 
Empire and for the next ten years resistance was pursued from abroad.” Ziircher, The Unionist factor: 
the role o f  the Committee o f Union and Progress in the Turkish national movement, 1905-1926 
(Leiden: Brill, 1984), 35.
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imperial concerns that the Ottoman actors abroad would reorganize themselves and 
re-engage with their ‘comrades’ in the Empire.
If the exile and arrests were a defeat for the Ottoman opposition, including 
the Armenian revolutionaries whose armed activities and raids into the capital proved 
fruitless in the face of non-involvement by European powers, it can be considered as 
a success for Abdulhamid II and his regime. The secret intelligence services, so 
valued by the Sultan, would be successful vis-a-vis various opposition groups until 
the Revolution of 1908. The Sultan, by the sheer number of the arrests, also 
demonstrated that he did not see the CUP as a student organization, but as an actual 
threat.
The Sultan was reassessing other threats as well, most notably the 
continuation of the dramatic changes in world politics. Just as the 1870s witnessed 
the rise of Germany under Bismarck, the 1890s witnessed Germany’s new 
Weltpolitik under Wilhem II. Just when the Balkans and the Eastern Question in 
general seemed to be relatively eventless, under the mutual understanding of Austria- 
Hungary and Russia, world politics was evolving gradually and the repercussions 
were to hit the Ottoman Empire in the 1900s. “What was to make this evolution fatal 
to Europe was the breakdown of the balance of power in Europe which followed the 
reshaping of German policy into a struggle for hegemony by all means, including, if 
necessary, force of arms.”205 The German overtures towards the Ottoman Empire, 
exemplified in the visit of the Kaiser and later in the Baghdad Railway concessions, 
were to be a part of the realignment of the European powers. As the Germans pushed
205 J. M. Roberts, Europe 1880-1945 (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 89.
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the existing alliances, Great Britain, Russia and France aligned themselves 
accordingly.
Many elements of these drastic changes in European diplomacy and its 
several offshoots were to have a great impact on the political choices of the Sultan as 
well as the opposition against him. In the pages below, the evolution and 
diversification of the Young Turk politics and the Sultan’s measures will be analyzed 
in light of these grand scale changes in world politics.
5.2.1 New Alliances and New Hostilities
The Greek-Ottoman war (1897) marks one period’s end and the beginning of 
another. With the victory won on behalf of the Ottoman state, the Sultan felt he could 
and should eliminate the internal opposition against him, from his own bureaucratic, 
military and educational cadres. He also tried to win over the opposition leaders 
already abroad, most notably Murad Bey (Mizanci). As Abdulhamid II 
commissioned Ahmed Celaleddin Pasha, the head of secret services, to conduct 
negotiations with the Young Turks in Turkey and conclude deals that would 
guarantee the end of their political activities and promise them various rewards in 
return, which differed from important positions in the bureaucracy to the release of 
Young Turk political prisoners in the Empire. Before going into the detail of what 
followed from these negotiations, it must be noted that the Sultan remained an 
important element in the process that shaped the Young Turk agency and as one of 
the elements in the critical juncture that was set out in the late 1870s he continued to 
influence the Young Turks, together with the other elements of the juncture. His role 
and the impact of his various choices should not be disregarded in the history of the
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revolution and one should not fall into the easy trap of portraying him as a mere hate 
figure that motivated the opposition.
This point is clear in the difference between his two moves. While he was 
arresting the organization members within the Empire, he was much more 
accommodating towards the ones in Europe. Indeed the final arrests in the spring of 
1897 of the students who regrouped after the suppression of the organization in 1896 
resulted in their exile to Tripoli. This fact alone gave the Sultan’s representative 
certain leverage in the negotiations in Europe. He also increased his leverage by 
pressing the European bureaucrats and politicians in the countries hosting the Young 
Turks and hence leaving less room for manoeuvre for them. Murad Bey, who was 
already estranged from Ahmed Riza over the tactic to be employed towards the Great 
Powers, a discussion in which he was advocating a milder approach206 and frustrated 
due to the Powers’ attitude in the aftermath of the Greco-Ottoman war,207 accepted a 
return to the Empire and ended his political activities. “As a consequence of this 
weakness on the part of Murad Bey, the “Young Turk” community was seriously 
shaken; some among them felt that they had to take refuge in the Sultan Abdulhamid 
now. This deal [between Murad Bey and Ahmed Celaleddin Pasha] is an important 
point in the “Young Turk” history.”208
206 “'phjg compromising attitude of Murat Bey, trying to gain the trust of the European cabinets, could 
have been tactically right. But it also tells how he did not even have a clue about the conditions that 
made the Committee form in military academies and moved it forward. He could not grasp the real 
reason behind the Committee’s existence, namely to stop the foreign intervention in the first place.” 
Mardin, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 79.
207 Ibid., 84-85.
208 Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, inkilap Tarihimiz ve Jon Tiirkler (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlan 2000 [First 
edition, 1945]), 76
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One of the tactical consequences of this deal was the regained leadership of 
Ahmed Riza within the movement and his strengthened image as a political thinker 
who was persistent in his belief and did not give up on the cause. Although some 
Young Turks, including some of the founders, ishak Stikuti and Abdullah Cevdet, 
had started publishing the journal Osmanli in Geneva, after the closure of Mizan, the 
publication of Murad Bey, the Sultan continued his advances towards the Young 
Turks. In 1899, the editors closed down Osmanli in exchange for the release of the 
political prisoners in Tripoli and a year later they accepted offices in various 
Ottoman embassies in Europe.209 It is important to note that during its short 
publication period, Osmanli editors advocated a pro-British approach. As Hanioglu 
notes, the editors also published “an English supplement to Osmanli that promoted 
British support for the constitutional movement and denounced the sultan’s anti- 
British policy.”210 This clearly reveals the persistence of the issue of foreign 
involvement and support in various Young Turk branches and factions. This matter 
was only going to be exacerbated in the near future.
The attempt to publish Osmanli in Geneva also points to the diversity of the 
Young Turk movement abroad and to the fact that it would be factually wrong to 
assume the absolute leadership of Ahmed Riza within the movement. The diversity 
intensified with the escape of another famous Ottoman statesman and his two sons.
209 Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jon Tiirkler ve 1908 ihtildli (Istanbul: Pozitif Yaymlan, 2007), 72-73. 
Georgeon explains this non-resistance on the part of the Young Turks by Hamid’s intuitive knowledge 
about them and their real desires: “Abdulhamid knows the weak side of the Young Turks; the reason 
that they are in opposition is because thay were not offered job opportunities through which the 
regime would make full use of their qualifications. They could be convinced if one starts giving away 
positions and scholarships and acknowledging their status. Indeed, this way of seeing the matter 
would prove to be right.” Georgeon, 390.
210 Hanioglu, Young Turks in Opposition, 117.
147
Damad Mahmud Pasha left Istanbul for Europe and took his two sons with him, 
Princes Sabahaddin and Lutfullah. Although Mahmud Pasha’s coming to Europe and 
his will to immediately contact Ahmed Riza had created a certain excitement within 
the Young Turks, also partly due to the status and financial resources of Mahmud 
Pasha, he could not pursue active politics due to his diminishing health and Prince 
Sabahaddin would be the ultimate new member of the Young Turk circles as a result 
of this escape. If Ahmed Riza was the positivist, Prince Sabahaddin during the course 
of the events would become a liberal of the British variety. Moreover, he would 
initiate and keep contact with the Armenian revolutionary group Dashnaktsutiun and 
become involved in the tax revolts in the Eastern Anatolia and Black Sea regions in 
1906-1907. So, despite Damad Mahmud Pasha’s inactivity, his estrangement from 
the Sultan and his escape contributed to the development and diversity of the Young 
Turk movement deeply.
Once again, we observe the importance of including the different dimensions 
of the Hamidian regime in the causes of the Young Turk revolution. In the last 
chapter, we focused on his policy inclinations, in the military, education and 
administrative fields. For the purposes of this chapter, his approach towards the 
opposition, including his methods of repression and rapprochement and his choices 
regarding the Ottoman-European dealings, will be of paramount importance. As his 
choices and limitations were realized within the parameters of a competitive 
European politics, we turn now to the European affairs in relation with the Ottoman 
state and the Young Turks.
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5.2.1.1 The oscillating peace in Europe and the Ottoman Empire
As the new imperialism was spreading to and intensifying in other parts of the
world, most notably the Far East and Africa, conflicts and diplomacy over the
European periphery slowed down. Russia, involved in Far Eastern politics, wanted to
protect the status quo in the Eastern Question. An early partition of the Ottoman
Empire would create more problems than it solved and most probably to the
detriment of Russia.
“When the Austrians eventually recognized this, in 1897, the 
way was open for an entente between Vienna and St. Petersburg 
that put Balkan affairs ‘on ice’ and did more to stabilize the
European state system itself than any other bilateral agreement 
of the era.”211
Britain’s occupation of Egypt and the subsequent intensification of what is 
also called her isolation in European politics only accelerated by the shift of the 
European clashes to other parts of the world. The Boer War, the Fachoda crisis and 
other conflicts that Britain found herself in, got only worse with the new Weltpolitik 
of Germany.
Hence, the stabilization of the European state system could not be achieved 
solely by a relative peace period over the Balkans. As mentioned earlier, Germany, 
under the new Kaiser and without Bismarck was claiming its right to be not only a 
European power but a world power. In its claim, Germany was neither alone nor 
marginal. The armament that started to increase around the 1870s continued to 
increase even further. Empires became bigger and public opinions more eager about
211 F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914 
(London: Longman, 2005), 253.
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expansion.212 “Imperialism was a popular cause in England in the 1890s.”213 
Germany, with the new Weltpolitik, was pursuing every international affair, 
including conflicts such as the Boer War, to mark its print on the global scene. Even 
familiar names supported this new agenda. “Max Weber’s inaugural lecture at the 
University of Freiburg in 1895 was typical. He claimed that German unification 
would prove but a youthful folly unless it was followed by Weltmachtpolitik”214
Weber’s choice of direction for German expansionism was indeed realized
and soon. Three years after his speech, the Kaiser visited the Ottoman Empire for the
second time and made his famous speech in Damascus, announcing his friendship
towards the Muslims publicly. From many aspects, this visit was a success both for
the Kaiser and the Sultan.215 Firstly, the Kaiser’s speech and declared intentions
towards Muslims boosted the Sultan’s position as a caliph addressing the whole
Muslim world. Two points made by Kay all and Georgeon are important in
understanding the heightened voice of Pan-Islamism in the Hamidian regime.
“What makes Islamism politically important was that it gained 
ascendancy in opposition to the political interests of the 
European powers that traditionally had abetted Ottoman 
territorial integrity. Islamism was the child of changing 
international and economic relations in Europe and the position
212 “Piecemeal and for a variety of reasons the British increased their empire vastly between 1880 and 
1905, so that at the end of the process the population of the British colonies was estimated to be over 
345.000.000, at a time when the United Kingdom itself had some 40.500.000 inhabitants.” Joll, 83.
213 Ibid., 83.
214 Bartlett, The Global Conflict, 21.
215 For the success and the glory of having hosted the monarch of a Great European Power, the Sultan 
spent ten percent of the empire’s budget, which was mostly spent on the gifts for the Kaiser and his 
circles and for the construction of a special wing in the Yildiz Palace for Kaiser’s accommodation. 
Georgeon, 395.
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that the Ottoman Empire acquired in the neoimperialist status 
quo.” 216
As Britain, Russia and France were drifting away from their traditional 
attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire, Abdulhamid was trying to create an Ottoman 
way of navigating in international politics. Among his several moves to create more 
manoeuvring space for the Ottoman state in the new imperialist era was precisely this 
Pan-Islamism,217 which was only fed further by the Kaiser’s attitude and Germany’s 
new ambitions towards the Near East. “With the support of Wilhelm II’s Germany 
who was advocating a made in Germany kind of Pan-Islamism, the politics of the 
position of the caliphate took a more aggressive turn and it became clear that it could 
be a formidable weapon in the hands of Abdtilhamid.”218 Although the actual use of 
the weapon did not produce such formidable results, it also entered the list of Young 
Turk frustrations. Despite the existence of Islamist individuals among their own 
circles, the Young Turks remained starkly secular under the leadership of Ahmed 
Riza before the turn of the century.
Another aspect of the Kaiser’s visit in 1898 was the Baghdad Railway 
Project. This project had repercussions in politics, economics and international 
diplomacy alongside the Young Turk opposition to it. As negotiations bore fruit after
216 Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1908 -  1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 32.
217 That Hamidian Panislamism was instrumental in nature rather than stemming from a genuine faith 
in the umma politics was mentioned in the last chapter. It is now widely agreed upon in the literature. 
Here, a quote from Akarli should suffice: “”If he pretended to the leadership of all Muslims, this was 
only to foil foreign pressures on the Ottoman government by gaining leverage over the European 
powers who had Muslim dominions. In other words, Abdulhamid was an Ottoman Sultan before he 
was the Great Muslim Caliph.” Akarli, “The Problems of External Pressures,” 60-61.
218 Georgeon, 396.
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the visit and Hamid, against the will of the pro-British bureaucracy, approved the 
grant of the concession to the Germans, the Young Turks saw this as another move 
towards the selling out of the fatherland. Georgeon’s quote from the Osmanli journal, 
mentioned earlier, demonstrates the growing anti-imperialist tendency among most 
of the Young Turks -  hence it supports the claim in the beginning of this section. 
Contrary to Keyder’s depiction, the Young Turks became more resentful towards the 
West as the century was ending: “The only thing left to be sold as a privilege by the
9 1 0Sultan is air; sooner or later he will sell that too and the people will suffocate.” 
The sultan seems to have been direct target but criticizing the long standing and 
escalating system of capitulations and concessions point to another target: European 
powers and specifically Germany. However, it was Germany that Abdulhamid was 
holding on to in the competitive international environment, which produced adverse 
results for the Ottoman Empire in the short and long terms. It certainly became a 
factor in the rapprochement of Great Britain and Russia.220
The Baghdad Railway took on a national importance for both Germany, who 
saw the partial realization of the Weltpolitik and for the Ottoman Empire, where 
Abdulhamid saw it as a diplomatic victory, in an international environment 
increasingly hostile to his regime. Also, as with his other modernization projects, 
such as the telegraph, he saw the railway as an expansion of his central authority to 
inner Anatolia and into the Arab territories. In an empire full of upheavals in distant
219 Ibid., 399.
220 “With the rapprochement between Germany and Austria-Hungary and under pressures from the 
German industry which had entered an expansionist phase, Germany made advances towards Ottoman 
territories and economy. This, inevitably, was going to push Russia towards the line of Britain and 
France. As a result of the Franco-Russian detente in 1893 and the Franco-British rapprochement after 
1902, Russia parted from Germany.” ilber Ortayli, Osmanli imparatorlugu’nda Alman niifuzu 
(Istanbul: Alkim, 2005), 26.
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territories, the sheer ability to reach these territories and communicate with them as 
fast and efficiently as possible was an almost personal concern to him. “Railways 
were an opportunity for bolstering the sultan’s political authority in the regions that it 
stretched to, in other words a tool for centralization.”221
A recapitulation of the politics of Empire and the world around it is necessary 
before we delve into the details of the Young Turks politics in exile and the 1902 
Congress of the Ottoman Opposition in Paris. The story so far reveals two important 
points regarding the case and the theoretical insights of this chapter. The first point is 
on the constitution and composition of the agency. It was mentioned in the 
introduction that various elements went into the constitution of the Ottoman agency 
and using the ideational versus material dichotomy in this context would be 
misleading. The change in the group of individuals that are identified as Young 
Turks was, as we have seen, first and foremost triggered by the Sultan’s triumph in 
defeating the movement in the Empire and specifically in the capital. Indeed, the 
Young Turks would try to establish quarters in Istanbul but failed to do so until their 
victory in the revolution, which is an evidence of the Sultan’s success in this 
struggle. Not satisfied with having exiled many to far provinces and caused many to 
escape to Europe, the Sultan pursued the politically active members of the opposition 
abroad as well. By pressuring the host countries and by offering the members 
positions and deals, he succeeded in having Murad Bey, the temporary leader of the 
organization, returned to the Empire. If the elimination of the organization within the 
Empire took away the possibility of political action, the pacification of Murad Bey 
caused Ahmed Riza to become the leader of the group and hence his positivism and
221 Georgeon, 396.
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disgust for bloody revolutionary activity prevailed for some time. Although he would 
receive internal opposition, he would encounter another competitor only during the 
1902 Congress. All this failure on the part of the Young Turks caused these 
immediate results and more. It forced various members to rethink the whole cause 
and its method and consequently the various divisions among them. The Sultan, with 
his foreign policy choices, also contributed to a European diplomacy that would not 
be favourable towards the Young Turks.
This brings us to the second point on the changing nature of the international- 
domestic interaction. When we remember the quote from Akarli from the beginning 
of the chapter, it is fair to say that the late 1880s and 1890s were harsher in 
competition compared to the 1870s and early 1880s. This had its toll on the Ottoman 
state. Abdulhamid’s foreign policy strategy of stalling and neutrality which had 
worked fairly well in the implementation of the Berlin Treaty and in the fading away 
of the Armenian crisis was now harder to hold on to. As Britain’s strategic interests 
shifted from the Straits to the Suez Canal and even to Central Asia, the British card 
against Russian expansionism did not function anymore. This happened in parallel to 
the Hamidian insistence on the maximum independence from foreign interference. 
However, the late 1890s witnessed the emergence of the nucleus of the Triple 
Entente and neutrality was replaced with rapprochement with Germany.
Another development occurred at the same time, what contemporaries called 
the penetration pacifique. The European investments of various kinds and the 
concession grants acquired through penetration pacifique were defended rigorously 
by the European governments. In this, they seemed to cooperate rather than compete.
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A handful of organizations, most notably the Public Debt Administration (founded in 
1881) regulated the competition and ensured the safe functioning of European 
operations. They also “played crucial roles in brokering the economic and political 
differences among industrial powers.”222 Indeed, it was not a rare phenomenon for 
the Great Powers to agree on some common issues. An interesting example is the 
Boxer Rising in China, where the rival Great Powers collaborated on the containment 
of the situation in 1900 when a common threat bounded them all.223 The commercial 
interests and any fear of harm towards them provided the same results. Another 
example is their defence against Hamidian advances to lessen the foreign influences 
in smaller issues such as the foreign post offices in the Empire. “Abdulhamid thought 
that they would disagree (...) He was mistaken: On the contrary, they supported each 
other.”224 Besides, each power of considerable importance had some sort of backing 
acquired by various means in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Indeed, the Sultan was not 
the only Ottoman actor who had to act and be creative within the limits of these 
multiple dimensions of international influence. Ahmed Riza’s faction of the Young 
Turks picked up on the subject as well and gradually adopted a different rhetoric 
towards the foreign influences. “According to this discourse the Western penetration, 
though seemingly pacifique, was a dangerous one. Its consequences were apparent in 
what had happened to the native Americans, Sudanese, Boers and Chinese.”225
222 Ibid., 216
223 “In the event, the interests of the powers in the Far East proved perfectly capable of 
accommodation and fears of an actual partition subsided. On the occasion of the Boxer Rising of 
1900, as many as ten powers, displaying (except for Japan) that same sense of Christian solidarity that 
they had formerly displayed towards the Armenian massacres in Constantinople and the Greco- 
Ottoman war, joined forces in an international expedition under the Kaiser’s friend, General 
Waldersee, to inflict condign punishment on the violators of the legations in Peking.” Bridge and 
Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914,257.
224 Georgeon, 412.
225 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 35.
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So, the change of the Hamidian foreign policy and the shifting alliances in 
Europe were mutually dependent on each other. Of course, the latter had more 
influential powers on the former but, as Hamid’s informal alliance with the Germans 
demonstrates, the Ottoman actions had a certain degree of influence as well. Several 
other interests, most notably the economic ones also have to be included in the 
equation. Hence, the international-domestic interaction was constant only in its mere 
existence. Its dimensions, density and nature fluctuated according to the 
circumstances. The revolutionary process between the years 1906-1908, with the 
culmination of the international conditions of the ten decades under the investigation 
in this chapter, will testify even more to this theoretical insight: it is not enough to 
account for the existence of the international-domestic interaction. The crucial issue 
for the discipline of IR and HS in IR is to show the various levels at which it was 
functioning and to be able to produce comparisons among eras and within a single 
case.226 These two points will be further expanded and re-evaluated once the political 
conditions of the early years of 1900s have been examined.
5.2.1.2 The 1902 Congress of Ottoman opposition
The Young Turks could not find much political space to be active in after 
their defeat. However, they did find time to rethink the cause and also to have their 
first congress, which crystallized the growing tensions within the group and caused 
the emergence of two separate camps, conventionally called the majority group 
(under the leadership of Prince Sabahaddin) and the minority group (under the 
leadership of Ahmed Riza). Both groups were actually coalitions, though the inner
226 Of course, although it is not within the scope of this thesis, comparisons among different cases 
from this angle would be very productive for the same purposes.
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clashes of the minority group are more of historical importance. Some of the Young 
Turks who had taken the Sultan’s deal and were appointed to certain positions in the 
Ottoman embassies in Europe returned back to political activity. Among them there 
was a group of members, described by Hanioglu as activists. They would join 
Ahmed Riza’s minority group in the aftermath of the 1902 Congress. The lines of 
diversion would cut across the issue of foreign intervention and support on behalf of 
the Ottoman reformers. A second point of diversion would be the method of toppling 
down the Hamidian regime, an aim shared by all Young Turks from all groups.
The Young Turk activities immediately prior to the 1902 Congress could not 
be of real importance. There were several reasons: the decreased membership, the 
lack of financial sources, the loss of important figures to the Hamidian regime and 
the Sultan’s incessant pressure on the European governments to expel the Young 
Turks and ban their activities. As Hanioglu calls it, these pressures on the European 
governments and the Young Turks responses and appeals to their diplomats rendered 
the issue a European affair: “Due to increasingly cordial relations between the 
Ottoman and German empires, the sultan requested the help of German diplomats 
and thus elevated the Young Turk movement from a mere domestic problem into a 
matter of European diplomacy.”227 An important example of the Young Turks’ 
countermeasures against Hamidian pressures on Europe was Ahmed Riza’s 
participation in the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, despite the fact that he was not 
invited. He also convinced an Armenian activist to join him in this venture.228 The 
conference had been summoned to discuss the alarming armament issue and to
227 Hanioglu, Young Turks in Opposition, 126-127.
228 Ibid., 127.
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contribute to the general peace upon the suggestion of the Russian tsar who found the 
burden of the armament too much to bear.
Ahmed Riza’s transformation from an admiration of Europeans to a more 
cautious attitude towards them occurred around the same time. In his dealings with 
the European diplomats and intellectuals and in his observations of world politics, he 
came to believe that the enlightened European men were hypocritical. His criticism 
towards the penetration pacifique was mentioned earlier. He questioned the claim of 
superiority of the Europeans and “as such, the already existing opposition towards 
the capitulations was coupled with the suspicious European behaviours towards the 
Turks and the hidden chauvinism of the European intellectuals and the 
disappointment that the Young Turks felt resulted in a harsher and intolerant rhetoric 
to prevail in Mechveret after 1900.”229 Ramsaur also mentions that Ahmed Riza 
became frustrated with the fact that Turks were the only group in the Empire to lack 
a foreign protector.230 It was with this mindset that Ahmed Riza accepted the 
invitation of Prince Sabahaddin to convene the 1902 Congress.
Also joining the Congress were the activist group, who wanted more radical 
action but were powerless to actually pursue it; and the Armenian, Greek and 
Albanian representatives; Prince Sabahaddin; and some members from the old 
nucleus of the CUP. The number of the participants was 47 in total and due to 
Ottoman pressure on the French government the congress had to convene in a private 
residence in Paris on February 4-9, 1902. Despite Prince Sabahaddin’s efforts to be
229 Mardin, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 154
230 Ramsaur, 84.
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all encompassing and compromising, the subjects of disagreement could not be 
avoided. “The disagreement occurred on specifically two topics: the European 
intervention and the resort to violence.”231
The parties in the debate were roughly Prince Sabahaddin and the Armenian,
Greek and Albanian representatives; and Ahmed Riza and the activists. It is
important to note that the former parliament member from Syria and the only Arab
representative, Khalil Ghanem supported the minority group led by Ahmed Riza.
Another crucial note is the mild presentation of each position. Prince Sabahaddin did
not want to look like he was betraying his own Empire; however, he found the
Armenian support necessary to attract European attention. He insisted that they did
not want an actual intervention but moral support on the matter. Ahmed Riza, on the
other hand, did not want to give the image of being anti-European. In his minority
appeal, he stressed that:
“We are not against Europe as we are unjustly accused. On the 
contrary, to imitate their progress throughout our country is our 
prime and sacred aim. Thus, what causes die disagreement 
between us is not that [we are against Europe] -  it is pro or con 
stand toward foreign intervention.”232
The Congress crystallized the existing tensions and made them publicly 
visible. The majority group, despite its name, was less experienced, less active and 
less coherent. In fact, one can hardly speak of a solid Turkish, Armenian, Albanian 
and Greek collaboration in the years that followed. The minority in turn were 
experienced in publication, propaganda and included the activists. The activities of
231 Georgeon, 437.
232 The quotation is taken from Hanioglu, Young Turks in Opposition, 196. He quotes the text from 
two separate journals. “Yeni Osmanlilar Kongresi,” Intikam, no. 50, 3, and “Ahrar-i Osmaniye 
Kongresi,” Kurdistan, no. 31, 4.
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these groups in the following years will be examined throughout the sections below, 
with special importance placed on the radicalization and reorganization of the 
minority group, also called by Hanioglu as the ‘coalition’. The minority group were 
also going to have inner clashes, especially on the issues of violence and method of 
revolution.
Having the Sultan as the common target and a constitutional regime as the 
ultimate objective were not enough to force them even to a tactical alliance and this 
was in the face of a terrible defeat and a confusing international political scene. In 
this fact, we can observe the deep and powerful division over the issue of foreign 
intervention. Only if we study some of the actual examples of intervention we can 
grasp why both sides felt the need to defend their positions. In parallel with the 
points of emphasis on the issue of agency, the study of the world to which they 
reacted and in which they emerged, these ideas would lead to a true understanding of 
the agency under investigation. A symbolic, politically significant and historically 
crucial example, especially in the context of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, is 
the Macedonian issue. After all, it is where the Balkan peoples, the Great Powers, the 
Hamidian regime, the Ottoman army and the Young Turks intersected and it is where 
the revolution was realized in 1908.
5.2.2 The Macedonian question
The Balkans233 was the hotspot of the Eastern Question for many decades and 
a matter of international struggle as explained in the preceding chapter. It was
233 “From a geographical point of view, the defining feature of the region is its mountainous character. 
Balkan derives from the Turkish word for mountain and nearly 70% of the land area is comprised of
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mentioned that the Berlin Treaty had created the seeds of future conflicts and the 
Macedonian Question was the centre of the conflict at the turn of the century. Many 
of the obvious and subtle themes of the Young Turk opposition and revolution could 
be seen in this issue. “For the Ottoman Empire the Macedonian Question was a 
question of existence in Europe.”234 It was the only meaningful piece of territory left 
in Europe after the defeats of the 19th century. It was commercially, historically, 
politically significant and also a matter of prestige and integrity for the Empire. For 
the Young Turks, with their close but also complicated relations with the Albanians, 
it always had importance but that importance was going to reach a very high level 
with the developments at the beginning of the century. The fate of Macedonia and 
the Young Turk movement was going to be symbiotically tied, especially after the 
reorganization of Ahmed Riza’s faction into the CPU and after its merger with the 
Ottoman Freedom Society -  an opposition society founded by young officers in the 
III. Army in Macedonia. “The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 is inextricably linked 
to the further development of the Macedonian question.”235 In the greater scheme of 
politics, the Macedonian Question reflected the complicated nature of Great Powers 
politics and was affected by the changes in world politics, such as the Russo- 
Japanese war and 1905 Revolution in Russia. Indeed, as one scholar argues, the 
Great Powers showed their influence in an unprecedented level in Macedonia, where 
even the gendarmerie became a European institution. Their continuous intervention
mountains.” Tom Gallagher, Outside Europe: The Balkans, 1789-1989 From the Ottomans to 
Milosevic (London: Routledge, 2001), 6.
234 Mehmet Hacisalihoglu, “The Young Turk Revolution and the Negotiations for the Solution of the 
Macedonian Question,” Turcica 36 (2004): 165.
235 Fikret Adanir, “The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1912,” in The Formation o f 
National Elites: Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 
1850-1940, ed. Andreas Kappeler (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 174.
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and the responses from the locals and the neighbouring Balkan countries left its mark 
in the region: “Just as Macedonia as a geographical region was invented by European 
geographers and ethnographers in the 19th century; the “Macedonian Question” was 
a creation of European diplomacy after the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878.”236
The chain of events that led to a very insecure and violent Macedonia started
with the Bulgarian issue. In the preceding chapter, the story was told of the Bulgarian
ambitions and how the Berlin Treaty, overriding the Treaty of San Stefano, led to a
divided Bulgaria, with Eastern Rumelia under Ottoman control. In 1895, the
Bulgarian revolt succeeded in the union and began to look over to Macedonia, which
they considered as an essentially Bulgarian region. The Bulgarian claims provoked
the other Balkan countries, caused frustration in the Albanian and Turkish
communities and finally led to the deeper involvement of the European Powers. The
literature considers the Crete revolt -  which had caused the Greco-Ottoman war of
1897; and by the intervention of European powers, the island won its autonomy -
also as an inspiration for the Bulgarians. The method was as follows:
“First, guaranteeing the support of one of the Great Powers and 
then initiating an upheaval in Macedonia; because it was known 
that the factor that made the political autonomy possible was
not really the revolt itself The real element was the intervention
of a Great Power on behalf of the rebels.”237 
With the Austro-Russian agreement on the protection of the status quo in
1897, and hence, with active Russian support for the Slavs out of the picture, the
Bulgarian militants felt that violent attacks were the only solution to attract other
Powers’ attention and achieve their aims of establishing Bulgarian dominion over
236 Ipek K. Yosmaoglu, “Counting Bodies, Shaping Souls: The 1903 Census and National Identity in 
Ottoman Macedonia,” International. Journal o f Middle East Studies 38, no. 1 (2006): 59.
237 Adamr, Makedonya Sorunu, 150.
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Macedonia. The Sultan was contributing to the complexity of the situation by 
favoring this or the other Christian group and thereby causing competition among 
them, though he seems to have favoured Greeks more than the Bulgarians and the 
Serbs. “Therefore, the Bulgarians were forced to a position where they had to fight 
against the Greeks and Serbs more than the Ottoman forces.”238 Another interesting 
Ottoman response to the situation was refraining from intense fights against the 
Christian bands, so as to prevent a whole-scale European attention on the topic.239
Even this brief outline on the causes of violence in Macedonia confirms the 
general understanding of this thesis. The Macedonian revolutionary committees240, 
with separate backing from several Balkan countries, were moving within a space 
built by themselves, by the respective Balkan governments, by the various attitudes 
of the Great Powers, by other similar examples from different regions, including 
Crete and Armenia and of course by the Sultan and the Ottoman state in the longer 
term. Their leap from committees publishing journals and engaging in cultural 
activities to becoming armed bands, kidnapping foreigners, murdering civilians and 
even terrorizing their own respective communities can only be understood by the 
continuous shift in the international, imperial and local contexts and in their 
particular interaction at the turn of the century. This point is supportive of this
238 Georgeon, 37.
239 Adamr, Makedonya Sorunu, 161.
240 One has to qualify the term Macedonian. For the period under investigation, Macedonian did not 
refer to a separate ethnicity or even language. It referred to the people living in this territory. “In the 
nineteenth century the term Macedonian was used almost exclusively to refer to the geographic 
region; the Macedonians were usually not considered a nationality separate from the Bulgarians, 
Greeks, Serbs or Albanians. The diplomatic records of the period make no clear mention of a separate 
Macedonian nation.” Barbara Jelawich, History o f the Balkans, Twentieth Century Vol. 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 91.
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chapter’s insights on agency and its composition and on the importance of studying 
the various links between the international and the domestic. Now we turn to the 
upheavals and their consequences in Macedonia in 1900s to see these links more 
closely.
As explained, the Bulgarian activists were the most influential in the region 
and had several organizations. Over the course of history, they too were divided 
internally. Two organizations are worth mentioning here: the External Organization 
(also called the Supreme Macedonian Committee) -  which was connected to 
Bulgaria and was working for the union with Bulgaria and the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) -  which was more locally based and was 
working more towards the autonomy of Macedonia.241 After the suppression of the 
upheavals and after being pursued heavily by the Ottoman forces, it was going to 
split further into left and rightwing camps, with the leftwing establishing relations 
with the CPU and even contemplating advocating a constitutional Turkey, rather than 
autonomy.242 There were also Greek, Serbian and Albanian organizations. Also 
residing in Macedonia were Jews, Vlachs and Gypsies.
It is interesting to notice the pattern of revolts and international interventions 
in the region. When the Supreme Committee initiated the Friday Revolt on 
September 23, 1902, it was suppressed, but a convention of Great Powers over the 
issue of reform in Macedonia followed just months later and in February 1903, the
241 “Another turning point in the development of the Macedonian conflict was the establishment of the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in 1893 in Salonica and that of a similar 
organization called the Supreme Committee or the External Organization (Vurkhovists) in Sofia in 
1895.” Yosmaoglu, 60.
242 “The idea of a constitutional Turkey as a solution for the Macedonian Question was winning wider 
support in the left circles.” Mehmet Hacisalihoglu, “The Young Turk Revolution”, 172-173.
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Vienna Program was suggested to the Sultan. The core idea of the program was as 
follows: “The Gendarmerie has to include Christians and Muslims based on the 
population percentages. The Government will appoint foreign officers for the 
reorganization of the gendarmerie. (...) The three provinces243 will have their own 
budgets.”244 The program did not bring autonomy and the Sultan thought that it was 
not really different from the reforms that he intended to implement. The Ottoman 
government accepted the program immediately. However, its implementation faced 
difficulties and the Albanian resistance to what they understood to be the 
preparations for the future partition of Macedonia among Balkan countries was 
formidable. 245
The issue, however, was far from being resolved. A bigger revolt followed 
these discussions of reform. This time it was the IMRO that led the upheaval. It is 
generally referred to as the Ilinden Revolt (as the starting day was St. Elijah’s day). It 
occurred only a few months after the acceptance of the reform program designed by 
European powers, in August 1903. The Muslim population of Macedonia, Albanians 
and Turks alike, supported the Ottoman troops, alongside the Greeks. The revolt was 
suppressed and no major intervention favouring autonomy arrived, contrary to the 
insurgents’ expectations. What followed was yet another reform program: The 
Mtirzsteg Reform Program in October 1903. This program was designed by Austria-
243 It refers to the three provinces (Vilayet-i Selase) that the Ottoman Empire had marked as 
Macedonia, though it did not use this term. These were Kosovo, Salonica and Monastir.
244 Adamr, Makedonya Sorunu, 171.
245 The Albanians even resorted to violence when they saw that Christians were allowed into the 
gendarmerie. Unwillingly, the Sultan approved of the suppression of the Albanian resistance and “the 
grand vizier informed the Austria-Hungary’s ambassador that the Albanian resistance was completely 
crushed on May 23.” Ibid., 182.
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Hungary and Russia. A notable contribution came from a British memorandum and 
the program was finally supported by France and Italy as well. The program, among 
many other reform suggestions was providing “for foreign advisers and for a 
gendarmerie under great power control. It also had a clause stipulating that 
Macedonia should be divided into districts based on ethnic divisions. This provision 
simply gave rise to further battles between armed groups, each attempting to secure 
control of a distinct area.”246
The revolts led to reform programmes by the foreign powers which caused 
further and deeper conflicts between the Macedonian peoples and the Ottoman 
Empire, as well as between the Powers and the Ottoman state. A good example of the 
second case is the Great Powers’ insistence on further financial control over 
Macedonian budget, which the Sultan resisted fiercely. With neither side 
compromising, Great Britain, Russia, France, Austria-Hungary and Italy decided to 
show off their naval powers to force Abdulhamid to back down. “When Germany 
refused to participate, the other 5 states gathered their ships at Pire and advanced 
towards the Straits, on 26 November [1905], the international fleet discarded to 
Midilli, took over the customs office, and invaded the post office and the telegraph 
office.”247 The Sultan finally accepted their demands.
Although this brief overview of the Macedonian Question does not do justice 
to the complex history of the region, it sets the ground for the further Young Turk 
related developments that will be presented in the next chapter. Such was the state of 
Macedonia when the Young Turks both intentionally and somewhat out of choice
246 Jelawich, 95.
247 Georgeon, 426.
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decided to make the region the centre of the revolutionary activities. Also this state
of affairs, where all the relevant actors for the purposes of analyzing the revolution
have intersected and interacted, will be crucial in understanding why the opposition
took root among the young officers’ circles in Macedonia. Ryan Gingeras sums up
the situation as follows:
“As in the cases of intercommunal conflict in Mount Lebanon 
and Eastern Anatolia, local tensions in Macedonia were 
manifestations of a broader discontent with the centralization 
efforts of the Ottoman government and the imperial designs of 
the European Powers.”2 8
The region would prove to be fertile ground for revolutionary groups who 
were opposing both the Ottoman state and the designs of the European Powers. 
Furthermore, trying to accommodate the multitude of religious and political 
orientations of the Macedonian peoples, the Young Turks would manipulate their 
propaganda accordingly. But just before their revolutionary activities accelerated in 
the region, three important international events had manipulated the Young Turks 
themselves. These were the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Russian Revolution 
of 1905 and the Iranian Revolution of 1906.
5.2.3 1905-1906: Preparation for action
These two years present a true turning point for the Young Turks. The 
international developments that led to the 1905 Russian Revolution and the 1906 
Iranian Revolution itself undeniably effected the Young Turks a great deal and 
mostly in an encouraging fashion. Another development internal to the Young Turks, 
however, was even more effective in bolstering the movement and accelerating the
248 Ryan Gingeras, “A Break in the Storm Reconsidering Sectarian Violence in Ottoman Macedonia 
during the Young Turk Revolution,” The MIT Electronic Journal o f Middle East Studies 3 (2003): 33.
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transformation from political ideas and conspiracies to political activities and in 
leading the way for a genuine preparation for the revolution. That was the joining of 
two medical doctors, Dr. Nazim and most importantly Dr. Bahaeddin §akir to the 
Young Turks’ ranks in Paris. What had come to be known as the CPU, became a 
truly revolutionary organization rather than a media source for intellectuals. It is 
impossible to grasp the reasons for the success of the Young Turk Revolution 
without a clear understanding of these developments.
5.2.3.1 One war and two Revolutions
We shall single out two repercussions of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904- 
1905 for our purposes. Firstly, the Japanese victory resulted in a change in European 
political rivalry. With Japan eliminating Russia from the struggle over the Far East, 
and particularly over China, the road to the British-Russian entente was opened 
further. And with Russia having lost its stakes in the Far East, the Balkan issue 
would see a return of Russian interest. Both of these spill-over effects would have 
their consequences for the delicate Ottoman status in the Near Eastern Question. A 
British-Russian agreement over the Balkans upset the already damaged Ottoman 
protection against Russia and the hopes for keeping the European territories in the 
Empire. The Balkans seemed to be ready for partition and this created various 
disturbances. This frustration on the part of the Ottoman peoples would provide 
fertile ground for the Young Turk activities in Macedonia and the infamous Reval 
Meeting between the British King and the Russian Tsar in the summer of 1908 
would accelerate the Young Turks’ revolutionary activities and contribute to the 
timing of the Revolution. The details of the impact of these newly developing
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alliances will figure a great deal in explaining the course of the Young Turk 
Revolution in the next chapter.
The second repercussion of the Russo-Japanese war had again two important 
aspects to it: The interpretation and reception of the Japanese victory and the 1905 
Revolution in Russia by the Ottoman opposition. The victory of an Asian power with 
a reformed and modernized administration over the eternal European enemy had 
created political excitement over the whole Ottoman Empire and vitalized the 
disillusion in absolutist monarchy. The Young Turks’ interpretation was as follows: 
“It was due to the constitution, the Chamber of Deputies, and principles of 
consultation that Japan had entered the ranks of Great Powers and conclusively 
defeated the enormous Russia on land and water.”249 The fact that the Japanese 
political transformation was bloodless and designed by an elite group also fascinated 
the alike-minded Young Turk members. There was a twist to this admiration though. 
As Worringer reveals, the Japanese example could be used both by the opposition 
and its target, namely the Sultan and his circles. “Thus, the Japan metaphor 
functioned as a defense mechanism for the authority against the critical subordinate 
voice.”250 The Japanese example had a deep impact on politically minded Ottomans 
of various camps; however, the 1905 Revolution, to which the emergence of the 
Japanese victory contributed, was going to scare the Sultan and further please and 
encourage the Ottoman opposition. Followed by the 1906 Iranian Constitutional
249 Nader Sohrabi, “Global Waves, Local Actors: What the Young Turks Knew about Other 
Revolutions and Why It Mattered,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 44, no. 1 (2002): 55.
250 Renee Worringer, ““Sick Man of Europe” or Japan of the Near East?: Constructing Ottoman 
Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras,” International Journal o f Middle East Studies 36, 
no. 2 (2004): 213.
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Revolution, the opening up of parliaments and consultative regimes in the 
neighbouring countries would even have an impact on the masses to a certain extent 
during the Eastern Anatolian revolts in 1906-1907.251
Sohrabi’s central claim on the interaction between these two revolutions and 
the Young Turks organizations at the time is that, in addition to adding to their self- 
confidence with regards to the constitutionalist cause, they added to the repertoire of 
action of the Young Turks. The existence of a disciplined organization in Russia and 
their approach to the masses, argues Sohrabi, had caused an admiration and re- 
evaluation of the available means of action. By analyzing the articles of the §ura-yi 
Ummet, the journal published by Ahmed Riza’s group, he finds that the 1905 
Revolution “highlighted the central role of social movement organizations and a 
dedicated cadre of revolutionaries, and the importance of the intelligentsia for 
inciting the masses and for setting the movement's broad goals beyond a mere 
revolt.”252 As with the Japanese example, the notion of vanguard elite was already an 
element of the Young Turks’ political mindset, so the feeling was sharing this 
common element rather than learning. With regards to the appeal to the masses, 
Ahmed Riza’s faction was already under such a transformation and would complete 
the transformation under a new leadership in 1906-1907, while Prince Sabahaddin 
group would find a whole new way of stirring up the masses in Eastern Anatolia. It is 
beyond doubt certain that 1905 Revolution gave a boost to the Young Turk 
movement and most certainly they were amazed with its execution rather than its 
ideology. They viewed the revolution in high regard, but “these views do not
251 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 121.
252 Sohrabi, “Global Waves, Local Actors”, 52.
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necessarily mean that either the Young Turks or the people who took part in the 
revolutionary activities shared the ideas of the Russian revolutionaries, or were even 
aware of those ideas.”253
The 1906 Iranian Constitutional Revolution was even closer to home, as the 
Iranian and Ottoman constitutionalists had a history of collaboration, at least on 
intellectual matters, and they had physical contact in the Ottoman Empire and in 
Europe, and they supported each other. The 1907 Congress of the Ottoman 
Opposition ended with an appeal for support for the Iranian constitutionalists. They 
had various common elements to discuss and share ideas upon, such as the role of 
religion, the method of response to foreign intervention, and how to fight an 
absolutist monarchy. To put it simply: “Turkish and Iranian constitutionalists 
supported each other and made a united front whenever the opportunity presented 
itself.”254
The Russo-Japanese war and the two revolutions contributed to the 
preparation and success of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The circulation of 
the ideas of constitutionalism gave further legitimation to the Young Turk insistence 
on a constitutional monarchy. However, it seems fair to say that prominent Young 
Turk leaders were more interested in the discussion on the method and organization 
of the revolution, rather than the revolutionary ideas behind these developments 
themselves. Also, as explained above, the international political repercussion behind 
these developments would be among the essential elements that went into the
253 Ibid., 122.
254 Zarinebaf, “From Istanbul to Tabriz,” 169.
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constitution of the 1908 Revolution. The two-fold influence of these internationally 
and historically significant events testifies to the multi-dimensional interaction 
between the international and the domestic. The conventional features of the 
international system such as wars and treaties undeniably showed their presence in 
this interaction in the preceding chapter. The international financial organizations, 
the local organizations from various parts of the Empire, the far away conflicts on 
other continents were all mixed up in this interaction that we are trying to 
disentangle. The two revolutions also showed us that it is not only the ideological 
aspect that is transferred between the critical groups in several empires, but also the 
repertoire of action, sometimes a sheer encouragement and boost to self-confidence 
and the spill-over international political effects, especially in a region like the Near 
East where the actors are most likely to be located within the same international 
tensions and opportunities.
The concrete repercussion of these tensions and opportunities will be evident 
in two spheres of activities of two separate Young Turks, the Sabahaddin group and 
his Armenian partners in Eastern Anatolia (1906-1907) and the Ahmed Riza group 
and the Ottoman Freedom Society in Macedonia (1906-1908). Leaving both of these 
activities that paved the way for revolution to the next chapter, we now turn to the 
transformation of the Ahmed Riza group (also called the coalition, the minority 
group, and later the CPU) into an active revolutionary organization with the coming 
of Dr. Bahaeddin §akir and Dr. Nazim.
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5.2.3.2 The emergence of the CPU as a revolutionary organization
There are a few controversies in the rather small literature on the Young Turk 
Revolution. One of them is the relationship between the CPU headquarters in Europe 
and the military cadres within the Empire, most importantly in Macedonia. The 
debate revolves around the following questions: which of these sides initiated the 
revolution, which group had the upper hand in decision making and more 
interestingly for our purposes now, would the leaders in Europe turn into 
revolutionaries at all, if it was not for their merger with the Ottoman Freedom 
Society (the military based organization in Macedonia) in 1907? For many decades, 
the debate seems to have settled on the superiority of the Ottoman Freedom Society 
over Ahmed Riza’s group and on the inactivity of the latter. With the most valuable 
contribution to the debate by Hanioglu, in his path-breaking study Preparation for a 
Revolution and also supported by Nader Sohrabi to a great extent, there is now a 
good deal of evidence supporting the argument that the coalition led by Ahmed Riza 
and composed of highly activist members had undergone a transformation with the 
joining of Bahaeddin §akir and Dr. Nazim. What they essentially changed was not 
the main objectives of the movement but the method of organization, as agreed by 
Ziircher as well: “The situation changed from 1905. Newly arrived activists 
reorganised the emigre movement into a far more effective force, with a cell 
structure and secure communications.”255
Before this transformation that Hanioglu calls reorganization, Ahmed Riza’s 
group, though more experienced and larger in numbers was not in the best of shape. 
The activist members of the group were intensely unsatisfied with Ahmed Riza’s 
lack of initiative for action. Ahmed Riza, opposing violence, was also against
255 Ziircher, “The Young Turks -  Children of the Borderlands?” 2.
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criticizing the Ottoman royal house, another division between him and the activists. 
“Ahmed Riza compared the republican criticism of the dynasty with the “barking of 
a dog at a horse”.”256 Nonetheless, neither Ahmed Riza and his colleague 
Samipa§azade Sezai, nor the activists could transcend the journal editing phase. If 
this was partially due to the ideological tendencies of Ahmed Riza, and indeed of 
many Young Turks who distrusted the masses and were appalled by the idea of 
resorting to them257, another partial reason was their lack of a solid organization to 
pursue any activity whatsoever. “The “activist” policies defended by many Young 
Turks from almost the outset of the movement always underestimated the importance 
of “organization”; to them this word did not mean anything more than a group of 
people purchasing dynamite together.”258
So, it was going to take the meticulous efforts of Dr. Bahaeddin §akir to turn 
this coalition into a revolutionary committee. His role and influence on the coalition 
is frequently likened to that of Stalin in the communist movement in Russia. It was 
also among the changes that he brought to actually name the committee the 
Committee of Progress and Union in 1906. He concentrated on establishing a solid 
organizational network and a true propaganda with mobilizing effects.259 The 
network included a centre in Paris and branches outside and inside the Empire. The 
concentration on Macedonia was a natural choice given the circumstances outlined
256 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 38.
257 “The general tendency of the Young Turks to look down upon the masses was now joined with 
another attitude: a dislike of the physical conditions of their own society, of the messiness and 
dirtiness of the East.” Mardin, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 196.
258 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 137.
259 Ibid., 137.
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above. Istanbul was particularly important for obvious reasons, yet despite their best 
efforts they could not really build a solid network there, due to the Sultan’s immense 
security system. So the strategy that was employed was to use the branches outside 
the Empire, such as Bulgaria, Romania or Crete to distribute propaganda inside. The 
branches inside the Empire were seen as branches of “action”. The propaganda also 
changed, in content and in style, modified according to the nature of the targeted 
audience. Before the reorganization, “a peculiarity of the self-styled coalition was its 
lack of a strong revolutionary praxis. The coalition confined itself to publications and 
awaited the moment when a few readers of these publications would carry out a 
miraculous revolution.”260 With the new turn of the movement after the coming of 
Bahaeddin §akir, the publications varied in style, took on shorter or longer versions, 
took the form of appeals with the intention of mobilization. Hanioglu documents in 
rich detail the different styles that the Young Turks used when addressing Christians 
or Muslims, Turks or Albanians, the military circles or the civilians.261
So, the CPU, parallel to the act of naming itself, transformed itself into an 
organization with revolutionary intentions, rather than mere wishes. Its ideology was 
not changed deeply by this reorganization, mostly because the new activist members 
were not really political ideologues but men of action. As explained above, Ahmed 
Riza’s group became increasingly anti-interventionist, had a growing tone of 
Turkism and remained conservative while it was radicalizing itself262 The Turkist 
tone or at least the emphasis on the betrayal of the non-Muslim peoples would have
260 Ibid., 173.
261 Ibid., 175-177.
262 Ibid., 190.
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to be backed down in the face of the efforts of working in Macedonia, a mix of 
ethnicities and religions. It made a more flexible use of the rhetoric of Islamism as 
well.
How could Bahaeddin §akir implement the organizational changes so easily 
without internal resistance? There isn’t a substantial explanation in the available 
literature. Nonetheless, one can attempt to arrive at a possible explanation when one 
considers both the international conditions leading up to 1905-6, that were explained 
throughout this chapter, and the state of Ottoman politics. The Young Turks were 
trapped from two fronts. The Sultan had managed to confine them to Europe, up until 
1906; he did also manage to prevent any new organizational activities within the 
Empire. The Great Power rivalry was creating an atmosphere of confusion and 
frustration, alongside a certain disillusionment with the European practices as against 
the European ideals again as explained above. The known and trusted prejudices 
against this or that interest of this or the other Power were crumbling down. New 
alliances were built over the Near Eastern issue and a new power, Germany, started 
investing its stakes in it. The year 1905 saw the victory of one reformed Asian 
Power and a revolution in Russia. 1906 continued with the Iranian constitutional 
revolution. From every angle possible the world was narrowing down on the Young 
Turks. The quick acceptance of Dr. Bahaeddin §akir’s organizational designs, 
especially by Ahmed Riza, who was so reluctant to delegate any power before, can 
only be explained by the intersection of these developments and the metamorphosis 
that they had caused on the agency in question.
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5.3 Conclusion
This chapter opened up the two theoretical insights from the last chapter 
regarding the international and the agency and the interconnectedness between them. 
While doing so, attention was drawn to the fluid but persistent nature of 
international-domestic interaction and to the constitution of agency. The inherent 
difficulty of telling a story of the causes of a revolution in this multi-layered way is 
the inclusion of various features of politics in general that are rarely used in actual 
combination, though frequently mentioned in passim while focusing on one or the 
other feature. The story of the international politics and domestic politics is 
interwoven in each others’ fabrics as well as with the stuff that agency is composed 
of. A further difficulty is to do justice to this intertwined nature of politics and to 
reveal the dialectical nature between the agents and the world around them, all the 
while trying to define the characteristics of both of them. The potential merit of this 
chapter for the purposes of this thesis would be realized if we can be convinced that 
this immanent relation between the domestic and the international that constantly 
builds and rebuilds the totality of politics, also exists between the world-historical 
moments and the agents that rose within and/or from them. From the critical juncture 
of 1878 emerged the Young Turk organization in Istanbul. The story of the decade 
between their defeat and exile and, their transformation in 1905-6 is their response to 
a different juncture, the details of which were provided above.
It is the story of their change to an organized group of actors that made 
history and the given circumstances that created a world in which they could act. The 
next chapter will show how their perceptions of the world and of their own Empire 
resulted in a revolution that bent and refracted the world to a certain extent.
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CHAPTER 6 THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION OF 1908
6.1 Introduction
In the summer of 1908, the revolt that started in Macedonia led to a regime 
change in the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan of three decades accepted the demands 
for a constitutional regime. A year later, he was to be dethroned and what is called 
the Unionist era in the Ottoman Empire would begin. The following chain of events 
and the place of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War are well known. The 
toppling down of the Hamidian regime by the opposition group, the Young Turks 
and their organization the CPU (Committee of Progress and Union) through an 
upheaval that started in Macedonia - the reasons of which will elaborated upon below 
-  forced the Sultan to announce the return of the constitutional regime that had 
actually been established three decades ago but was suspended by the Sultan after a 
short period of time. The newly introduced liberties produced an enthusiastic era 
when Ottoman politics in general entered a whole new phase of modernization. 
However, the Unionist era that started in 1908 -  the full take-over of the state 
institutions by the Unionists was only completed in 1913 -  was not going to proceed 
as the liberal revolution it promised to be. The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the 
First World War (1914-1918) would leave their marks and Unionism would witness 
the dissolution of the Empire it tried to save.
In this chapter we will look at the two years before the revolution: what will 
be called here the revolutionary process. From the reorganization of the CPU 
onwards, the Young Turks of various fractions entered a period of intense 
revolutionary activity. Although somewhat separate, this period includes the
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collaboration between Prince Sabahaddin and Dashnaktsutiun and the revolts in 
Anatolia. The merger between the CPU and the Ottoman Freedom Society was a 
critical turn along the way. This revolutionary process was intertwined with an 
international event, the detente between Russia and Great Britain, which in 1907 
resulted in the Anglo-Russian Convention and later in the Anglo-Russian 
collaboration on the Macedonian issue, the peak event being the Reval Meeting 
(1908) between the two monarchs. As the emergence of Unionism was one of the 
milestones on the road to the First World War, from an Ottoman perspective, this 
detente was one of the milestones for the international alignments that created the 
conditions and determined the course of the First World War. So these two years are 
critical to understanding the longue duree that connects the world of the mid-19th 
century to the 20th century in the Ottoman and international politics.
These two years (1906-1908) are also critical to the general intent of this 
thesis, namely to disentangle and explain the international connections of the 1908 
revolution and to enter into a discussion of the international/domestic distinction. It 
will be clear in the following narrative of the revolutionary process that, from the 
motivations of the actors to the opportunities of the world-historical moment 
presented to them and including the Sultan’s own capabilities for action -  a rather 
neglected part of the equation -  the coming of the 1908 revolution was tied to the 
world around it. The fast-moving international political scene, most visible in the 
Macedonian situation, was an obvious constitutive factor in the revolutionary 
process.
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The two other, interrelated sub-themes, namely the structure/agency and 
ideational/material dichotomies, presented themselves in the preceding history of late 
Ottoman politics and in the interaction between that history and the historical 
sociological approach to IR. An opportunity to further clarify these themes arises in 
the analysis of the revolutionary process in this period, 1906-1908. The 
transformation and further multiplication of actors and their complex set of responses 
to the Sultan, to the international conjuncture and to the material world with which 
they were linked are elements demanding a proper explanation that can only be 
provided with an appropriate understanding of the international and of agency. At the 
same time, these elements of the narrative offer insights into the way in which we 
should perceive international-domestic interaction and into the analysis of the nature 
of the agency arising from that interaction, especially in periods of change.
Although the precise influence of the Anatolian revolts on the revolutionary 
process is a matter of controversy in the field, the first section of this chapter will 
start with an analysis of the political program of Prince Sabahaddin and his activities 
in collaboration with Dashnaktsutiun, which then will lead us to the upheavals in 
several East Anatolian and Black Sea towns, the most important being the Erzurum 
revolt, where Ottoman central authority was to be absent for several months. The 
Ottoman Freedom Society and the circumstances, in which it was founded, along 
with its links to the Macedonian Question, will then be investigated. Following their 
merger with the CPU, reorganized by Bahaeddin §akir, the Ottoman Freedom 
Society was to turn Macedonia into a hotbed for Young Turk activities. Although 
somewhat inconsequential for the revolution, the 1907 Congress that followed will 
be important for our purposes of reassessing the propositions of the last chapter
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concerning the links between the international and agency, as this documents the 
positions of the different sides.
The second section will focus on the revolution itself. It will endeavour to 
make sense of this revolutionary process which, it would be fair to say, is rather 
strange when compared to other revolutions. The way events unfolded and led to the 
triumph of the revolutionaries, as well as a deeper discussion of the revolutionary 
process, will be investigated in terms of the revolutionary situation/revolutionary 
outcome distinction made by Charles Tilly in his work on theories of revolution. The 
intuition here is that, even if we leave the consequences of the revolution aside, the 
situation as it emerged in the first half of 1908 was revolutionary and as such 
deserves separate treatment. Several repercussions of this definition for the main 
theme and sub-themes of this thesis will accordingly be discussed in this section. 
Again, in line with the spirit of this work, these events will be located within their 
broader international context and without neglecting another actor and institution, the 
Sultan and the Ottoman state. The second section will conclude with an effort to tie 
together the different causes and process of the 1908 Revolution in this last chapter 
dealing with the case study. We have followed the trajectory of the emergence and 
maturing of the global, imperial and a few local conditions, starting from the political 
economic developments of the 19th century, to the political developments of the late 
19th century that constituted this revolutionary period. We now turn to the immediate 
reality of the revolution itself.
181
6.2 1906-1907: Accelerated Politics
1906 turned out to be a critical year for the Young Turk movement. One 
reason for this special importance was presented in the last chapter, namely the 
reorganization of the CPU into a disciplined revolutionary organization with the 
intention of propaganda and expansion outside and within the Empire. In this section, 
two other reasons will be provided. Firstly, Prince Sabahaddin initiated a whole new 
political agenda around his newly founded League of Private Initiative and 
Decentralisation. Related to this new League are the revolts in Eastern Anatolia, 
known in the literature as the tax revolts, as these were ignited after the imposition of 
two new taxes by the government. The role of the CPU and the League of Prince 
Sabahaddin in these revolts are intriguing pieces of Young Turk history. Secondly, a 
new society was founded in Macedonia, mostly by young officers belonging to the 
III Army in the region. The Ottoman Freedom Society, as it was called, would prove 
only a few months after its establishment, to be the needed agent of revolutionary 
activity. Merging with the CPU and expanding in Macedonia, it was to initiate and 
defend the revolution. These two developments in different regions and by somewhat 
separate actors constitute the core of the revolutionary activity that led to the yielding 
of the Sultan. Both are products of the global conjuncture, though in the case of the 
latter links are more visible and more vital to a solid account of the revolution. Both 
developments are also moments of emergence and variations in agency. With the 
objective of clarifying these themes, we now turn to Prince Sabahaddin’s League, his 
collaboration with Dashnaktsutiun, and to the tax revolts.
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6.2.1 Prince Sabahaddin and the League of Private Initiative and 
Decentralization
Prince Sabahaddin had taken refuge in the study of social sciences, politics 
having become after the 1902 Congress a realm where his efforts seemed futile. In 
his reading, especially of French scholars like Demolins, he thought that he had 
found a new way to prevent the Ottoman Empire from disintegrating, to find a place 
for it in the international arena and to solve its ethnic, religious and social problems. 
In the problems he was trying to solve, he was no different than any other member of 
the Ottoman elite, a group who had been devoting themselves for many decades by 
now to saving the Empire. “A large part of die dilemma of the Ottoman elite who 
forged the new concept of imperial sovereignty was the thin line that separated 
citizenship and subjecthood, nationness and Ottomanness.”263 Prince Sabahaddin’s 
answer to that dilemma was decentralization and individualism in the Anglo-Saxon 
style.264 Individualism and private initiative would be catalysts in an Empire that 
needed further modernization and industrialization. Decentralization, on the other 
hand, would be a solution to the ethnicity problem, but also a democratic merit in 
itself. Hence, the mere name of his organization, the League of Private Initiative and 
Decentralization, “was a program in itself.”265
263 Dina Rizk Khoury and Dane Kennedy, “Comparing Empires: The Ottoman Domains and the 
British Raj in the Long Nineteenth Century,” Comparative Studies o f South Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East 27, no. 2, (2007): 240.
264 Mardin points out an interesting clash between Prince Sabahaddin’s interpretation of Ottoman 
society from an individualist angle and the social world of the rest of the Young Turks. Inspired by 
Demolins’ praise of British society and its training of the individual, Sabahaddin came to believe that 
the state was too protective towards the individual and that the large segment of state officials of 
various sorts was an adverse effect of this society. “Attacking this ‘public servant’ itself and 
considering the public service as a harming activity, was a very deep social criticism in a country 
where all sorts of ‘elite’ were public servants themselves.” Mardin, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 
213-214.
265 Georgeon, 451.
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Prince Sabahaddin was reacting not only to what he had been studying, but to 
a political world which included the complicated nature of Ottoman and European 
politics and also to the political attitudes of his adversaries, Ahmed Riza’s CPU, now 
more bolstered than ever after Bahaeddin §akir’s interventions. After the foundation 
of the League and the publication of a new journal, Terakki, Prince Sabahaddin faced 
the ultimate problem: how to act/what to do? Hanioglu notes that, in this problem 
and in their lack of revolutionary activity, Ahmed Riza and Prince Sabahaddin 
resembled one another. Bahaeddin fakir’s revolutionary and practical perspective 
became the solution for Ahmed Riza, although at the expense of some of his own 
powers. “Sabahaddin Bey, however, was left with no alternative but to present 
‘decentralization’ as a privilege to be accorded to non-Turkish groups of the empire 
seeking autonomy.”266
This policy had a dual function. On the one hand, collaboration with various 
non-Turkish/non-Muslim groups, mostly with the Armenians, would serve the 
ultimate objective of Prince Sabahaddin, that of obtaining the support of the 
European Powers for a future change of regime. The history of non-Muslim politics 
in the Ottoman Empire, some aspects of which have been presented in this thesis, is a 
testament to the influences of non-Muslim political activity in attracting the attention 
of the outside world. Also, Prince Sabahaddin, placed in a difficult situation by the 
concrete developments in the CPU, had felt the need to respond and recognized the 
need to establish an organizational presence in the Empire. For this purpose he chose 
Eastern Anatolia and the Black Sea towns. “The existence of a significant Armenian 
movement in the very same region makes it difficult to believe that this was a mere
266 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 88.
184
coincidence.”267 He tried to move the League’s agents to this region and engaged in 
political activity in solidarity with the Dashnaktsutiun organization. This 
collaboration would prove to be effective in the tax revolts of late 1906 and 1907.
The emergence of the League as a political organization with concrete aims 
and means is thus a result of its interaction with the European and Young Turk 
politics and its reflection on Ottoman politics in general. Once again, we observe the 
combined process of the emergence of revolutionary agents. Combined, as in being 
the result of a specific moment in global conjuncture and also as in being 
consequential to a dialectical relationship between the ideology and the material 
world within which it was contemplated.
Prince Sabahaddin’s emphasis on decentralization gave him a more tolerant 
and confident attitude towards the involvement of the people in imperial politics. He 
was thus prepared to trust the choices of the locals on political matters. “Therefore, 
Prince Sabahaddin was ready to give credit to the rural areas, much more than most 
of the Young Turks who actually did come from these rural areas.”268 Hence, he gave 
preference to urban notables in the towns where his League was trying to channel 
their mostly economic frustrations towards a revolutionary agenda.
The point to be reiterated here is that the Prince’s choices of these towns, like 
his choice of presenting decentralization as a solution to the Ottoman Question in the
267 Ibid, 93.
268 Mardin, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 216.
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international arena, were choices emerging out of a specific intersection: the moment 
when his ideological preferences met the necessities of revolutionary action in a 
specific Ottoman and international conjuncture. The need to attract the attention of 
Europeans and to secure European intervention in support of regime change, an axis 
around which many of his political choices and ideological orientations were 
evolving, was itself a product of a particular world, where international and domestic 
political changes were intertwined and where the Ottoman Empire was on the losing 
end of the emerging European alignments. Although Prince Sabahaddin himself 
would be on the losing end of the revolutionary process and outcomes, it is important 
to note his presence in the revolutionary process and the international, global and 
local conditions that made this possible. This is essential not only because his 
politics provide further feedback for our theoretical insights, but also because his 
League played a significant role in the tax revolts of 1906-1907.
6.2.2 Tax Revolts in Anatolia, 1906-1907
“The hero o f the revolution, Niyazi Bey, after igniting the revolt that resulted in the 
proclamation o f liberty in 1908, has sent a telegraph to the Yildiz Palace and stated that 
“The wish o f the whole nation is the enactment o f the Constitution. The persecutions in 
Erzurum did not scare the people off. On the contrary, it pushed us to further resistance 
in this cause". ”m
Although the tax revolts in Anatolia did not directly influence the 
revolutionary outcome, they were part and parcel of the revolutionary process. The 
quote above shows that the link between the Anatolian revolts and the upheaval in
269 H. Zafer Kars, 1908 Devriminin HalkDinamigi (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlan, 1997), 13.
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Macedonia which finally led to the proclamation of liberty was also established by 
the Young Turks in the latter region.270
Two distinct developments provoked and shaped these tax revolts in Anatolia. 
One was the enforcement of the two new taxes by the Ottoman government (the 
personal tax and the tax on animals) that caused great frustration on the part of rural 
residents. The already poor economic conditions became unbearable with these new 
taxes, and in addition to this there were “crop failures and price rises.”271 A second 
development was the infiltration of the League’s agents, most notably of Huseyin 
Tosun, and the constant endeavours of Armenian militants to organize and channel 
these disturbances. Rural revolts were not in fact rare in Ottoman history. “What 
seems new in July 1908 is that an economic crisis unfolded in the presence of an 
organized, widespread revolutionary cadre. For the first time in decades, there was a
979favourable juncture, of economic and political conditions.”
270 However, the historiography on the causes of the Young Turk revolution -  so scanty for an event 
of such scale -  does not really discuss or point out this link. In an article written in 1979, “The Young 
Turk Revolution: Old and New Approaches”, Donald Quataert was attempting to open these matters 
for discussion and asked the following question: Why did the Anatolian unrest not translate into 
revolutionary activity or transform the movement in Macedonia? Hitherto, no satisfactory account has 
been written. Aykut Kansu, in his famous study of the Young Turk revolution, analyzes the tax revolts 
in a separate chapter {The Revolution o f 1908 in Turkey, 29-73), yet fails to establish a clear and 
distinct link between the revolts in Anatolia and in Macedonia. Instead he attempts to find the 
demonstration effect of the Anatolian revolts on the upheaval in Macedonia. Apart from the 
encouragement and enthusiasm that these disturbances in Anatolia might have caused for the Young 
Turks in Macedonia, he also argues that these tax revolts affected the state’s capacity in an adverse 
way. “The continual disturbances in the provincial towns all over Anatolia and Macedonia, however, 
crippled the representative power of the state by the end of the year.” (Ibid., 75) Unfortunately, a solid 
answer to this debate has to be given after a detailed historical research on the subject. However, the 
content and method of these tax revolts remain important for the purposes of this study.
271 Quataert, “The Economic Climate of 1908,” 61.
272 Ibid., 61
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Discontent with economic conditions, combined with the existence of the 
League’s propaganda, led to the politicization of some of these revolts. Georgeon 
describes the general pattern of these tax revolts as follows (note that the people were 
also showing discontent towards local representatives of the state, towards corruption 
and unnecessary use of force): “the insurgents first controlled the telegraph office 
and then bombarded the Yildiz Palace and the Sublime Porte with telegraphs. Among 
their conditions they listed the abolition of the taxes and the removal of incompetent 
government officials. The telegraph, which was a tool of the regime’s centralization, 
was rendered like a boomerang and became a tool for the expression of the local 
people’s demands.”273
Abdiilhamid seems to have adopted a two-sided strategy in the face of these 
upheavals. He used compromise and suppression at the same time. While Istanbul 
sent telegraphs accepting some of the demands, it also pursued those individuals that 
it saw as the most radical and politicized.274 Upon receiving the news of the 
acceptance of their demands, the crowd in most cases started to pray for the well­
being of this generous sultan and shouted “Long live the Sultan!”275 However, in the 
famous case of Erzurum, the discontent was organized by the League’s agents and
273 Georgeon, 451.
274 “The extent of these tax revolts forced the absolutist regime to take some measures to satisfy public 
outrage. In May [1907], the Government had sent a circular to the Governors of Van, Bitlis, and 
Trabzon, instructing them to make a tour of their provinces to investigate popular grievances. They 
were also instructed to remove from office all functionaries who had been guilty of injustice and 
malpractice.” Kansu, 43.
275 “When Abdiilhamid responded to the demands of the insurgents -  generally by the removing the 
governor -  the crowd gathered in front of the telegraph office and shouted “Long Live the Sultan!” 
also they ran to the mosques and prayed for the Sultan.” Georgeon, 452.
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Armenian partners and led to a politicized revolt with the objective of constitutional 
regime.
In the case of the Erzurum revolt, which extended from 1906 to 1907, we can 
observe the fruits of the League’s collaboration with Dashnaktsutiun. The fact that 
Erzurum was where Huseyin Tosun chose to start propaganda makes sense, as 
Erzurum was an important city of the region with a great number of Armenian 
residents. The voicing of demands started in the spring of 1906 and the course of 
action adopted was that of sending petitions to Istanbul for the abolition of the new 
taxes, especially the one on animals which was harming the local economy engaged 
in raising livestock. The month of March witnessed the closing down of shops and 
civil disobedience on the part of the people of Erzurum, mostly under the guidance of 
the urban notables. They triumphed and the governor of Erzurum was removed from 
office -  one of their initial demands. The new governor encountered the difficult task 
of finding and arresting the leaders of the March revolt, an endeavour which caused 
further disturbances.276 “A crowd occupied the governor’s office and captured the 
governor who had hidden in a nearby house. He was wounded and held hostage at 
the Ibrahim Pasha Mosque.”277 The weeks that followed were an experience of 
oscillation between the Sultan’s compromises and aggressive plans and between joy 
over the successful demands and the ambition to voice all the remaining grievances, 
which included the soldiers’ demand for receipt of all the unpaid salaries. The 
inability and/or unwillingness of the central government to pay the salaries of the 
soldiers fuelled the insurgents’ anger further andi, under the guidance of the
276 Kars, 1908Devrimi’nin Halk Dinamigi, 31-32.
277 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 112.
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organized revolutionaries, the insurgents managed to cripple the authority of the 
central government. “An Azeri journal likened the situation in the town to that in 
some Iranian cities under the administration of local anjumans.”278 This situation 
lasted for months and there was a locally formed authority managing the affairs of 
the city. In November of 1907 military forces suppressed the rebellion.
There were other revolts at this time in cities like Kastamonu, Van, Bitlis and 
Trabzon. The Erzurum revolt was the most successful in challenging the state and the 
longest in duration, mostly due to the activities of the League-Dashnaktsutiun 
alliance.279 They achieved the desired politicization but could not obtain their 
ultimate objective of securing foreign intervention on behalf of a regime change in 
the Ottoman Empire, despite Prince Sabahaddin’s efforts in communicating with 
European diplomats.
The tax revolts did do some damage to the state’s capabilities of coercion. It 
also gave courage to the emerging revolutionary agency in the Macedonia region. 
However, the failure to transform these revolts into organized and coordinated 
revolutionary activity rendered them detached from the hotbed of Young Turk 
propaganda, the European provinces. Part of the reason for this detachment seems to
278 Ibid., 113.
279 As the collaboration between the two parties was a sensitive matter, and in accordance with the 
requirements of optimum propaganda methods, some bogus organizations were set up during their 
activities, which Hanioglu reveals in detail in Preparation for a Revolution, 97-103. For a brief 
summary of how this was done, the following quote may be useful: “Accordingly, Sabahaddin Bey’s 
League and the Dashnaktsutiun solicited help from intermediary organizations and set up bogus 
organizations to facilitate cooperation. This continued until the Second Congress of Ottoman 
Opposition Parties, after which the agreement between the Dashnaktsutiun, Sabahaddin Bey’s League, 
the CPU and numerous trivial and bogus opposition organizations were drawn up and made public.” 
Ibid., 97.
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be the division among die Young Turks and the difference between the CPU and the 
League,280 which was the result of the 1902 Congress. The CPU was absent in the 
Erzurum revolt, despite its escalating efforts to penetrate the Empire itself. It was, 
however, to have a strong hold in Macedonia.
To recapitulate, Prince Sabahaddin, Dashnaktsutiun and the locals of these 
towns had succeeded in creating a temporary revolutionary moment that remained 
local and could not transcend the geographical origins of the discontent. We have 
followed this trajectory from the Prince’s social scientific studies to the livestock 
breeders in Erzurum. It was indeed a combination of the global conjuncture, imperial 
politics and local concerns, bound together by the political will of the people, the 
League and the Armenian revolutionaries. However, it remained specific to the 
region and the state managed to suppress the insurgents. This was not to be the case 
in Macedonia, where the links between these three different levels are stronger, more 
intertwined, and where the revolutionary momentum will be able to transcend its 
immediate surrounding and concerns.
6.2.3 The global, the imperial and the local: a combined analysis of 
revolutionary agency
In 1906, the balances in Europe, in the Ottoman Empire and accordingly in 
Macedonia were changing. The traditional ally, Britain, was transforming its status in
280 It should be noted that, while giving a detailed account of the revolts, Kansu does not distinguish 
between the CPU and the League and seems to be referring to both as the Committee of Union and 
Progress, which, if not historically inaccurate, creates confusion in an already perplexing chronology 
of events. Also reviews of the book have criticized its referring to Turkey rather than to the Ottoman 
Empire and its seemingly arbitrary use of the phrases Turkish/Turk. For an example, see Keith 
Watenpaugh, review of The Revolution o f 1908 in Turkey, by Aykut Kansu, International Journal o f 
Middle East Studies 32, no. 1 (2000): 168-171.
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world politics along with its attitude towards the traditional enemy, Russia. What 
was to be known as the Triple Entente was in preparation, especially after the Anglo- 
French agreement of 1904. The Austro-Russian understanding on maintaining the 
status quo in the Balkans was also shaken and, as Russia drifted away from Austria, 
the Anglo-Russian friendship evolved into a collaboration over the Macedonian 
Question. The Ottoman Sultan was seeing confirmation of his fears of the return of 
Russia to Balkan politics after its defeat by Japan. The already difficult task of 
carving out a manoeuvring space for the Empire was becoming impossible. 
Approaching Germany and allowing it to enter the Ottoman political and economic 
space did not produce tangible results, as was seen in the naval demonstration of the 
European powers against the Sultan’s attitude over the customs issue in 1905, which 
took place despite German abstention. The Baghdad railway, on the other hand, was 
drawing Russia and Great Britain closer in their common fear of Germany’s 
expansion. “The result was that the Anglo-Russian convention of August 1907, 
which attempted to settle outstanding Anglo-Russian rivalries in Persia and to 
regulate the position of the two powers in Afghanistan and Tibet, was, at least so far 
as Britain was concerned, more clearly anti-German in inspiration than the Anglo- 
French agreement of 1904.”281 From an Ottoman perspective this was a preparation 
for an Anglo-Russian partnership on the Macedonian Question and that was indeed 
what followed. This was seen as a ‘diplomatic revolution’ in European affairs, as it 
ended the ‘splendid isolation’ of Great Britain.282 Together with the Anglo-French
281 Anderson, Ascendancy o f Europe, 49.
282 “The basis for friendship already existed in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, a settlement of 
outstanding differences in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet; to achieve a wider co-operation would 
complete the diplomatic revolution and favourably alter the Balance of Power in Europe.” M. B. 
Cooper, “British Policy in the Balkans, 1908-1909,” The Historical Journal 7, no 2 (1964): 261.
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entente, it deeply influenced European political affairs.283 In accordance with the 
central theme of this thesis, it would also be seen to influence the Ottoman Empire 
and Macedonia in particular, with rather unpredictable results.
Specifically, it would push the revolutionaries to act sooner and more swiftly, 
fearing the loss of Macedonia. In this demonstration effect, we can once again 
observe the ‘either or’ thinking discussed in Chapter 4. The juxtaposition of 
international influences and the rise and development of domestic agency, as we 
have seen, was not sufficient to give a full understanding of the intrinsic relation 
between the international and the domestic. As encroaching and as restrictive as the 
international’s impact can be, that encroachment is not necessarily an invasion of the 
realm from which agency arises. Rather, that encroachment of the ‘foreign’ is part of 
that realm and of the process whereby the political world of the agency in question is 
constructed. In this part of the case, the Anglo-Russian entente after the turn of the 
century and the breaking down of the status quo at the global, imperial and local 
levels, most discernible in the Macedonian Question, transformed the Young Turks, 
the revolutionary agents, just as they were transforming themselves. In comparison to 
the decade preceding 1906-1907, it would be fair to state that the CPU was already 
on its way of developing a more radical politics. This was caused by its interpretation 
of Ottoman and European politics. As we have seen, they were already developing 
anti-Western ideas drifting away from the publication of scientific analyses and
283 “The Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, along with the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902 and the 
Anglo-French entente of 1904, marked a sea-change in the history of international politics in Europe. 
While the ad hoc manner in which the agreements were negotiated suggests that they were not 
designed as a deliberate attempt to promote a new British diplomatic strategy, together they marked 
the end of the country's tradition of 'splendid isolation' from the intricacies of European affairs.” 
Michael Hughes, “Bernard Pares, Russian Studies and the Promotion of Anglo-Russian Friendship, 
1907-14,” The Slavonic and East European Review 78, no. 3 (2000): 510.
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moving on to organizational networks and actual propaganda. The change in world 
diplomacy interacted with this transformation in the making and pushed it further. 
So, it is reasonable to assume that the international did not necessarily restrict or 
constrain domestic agency, but was part of the material from which the Young Turks 
composed their politics. If this is not obvious from the mere chronology of events, it 
is clearly so because of the complicated nature of the subject matter. Here lies the 
difficulty of capturing this dialectical relation between several actors and 
developments at various levels. One has to disentangle these links, but not to the 
point where one loses the theoretical intuition into and empirical observation of their 
mutual constitution.
A vital component in the process of Young Turk revolution was indeed 
Macedonia, where all these links are more easily observable. Macedonia, throughout 
the revolutionary period, remained the central focus of the international and 
revolutionary actors, and for clear reasons. Several reform programs, outlined in the 
preceding chapter, were unable to halt the circle of violence in Macedonia. What 
they did start was an international military regime in Macedonia, side by side with 
the Ottoman army. The various armed bands were creating an unsafe environment 
for every resident. The violence had its impact not only on the peoples of Macedonia, 
but also on the officers of the III Army. As the government had to send more 
reinforcements to the region, the young officers immediately out of the military 
academies “had directly witnessed the failure of the government to calm the situation 
and (...) resented the presence of the foreign inspectors who had arrived after 
1903.”284 They also saw the better conditions of the foreign officers. They
284 Jelawich, 83.
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themselves were unpaid, were not trained well enough for active combat and had to 
pursue irregular armed bands in difficult terrain. Perhaps, in their poverty, they were 
like any other army division. But their specific location, constant exposure to foreign 
officers and the difficulty of the conflict itself led to severe grievances among these 
young officers. Most of these can be observed in the memoirs of Kazim Karabekir.285 
The target of these grievances was the Sultan, whom they held responsible not only 
for the poor handling of foreign affairs, but also for the poverty of the army. In the 
end, for the purposes of revolutionary success these grievances weight more heavily 
than the rural unrest. In the words of Kansu: “More critical than civil disobedience, 
however, was military unrest.”286
Why did the military upheaval turn out to be among the most critical factors 
for revolution in the Ottoman Empire? The answer has several aspects, most of 
which will be hinted at below, when the military revolutionary organization, their 
links to the CPU and their role in the actual execution of the revolution are analysed. 
One aspect which can be dealt with here is the long-term causes of this military 
unrest, the kind of a political world by which it was shaped and to which it was
t l ireacting. The Hamidian educational reforms of the late 19 century have been
285 Once a general in the army and later an MP and Chair of the Parliament in the Republican era, 
Kazim Karabekir (1882-1948) is one of the important figures of the period stretching from Unionism 
to Republicanism. Below are a two of his observations from his years in the III Army in Macedonia. 
When he arrives at his post in Monastir, he sees the poverty of the army and blames the Sultan:
“I have cursed once again the destructive delusions and mentality of Sultan Hamid - so ambitious to 
reign -  that was to be observed everywhere and in every matter.” Kazim Karabekir, ittihat ve Terraki 
Cemiyeti (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlan, 2009), 54.
“We had neither medical detachments nor bandages. This and the fact that we only had Martin rifles 
against the Manliher of the bands, showed that our management was corrupt and broken. We were 
fighting for the patriotic cause with our lives, whereas the Istanbul government and the palace were 
reckless in their pleasures.” Ibid., 66.
286 Kansu, 81.
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explained in preceding chapters, along with the backgrounds of the students who 
benefited from the new military academies and their curriculums. These young 
people, eager to rise in the army, hostile to all those who had won their privileges 
outside the merit system and also equipped with a scientific outlook towards the 
world in general, were the origins of this military unrest. Also, having been told of or 
having observed the short rise and long fall of the Young Turk movement in Istanbul 
in the 1890s, they did have an idea of a possible opposition to the Hamidian regime. 
Some older officers were former CUP members. When a concentration of these 
young officers accumulated in a region like Macedonia, the outcome was the 
transformation of action around these grievances into an actual political organization. 
Unlike the locally distinct tax revolts of a vast region, Macedonia, with its intense 
conflicts and sense of being a distinct European province of the Ottoman Empire, 
segregated as it was, provided the catalyst necessary for the politicization and 
political organization of grievances. As Russia and Great Britain were putting 
pressure on the Macedonian issue, and as Macedonia’s inner struggles were putting 
pressures on the young officers in the Ottoman army, they felt that they had to 
respond. Added to this were a sense of vanguardism and of a historical mission to 
‘save the Empire’. Thus the formation of revolutionary agency in Macedonia was, as 
much as it was a choice on their parts, also a crystallization of several conflicts at one 
historical moment, a moment also encouraged and informed by Russian (1905) and 
Iranian (1906) constitutional revolutions. The result was the foundation of the 
Ottoman Freedom Society in September 1906.
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6.2.3.1 The Ottoman Freedom Society and the Merger with the CPU
As Macedonia continued to be an area of intense struggle and a space of 
intersection for international, imperial and local affairs, the military unrest paved the 
way for the foundation of the Ottoman Freedom Society, which was founded in 
September 1906 and in September of the following year officially merged with the 
CPU. The nature of the Ottoman Freedom Society was linked from its inception to 
the Macedonian question. The organization was founded in Salonica and included 
some famous pashas of the Unionist period that followed the 1908 revolution, such 
as Enver and Talat288. Although it included some civilians, it essentially expanded 
among the officers in die III Army and established a branch in Monastir. “From the 
fall of 1907 onwards the II Army also established relations with the Society, through 
the recruitment of officers such as Seyfi (Diizgoren), the chief of army intelligence 
and division commander, and ismet (inonu).”289
There is no doubt that the establishment of the Ottoman Freedom Society is a 
response to Macedonian Question and its intersection with international and Ottoman 
politics. Specifically, the failure of the reform programs and their adverse effects on
287 Ziircher, Milli Miicadelede ittihatgilik, 67-71.
288 Talat (1874-1921) was a former member of the CUP in the 1890s and a founder of the Ottoman 
Freedom Society in 1906. He was working as a high-ranking public servant in the Postal Services and 
hence was a civilian at the time of the revolution. He served as ‘sadrazam’ for a short period during 
the First World War and had to flee the country after the defeat. He was assassinated in 1921 in 
Germany. Ibid., 66.
Enver (1881-1922) was a military officer and would become the future Minister of War in the 
Unionist era. He is generally held responsible for the way in which the Ottoman Empire entered the 
First World War. At the beginning of the war he had suffered a huge defeat on the eastern Russian 
front at Sankami§.
289 Ibid., 70. Ismet Inonu (1884-1973) after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk would become the 
second president of the Turkish Republic in 1938.
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the various peoples of Macedonia inspired these young officers to respond. In this 
regard they were acting in the immediacy of the situation rather than from a planned 
and ideologically distinct point of view. They also had immense potential for 
revolutionary action due to their positions in the army and the resources they could 
muster. They opted to contact the CPU abroad, requested cooperation and later a 
complete merger with the CPU. Zurcher explains this decision to choose the CPU 
rather than the League of Prince Sabahaddin by referring to the familiarity between 
the officers’ backgrounds and the nationalist and pro-centralization views of the 
CPU, as against the liberal ideals of the League.290 One could also argue that the 
increasing tone of anti-Europeanism in CPU publications must have attracted these 
officers. Thanks to the organizational efforts of Bahaeddin §akir and Dr. Nazim, 
more propaganda material than ever was being smuggled into the Empire. Especially 
if one considers the timing of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, which was 
concluded in August and exacerbated the attitude of many Macedonians and 
Ottoman military officers against foreign intervention, the officers’ choice of the 
CPU seems like the joining of two organizations that were extremely similar in world 
outlook.
Indeed, the nature of this merger is another controversial issue in the literature 
on the Young Turk revolution. The discussion revolves around the question of which 
of these two organizations gave the movement its revolutionary impetus. The CPU’s 
more refined ideological line and its exile status is juxtaposed to a picture of young 
officers eager to act as radically and as fast as possible. This juxtaposition leads to 
the conclusion that it was the cadre of officers that actually carried the responsibility
290 Ibid., 71.
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for decisions in the revolutionary process and should be given sole credit for the 
revolutionary success.291 However, recent studies point to the similarities between 
the two groups in terms of revolutionary objectives, to the transformation of the CPU 
prior to the merger, to the presence of former CUP members in the Ottoman Freedom 
Society and finally to the importance of the CPU’s propaganda292 and guidance for 
the execution of the revolution, besides the obvious contributions of the young 
officers.293 Indeed, Hanioglu also underlines the fact that the Ottoman Freedom 
Society was unorganized and inefficient before the merger with the CPU.294 Sohrabi 
agrees with him: “In one sense, the CUP abroad, by providing an organizational 
umbrella for officers, did what the latter was to do for the disparate bands of Turkish 
villagers in Macedonia.”295
After the initial contact with the CPU abroad, the official merger occurred in 
September 1907 and the Ottoman Freedom Society became the Internal Headquarters 
of the CPU, whereas the Paris group became the External Headquarters. A division 
of labour followed the merger, whereby the External Headquarters took charge of 
communications with the European community, organization and management of 
external branches, preparation and dissemination of propaganda material and so
291 “Regardless of the contributions of the opposition centres abroad in the preparation of the 1908 
revolution, their direct influence on the events prior to the revolution is insignificant. The 1908 
Revolution is a result of the efforts of the groups residing within the Empire.” Ibid., 44.
292 Ahmet Bedevi Kuran (1886-1966), who was a student at the Military Academy around early 
1900s, testifies to the receipt of CPU propaganda among the students: “All of the academies had a 
society for themselves. We would meet the heads of these societies every Friday, enter into discussion 
and share the “Young Turk” publications that had arrived from Europe.” Kuran, 277.
293 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, Kansu, The Revolution o f 1908 in Turkey, Sohrabi, 
“Global Waves, Local Actors”.
294 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 212.
295 Sohrabi, “Global Waves, Local Actors,” 66.
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forth. The Internal Headquarters, on the other hand, was organized after the merger 
upon the suggestions of Bahaeddin §akir, who had advised them to study the 
organizational methods of non-Muslim organizations. Hanioglu notes that they had 
asked for a copy of Dashnaktsutiun’s program, whereas Ramsaur mentions IMRO as 
an inspirational model.296 The attention paid to the possible uses of the Muslim bands 
of Macedonia, and the study of the Macedonian organizations for organizational 
efficiency suggest that, after the merger, the CPU in Macedonia was engaged in 
various forms of revolutionary activity. Here, Sohrabi’s picture of the preparation of 
the revolution seems accurate: “Agency in revolution, contrary to caricatures of it by 
critics, did not magically create organizations and resources out of will power. But 
by giving direction to what was at hand and by making crucial linkages among 
disparate elements, it realized potentials that would otherwise have remained 
dormant.”297
Leaving the actual course of events that followed the merger and that 
constituted the final revolutionary blow to the Hamidian regime to the next section, 
and before going into details of the 1907 Congress when all the above mentioned 
actors convened, a few words on agency formation would be timely and of relevance 
to the themes of this thesis. Charles Tilly, in his work on mobilization and social 
movements298, postulates that the formation of revolutionary agency depends upon 
the resources and opportunities for the actors, and that these resources in turn range 
from material resources to the formation of alliances among several actors and
296 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 217; Ramsaur, Jon Turkler ve 1908 Ihtilali, 125.
297 Sohrabi, “Global Waves, Local Actors,” 66.
298 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).
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include the repertoire of action available. The merger of the CPU and the Ottoman 
Freedom Society can be seen from this perspective as an alliance that contributed to 
the process of agency formation, rather than as the coming together of two fully- 
fledged and separate groups. Through these alliances other resources presented 
themselves to the extended CPU. Networks were enhanced, new methods of 
propaganda emerged (such as that of appealing to the Muslims of Macedonia through 
the politicization of the Young Turk officers), and emerging opportunities were also 
used in a more efficient way (such as the issue of foreign intervention to Macedonia). 
While the past divisions and internal strife among the Young Turks in Europe had 
taken their toll on their political capacities, this merger expanded their capacities for 
political action. If we remember the global conjuncture that led to the politicization 
of the young officers in the first place, namely the changing European alliances and 
the meaning of this for the Ottoman context, it becomes additionally plausible to 
consider the international context among the opportunities that contributed to the 
composition and evolution of revolutionary agency. Hence we can conclude that the 
international determinants of a revolution may occur not only in the long-term inputs 
that were identified in the critical juncture of the late 1870s, and not only in the 
transformation of the actors that arose out of this critical juncture (in the decade prior 
to the revolution), but also in the emergence and development of a ‘revolutionary 
situation’ in a manner that would affect the timing and resource capabilities of 
revolutionaries.
An appreciation of the profound and constitutive role of the international 
community at all these periods can only be reached through a nuanced approach to 
the issue of agency, especially in the analysis of the political change carried out by
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specific actors. This kind of investigation into the first two years of the revolutionary 
process (1906-1907) bolsters the theoretical insights that presented themselves in the 
preceding chapters: the intrinsic link between the international and the domestic, a 
renewed understanding of the impact of international factors on domestic agency, 
and the need to associate these two points. In the next subsection, an opportunity 
emerges to look more closer at the actors involved, namely the 1907 Congress, the 
result of which Hanioglu calls as a ‘tactical alliance’.299
6.2.3.2 1907 Congress: A tactical alliance
So, just months after the merger between the CPU and the Ottoman Freedom 
Society and also only a short time after the suppression of the tax revolts, in part led 
by the League-Dashnaktsutiun collaboration, the parties came together in December
1907. Kuran notes that the call for a Congress came from the Armenian 
Dashnaktsutiun organization and that they had first approached Prince Sabahaddin 
and then Ahmed Riza to arrange such a meeting with delegates from 
Dashnaktsutiun.300 Georgeon points out the ideological differences among the 
participants, especially between the “socialist-revolutionary” Dashnaktsutiun and the 
“conservative-nationalist” CPU.301 However, the negotiations went more smoothly 
than expected and, after the League’s cooperation with Dashnaktsutiun and the 
CPU’s merger with the Ottoman Freedom Society, a third alliance would emerge 
between these parties. Due to its insignificance for the outcome of the revolution (as 
the revolutionary process proceeded in Macedonia and under the leadership of the
299 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution.
300 Kuran, 287.
301 Georgeon, 453.
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CPU as opposed to the other participant parties of the Congress), this Congress does
not occupy a significant place in the literature on the Young Turks. The parties to
this Congress understood their limitations and also that there was power in numbers
and they wanted to include as many organizations as possible in support of their
cause. In that context, they approached Macedonian organizations, but with little
success. This failure did not intimidate them and they managed to find a way to make
the Congress appear larger in scale:
“The organizers thus made use of the editorial boards of various 
insignificant journals and virtually non-existent, one-man 
organizations to inflate the number of signatures. This ploy 
enabled them to make the bombastic claim of having 
accomplished a general union of “Ottoman opposition parties” 
and served as a shield against the attacks of opponents who 
rejected any rapprochement between the CPU and the 
Dashnaktsutiun. These signatures were, however, of no help to 
the organizers in carrying out revolutionary activities.”302
It is important to notice the concerns of the CPU and of Dashnaktsutiun about 
their image in the eyes of both friends and foes. As the revolutionary propaganda was 
intensifying, appeal to potential sympathizers gained the utmost importance, a fact 
that will come to the fore in the CPU’s growing pragmatism during the revolutionary 
process. It is also important to note Dashnaktsutiun’s need for alliances. Kuran 
attributes this to the failure of their previous actions303, the most famous being the 
1905 attempt to assassinate the Sultan, which failed due to a delay in Abdulhamid’s 
exit from the mosque on one of his Friday visits. Both the League of Prince of 
Sabahaddin and Dashnaktsutiun had failed to attract foreign involvement or to 
establish a coordinated organizational presence within the Empire. The CPU, on the
302 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 202-203.
303 Kuran, 288.
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other hand, was seeking ways to expand. The urgency of toppling the common 
enemy led to a Congress that was extremely critical of the Sultan and appealed to 
similar sentiments in the Empire. They called for civil disobedience, strikes and all 
the other means appropriate to removing the Sultan and reinstalling the Constitution. 
This tactical alliance would not really translate into revolutionary action. 
Nonetheless, it is important to observe the heightened will and determination of the 
CPU, which led them even to enter into an alliance with the Armenian 
revolutionaries, whose actions they had been describing in recent years as harmful to 
the Empire, and with Prince Sabahaddin, whose preference for and insistence on 
foreign intervention they had come to despise. This reflects their newly evolved 
political flexibility. In the end, the coming of the revolution would proceed from the 
European provinces of the Empire and against foreign intervention. We now move 
on to the year 1908, when the diplomatic revolution coincided with the revolution of
1908.
6.3 From the Diplomatic Revolution to the Young Turk Revolution: the 
Summer of 1908
The diplomatic revolution, as explained above, was a combination of several 
treaties. One of the most important, the Anglo-Russian Convention, was signed in 
August 1907. Below is a chronological account of what followed: the CPU’s merger 
with the Ottoman Freedom Society occurred in September 1907. The 1907 Congress 
was convened in December 1907. Austria-Hungary and Russia broke their entente in 
the first two months of 1908, after Austria obtained from the Ottoman Sultan the 
concession to build a railway to reach the Aegean. From February 1908 onwards it 
became common knowledge that Russia and Great Britain were working on a new 
reform programme that had a high likelihood of leading to an autonomous
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Macedonia. In May 1908, the CPU sent a letter to the consulates of the Great 
Powers, explaining the futility of European attempts to solve the Macedonian 
question, and that they were going to do this themselves. In 9-10 June, The British 
King and the Russian Tsar met in Reval to discuss world politics, including the 
Macedonian Question. Only weeks after this, on 3 July 1908, Ahmed Niyazi Bey (a 
CPU officer and an Albanian) took 200 men, including public servants, to the 
mountains in Resne and sent telegraphs to the Sultan demanding the enforcement of 
the Constitutional Regime. So, the revolution started. An Albanian crowd (20,000- 
30,000) gathered in Firzovik and swore “an oath to work for the restoration of the 
constitution.”304 On 23 July 1908, the constitutional regime was declared in Monastir 
by the revolutionaries. On 24 July 1908, the Sultan issued a decree for the re­
establishment of the constitutional regime. Me§rutiye1*05 was proclaimed. It took the 
CPU only 20 days to submit the Sultan to their demands after open revolt broke out 
with Niyazi Bey’s move to the mountains.
This is indeed a brief summary of the year that started with the merger and 
ended with a revolution. As can be seen in this simple chronology of events, it was a 
rapid revolutionary process, a dense historical period, and the lines between the 
international, imperial and local were highly blurred. Below we will try to unravel 
these links. However, one should be extremely careful, as too rigid a disentanglement 
would lead to the disillusion that these were separate events in time and space. The 
several intuitions that this case study has provided us so far reach their peak and
304 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 272.
305 Constitutional Regime. The Unionist era is also called the era of the II. Me§rutiyet.
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crystallization in this period and the need to reveal the dialectics of these events, 
rather than compartmentalizing them, becomes the most significant task. Also 
important is the weight of the last 30 years of Ottoman and international politics on 
these events. Here, this case study has the advantage of comparison within a single 
case.
The Anglo-Russian rapprochement, as we have seen above, was indeed a 
diplomatic revolution. The politicized and to some extent radicalized Young Turks of 
Macedonia and Europe witnessed the toppling of the international system as they 
knew it. This entente further pushed them towards anti-imperialism306, not only 
because it led to the emergence of new fears, but also because it helped in the 
reshaping of Ottoman politics, when anti-imperialism became an asset to the 
revolutionary actors. It gave their propaganda an additional impetus, especially 
because in Macedonia the impact of this entente and the centralization of 
revolutionary activities coincided. Moreover, the failure of the reform programs 
since the Berlin treaty created a space of discontent within which the Young Turks 
found the skills to contact other Macedonian organizations in order to seek alliances 
or at least to secure their neutrality. The result of these contacts is summarized by 
Hanioglu, who documents these negotiations in detail: “The CPU’s success in 
striking deals with various Christian organizations and in neutralizing others, either 
by implicit threats or by explicit demonstrations of power, persuaded the Christian 
masses to join the movement at the hour of its triumph, or at least not to oppose
306 Hasan Unal explains the Young Turks’ attitude in international politics, in comparison to that of 
the Sultan at this period, as follows: “He [Abdiilhamid] accepted the prevailing international order as 
given, and sought only to ensure the Empire's survival within it. In contrast, the anti-Europeanism of 
the CUP was rooted in an aggrieved and assertive nationalism, some of whose implications in 
international affairs were potentially revolutionary.” Hasan Unal, “Young Turk Assessments of 
International Politics, 1906-9,” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 2 (1996): 36.
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it.”307 This success is additionally intriguing given the CPU’s nationalist tendencies 
and reactions towards the non-Muslim political activity. It certainly is a reflection of 
their newly developed political flexibility and pragmatism and a testament to their 
revolutionary will.
Another factor in the rapidity of the revolutionary process is the local political 
environment. Despite the failure of the reform programs in the past, these foreign 
interventions in Macedonia had rendered the region a relatively free environment, 
free to discuss politics, engage in propaganda activity and free to recruit new 
members. Together with the violence, this freedom led to a rapid politicization 
process among the people of Macedonia. Accordingly, the Sultan’s authority and 
powers were weakened in the region, parallel to the rise of the number of new 
recruits to the CPU.
Another accelerator along the way was the concession that the Sultan granted 
to Austria-Hungary. “In February 1908, the Sultan gave a concession to Austrians to 
build a railway that would pass through the Sanjak of Novibazaar; this railway would 
open them the road to Salonica and the Aegean Sea. This decision altered the 
balances in the Balkans.”308 The Sultan was making an effort towards managing this 
complex situation. However, his response further damaged the little manoeuvring 
space he had. This concession caused the breakdown of the Austro-Russian coalition 
on Macedonian affairs, alarmed the British and further provoked the Young Turks.
307 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 238.
308 Georgeon, 455.
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Nonetheless, it is crucial to observe that the Sultan remained part of the revolutionary 
equation until the end.
Russia and Britain started working on a new reform program. These 
developments caused a further acceleration in Young Turk activity in the region and 
also led to their statement on the Macedonian issue, which they sent in May 1908 to 
the consulates of the Great Powers. The statement was essentially a warning to the 
Powers, explaining the damage their intervention has inflicted upon the region, and 
informed them that the CPU claimed the Macedonian Question as an Ottoman affair. 
“This document demonstrates that the Committee of Progress and Union had decided 
to solve the Macedonian Question on its own and informed the Great Powers two 
months before the revolution.”309 It also testifies to the revolutionary will of the 
Committee. They were prepared for a revolutionary struggle and also ready to give 
the news to the relevant parties.
The timing of the revolution in July 1908 is generally explained in the 
literature by reference to two additional triggers: the Reval Meeting of June 1908 and 
the increasing intelligence activity of the Sultan’s representatives in the region. The 
Reval meeting, between the monarchs of Great Britain and Russia, only confirmed 
the fears of both the Ottoman state and the Ottoman opposition. The traditional 
enemy and the traditional ally had finished working on their plans for the Ottoman 
Empire and Macedonia in particular.310 This hastened the whole process of
309 Mehmet Hacisalihoglu, Jon Tiirkler ve Makedonya Sorunu, 170.
310 “The sovereigns, accompanied by Hardinge and Isvolsky, met at Reval on 9 June. The ministers' 
discussions ranged over Macedonia, the Middle East and the Balance of Power. They put the finishing 
touches to the Macedonian programme and Hardinge promised British support for a Danube-Adriatic
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preparation for the revolution311 and also put the Sultan in a difficult position. “If the 
Sultan accepted the Reval plan, the revolutionaries would gain a powerful weapon 
against him; if he rejected it, the European Powers would no doubt intervene.”312 The 
Sultan’s sovereignty over the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire was 
seriously diminishing, in reality as well as in perception. This surely became a 
motivation for die opposition, whose sole aim was to topple his ‘repressive regime’ 
and replace it with a constitutional one. The second trigger was the Sultan’s 
increasing surveillance of the Young Turks in the region. The CPU tried to take 
counter-measures against this move by the Sultan and attempted to assassinate, but 
only wounded, one of the Sultan’s agents.313 They were thus entering the point of no 
return.
Here it would be helpful to remember the emphasis of Tilly on the 
revolutionary situation, as distinct from revolutionary outcome, and his insistence on 
giving analytical priority to the resources, capabilities and contingent opportunities 
that present themselves to revolutionary agents.314 When looked at from this angle,
railway as soon as the reforms were presented to the Porte.” M. B. Cooper, “British Policy in the 
Balkans”, 262.
311 “Had the Reval meeting of June 1908 between the Russian tzar and the British king not taken 
place, the CPU would have commenced its campaign to foment unrest at a relatively late date. This 
meeting however, not only provided the CPU with the convincing propaganda thesis that a European 
intervention led by Great Britain and Russia was imminent, but also impelled the leaders and 
members of the CPU to risk all and to start the revolution.” Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 
237.
312 Kansu, 87.
313 Georgeon, 455.
314 In a special issue of Dogu Bati on the Second Constitutional Regime, Cenk Reyhan also refers to 
this distinction of Tilly, between revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome. His emphasis, 
distinct from mine, is more on the events that unfolded after the triumph of the revolution in 1908 and 
he identifies 1909 as the crucial point when the revolutionary outcome emerged. Cenk Reyhan, “Jon 
Turk Hareketi: Turk Devrim Stireci Uzerine Kar§ila§tirmali bir ^oziimleme,” Dogu Bati 1, no 45 
(2008): 105 -132.
209
the role of the Reval meeting and of the bigger global conjuncture behind it and the 
effect of the Sultan’s policies and tactical moves can be appreciated as constitutive of 
the revolutionary situation, rather than as mere triggers for some event waiting to 
happen. In this regard, we do not have to choose either a voluntaristic view of agency 
that is full-fledged and ideologically equipped or a structural causation that proceeds 
on a set course. It is within the situation that the agents form themselves. That 
situation in turn is formed by the previous actions of the agents, as well as by 
political transformations at the international, imperial and local levels.
Indeed, it was at all these levels that the revolution occurred. Following the 
Reval meeting, the CPU mobilized its accumulated resources in the region. They had 
been for some time now focused on Muslim bands which they envisaged to be led by 
Young Turk officers. The Macedonian peoples were already moved by this course of 
events and by the immediate threat of a wholesale foreign intervention. Here the 
local level assumes a special importance and perhaps explains why the tax revolts in 
Anatolia did not produce such a coordinated action. Having lived with foreign 
gendarmerie, foreign advisors and foreign reform plans for so long, the high politics 
of diplomatic revolution was a concrete reality for the peoples of Macedonia.315 So, 
most notably the Muslims, but also the Albanians (Christian and Muslim) and later 
the Christian community of various sects stepped up for the revolution.
315 “Foreign intervention, which was no more than an abstract idea in the capital, and not even an issue 
in the Asiatic provinces (expect the so-called six provinces in Eastern Anatolia), was embodied in the 
actual presence of foreign officers and officials in Macedonia.” Hanioglu, Preparation for a 
Revolution, 238
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Adjutant-Major Ahmed Niyazi headed for the mountains on 3 July 1908, with 
not only military officers but also a significant number of civilians. The original 
group consisted of 200 people, including the mayor, the chief of police, the director 
of a Serbian school and so forth.316 The number increased as the battalion advanced. 
The Sultan reacted by sending §emsi Pasha to the region to suppress the revolt. 
§emsi Pasha’s assassination by the CPU caused further chaos and more officers 
headed for the mountains. Along the way, these battalions made full use of the 
telegraph and passed their demands to the Sultan. The Sultan however was not 
receiving accurate information on the size and power of the rebels, which caused 
frustration and inability to assess the situation on his part.
The final blows of the Sultan and the Young Turks coincided in the following 
event: the shift of the enforcement troops from Anatolia to Salonica. The Sultan was 
counting on the suppressive power of these troops. What he did not know at the time 
was the success of CPU propaganda among these troops, the credit for which is 
usually given to Dr. Nazim. When they reached the region, around mid-July 1908, 
they did not fight, but joined the rebels. Thus, the Sultan was losing his coercive 
powers, which were at this point his only means of preventing the rebellion. “Hence 
the CUP deprived the government of its last military resort in Macedonia.”317
It is also important that, during all these actions, the CPU did not neglect to 
calm the Great Powers by sending a memoir explaining itself, assuring them that the
316 Hacisalihoglu, Jon Tiirkler ve Makedonya Sorunu, 174.
317 Ibid, 201.
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revolution was not anti-Christian in motivation and it was based on European ideals. 
On the day of the proclamation of liberty, 23 July, Enver Bey spread the news to the 
European press. Also, “on the morning of July 23, The British Consulate at Monastir 
was informed that in a few hours, the Committee of Union and Progress would 
proclaim the Constitution, and that the Unionists were firmly determined to maintain 
order and avoid senseless bloodshed.”318 This was a reflection of one of the most 
instinctive fears of the Young Turks for the last three decades, namely that of causing 
further loss and damage to the Ottoman Empire at the hands of foreign powers while 
attempting to change the regime. Therefore they made sure that they gave no excuse 
for this. Their success in neutralizing or even obtaining the support of the Christian 
population was an important help in this regard.
The day after the proclamation of liberty, the Inspector General in Salonica
received the telegraph from Istanbul which stated that the Sultan was reinstituting the
Constitution and recalling the Parliament. The whole region engaged in celebrations
afterwards. Hanioglu gives the most reasonable and well documented account of the
Sultan’s reasons for yielding to the demands of the revolutionaries:
“The number of troops of the Third Army alone, 70,000, 
exceeded the total number of troops of the First and Second 
Armies between Macedonia and the capital. No Ottoman sultan 
could risk a civil war between Ottoman armies and Abdulhamid 
II’s final decision reflected a realistic appraisal of the 
situation.”319
So Abdulhamid was defeated and a year later was to be dethroned. He was to 
be the last Ottoman Sultan to rule and reign. Thus began a whole new era in Ottoman
318 Kansu, 96.
319 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 278.
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politics. The revolution of 1908, when seen from the day of 24 July 1908, was not 
yet looking like the revolution it would come to be: a catalyst for fundamental 
change in the Ottoman Empire, a constitutive factor in the emergence of the modem 
Middle East and Balkans, and finally an integral part of the First World War.
6.4 The Aftermath
"The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument o f a discontented 
bourgeoisie, it did not ride on a wave o f peasant dissatisfaction with the 
social order, and it did not have as target the sweeping away o f feudal 
privileges, but it did take as a target the values o f the Ottoman ancient 
regime. In this sense it was a revolutionary movement. ”320
The exact nature of the change that was brought about by this revolutionary 
process explained above is still a matter of academic and political controversy. 
Whether it was a bourgeoisie revolution with characteristics of a movement from 
below or a mere coup d’etat from above that did not really transform any part of the 
social structure are questions still discussed. A thorough elaboration on the issue of 
how to classify the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 requires another kind of study, 
one that would cover the outcomes of the Revolution as well as the broader period of 
modem Turkish history. As such these questions in no way form an integral part of 
this thesis, which was primarily concerned in grasping the international-domestic co­
constitution in the causes of Young Turk Revolution. However, a few words on the 
changes brought about by the revolution are indeed necessary.
As we have seen in this and preceding chapters, the revolutionary situation 
that led to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was the result of a combined process. 
In this combination global, imperial and local conflicts played their roles in an
320 §erif A. Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution,” International Journal o f 
Middle East Studies 2, no.3 (1971): 202.
213
interactive way. Starting with the critical juncture identified around 1875-1878, the 
case study at hand focused on these conflicts whenever necessary and underlined the 
combined effect of these conflicts on the actors that in turn transformed themselves 
within that world of combined development and arose as revolutionary agents. These 
agents were primarily the Young Turks in exile who had symbiotic ties to the 
Ottoman civil and military bureaucracy and especially in the period examined in this 
chapter the young officers in the Third Army in Macedonia.
The world outlook of these exiles and later the officers were explained 
throughout the chapters. It is now evident that there was no revolutionary master 
plan, no ready-made and specifically set social engineering project and that these 
actors were shaped and shaping the world around them as historical junctures 
rendered possible and their room of manoeuvre was limited yet present. Their world 
was not yet the world they shaped through their interventions, the victory was not 
pre-determined and most importantly it was not known to them.
Moreover, as their hastened radicalization process has demonstrated, although 
they were part of the bigger process of change, they had to act quickly in a rapidly 
moving set of events and they showed tactical ideological manoeuvres and 
variations. Finally, they were the ones who at the end showed a revolutionary will to 
topple down the Hamidian regime and the enthusiasms and contributions of local 
actors in Macedonia and later the celebrations throughout the Empire do not change 
this fact in a fundamental way. Aykut Kansu’s claim that the Young Turk Revolution 
of 1908 was a deliberately made bourgeoisie revolution by a new class for the
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purpose of creating a whole new social structure remains yet unsupported.321 It seems 
that this claim stems rather from a retrospective thinking, hence, from a gaze at the 
consequences of the revolution.
The most visible accomplishment of the revolution is the establishment of a 
Unionist regime replacing the Hamidian regime. The Unionist era is generally 
divided into two periods: the years between 1908-1913 and 1913-1918. The two 
Balkan Wars were crucial in the consolidation of the Unionist power as before 1913 
the CUP was a power behind the curtain whereas after 1913 they occupied all the key 
posts in state institutions. In the spring of 1909 they managed to prevent a counter­
revolution attempted mostly by conservative forces. Throughout the Unionist period 
they had to invent ways to deal with an opposition for whose existence the revolution 
was claimed to be made. The opposition included not only conservative elements of 
the ulema and rebellious parts of the military but also the liberal forces and the 
various non-Muslim groups, as well as non-Turkish groups such as the Albanians. 
The Unionists faced an inevitable dilemma: their proclaimed revolutionary goals 
contradicted with what they perceived to be the necessities of the Ottoman politics, 
the liberal orientation of the revolution faced the centralizing, nationalist and 
authoritarian tendencies among the Young Turk cadres, whose rhetoric of the 
‘people’ never transcended their disbelief in the actual rule of the ‘people’. The result 
was a new way of politics for the Ottoman Empire, the nucleus of one-party politics 
with para-militaristic and nationalist veins. Indeed, in introducing a new elite to rule 
the country and a new way of organization of politics, the revolution succeeded in
321 “In short, 1908 represents a revolution in which political power is taken from the hands of the 
monarch and the bureaucracy and given to representatives of the citizens with a view to establish the 
political as well as the economic supremacy of a new class. In this sense, 1908 is one of the last 
examples of bourgeois revolutions to have taken place before the First World War.” Kansu, 27.
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toppling down not only Abdulhamid II but also in toppling a political mentality. This
meant both the elimination of old bureaucracy and the weakening of traditional
political nods, such as the urban notables, tribal chiefs, etc.
“For the first time in the history of the empire, politics was the 
business of political parties sponsoring competing policies and 
visions of the future. Although this political pluralism was not 
long-lasting, it caused a far more enduring change in the nature 
and composition of the Ottoman ruling elite.”322
And this is in agreement with the statement by Mardin from the beginning of 
this section: that the Young Turks did not create a social revolution but more of a 
political revolution, that is they succeeded in creating a new political regime, with 
new institutions, new values, new ways of organizing political will and of mobilizing 
the masses, and new ways of controlling the opposition. Indeed, they proved to be 
able to be as oppressive as the Sultan they deposed, but they conducted these 
measures through temporary laws. They did not disregard the parliament and hence 
rendered the path of parliamentary regime as the point of no return.
As such, it is not too daring to call the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 a 
political revolution, as opposed to a coup d’etat or a social revolution. Here, we can 
refer to Skocpol’s study on revolutions: “Political revolutions transform state 
structures but not social structures, and they are not necessarily accomplished 
through class conflict.”323 After 1908, not only the state structure but the whole 
structure of politics was set in a motion of change. And this sea-change was not the 
characteristics of the territory that was to become modem Turkish politics but
322 Hanioglu, Late Ottoman Empire, 200.
323 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 4.
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belonged to the Balkans and the Middle East. “The Young Turk Revolution played a 
significant role in the reshaping of the Middle East and the Balkans. Because of it an 
area from Scutari in Albania to Basra became acquainted with political parties, 
nationalist clubs, elections, and the idea of constitutional rights.”324
Also, the CUP’s coming to power became a vital part of the international 
history. That is so for two reasons: Firstly, as mentioned above, it had a huge 
political impact on the Middle East and Balkans. CUP’s nationalism as well as its 
performance of a certain kind of modem politics had produced reactionary attitudes 
as well as imitation on the former parts of the Ottoman Empire. These all figured in 
the political configuration of these areas after the First World War. Secondly, the 
Unionist reign had left its mark on the First World War as well, the simplest 
evidence of which is the entrance of the Ottoman Empire to the War and thus the 
change of the course of events, the opening up of new fronts, the influence of these 
on the proceedings of the Bolshevik Revolution, etc. Hence, not only the causes but 
also the outcomes of the Revolution have important international dimensions yet to 
be studied thoroughly and with an appropriate theoretical framework. However, 
these are the topics of another study yet in themselves are the proof of the world- 
historical importance of the Young Turk Revolution.
324 Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 317.
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6.5 Conclusion
“HS examines processes as evolving over time, identifying those deeper structural 
factors that both limit, and also potentially empower, the actions o f agents. ”325
In this thesis a possible trajectory of the revolution has been followed from 
the economic and political background of the 19th century, focusing on the political 
developments of the late 19th century, up until the day of the proclamation of liberty. 
The case study has focused in general on the international dimensions of the coming 
and the making of the revolution, and also paid attention to the formation of agency, 
which turned out to be intrinsically linked to one other.
At this moment of revolutionary agency formation, as told above, we can 
observe the merit of an historical sociological approach to international relations 
when explaining political change, domestic or otherwise. As the quote above 
suggests, only through this rather complicated lens can we appreciate the totality of 
politics, which in world-historical moments like 1908 and in longue duree 
transformations such as the period leading up to the First World War reveals itself 
completely to its seeker.
An appreciation of the case from an historical sociological perspective to 
International Relations led to the emergence of several suggestions as to how to 
study political change located in the global conjuncture. Vice versa, the course of the 
1908 revolution when analysed in its long and short-term causes and in its process
325 Dannreuther and Kennedy, “Historical Sociology in Sociology,” 376.
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led to theoretical suggestions as to how to develop a more nuanced way of looking at
the long-standing dichotomies of political analysis, such as international/domestic,
structure/agency, and to a certain extent, ideational/material. A unique combination
of both of these efforts also presented another excursion into the relation between
international influences and domestic agency. In this double challenge between the
theoretical approach and the specific case study, an opportunity arises to develop our
social scientific understanding regarding both these challenge. The double challenge,
when applied properly, becomes a double contribution. And the bulk of this
contribution in the context of this thesis is directed towards the discipline of
International Relations and could only be convincing if sound suggestions for this
discipline can be provided. This double challenge will be the topic of the next
chapter, where the findings of the case study will meet and clash with the approach
in International Relations. This is all the case because:
“The analysis of revolutions in their international context, both 
ideological and historical, provides an occasion to assess not 
only international history itself, but also the ways in which this 
topic can have implications for theorising international 
relations.”326
326 Halliday, Revolution and World Politics, 293.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION: DOUBLE CHALLENGE
7.1 Introduction
‘‘Rather than compare reified, static social facts, this mode o f research involves the 
study o f the relations, linkages and processes that make up the social world’’327
Throughout the course of the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire 
was in an intense interaction with the world around it. This empirically evident 
interaction should be reflected in our theoretical excursions. As Lawson emphasises, 
the historical sociological lens, coupled with the reflexes of such minded IR studies, 
forces us to see the linkages and the relations that go into the composition of the 
world. The world was not and still is not a parochial place, neither should our 
theories be.328 By parochialism, I refer to the analytical and historical distinctions 
and dichotomies that social science had produced between what are essentially 
elements in a constitutive relation, the international and domestic. This thesis as such 
not only attempts to contribute to the rescue of the history of the 1908 Revolution 
from the parochialism of ‘national history’ but argues that this attempt when 
combined with a sound theoretical direction would also contribute to the rescue of
327 Lawson “Historical Sociology in International Relations,” 358.
328 The usage of the term ‘parochialism’ in this context was inspired by Bayly’s warnings about the 
history of human interaction and communication in the previous centuries. He uses it to underline the 
actual communication among people whereas I also refer to the second meaning of the term, namely 
the ‘limited’ thinking. Bayly’s much needed observation is as follows: “We need to rescue the early 
modem, even pre-twentieth-century world from the imputation of parochialism. The old social history 
of the village community and the “world we have lost” often seemed to argue that because travel and 
communication were difficult in the past, people did not travel and communicate. On the contrary, 
they tried harder and connected more resolutely. The Indian world and the Middle Eastern world were 
connected by trade, faith, legends, and imaginings well before the start of the period under 
consideration. Interregional connections may actually have reached their peak in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, before they were fragmented as the political control of the nation-state asserted 
itself so strongly in the twentieth century.” Bayly, “Distorted Development,” 344.
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International Relations from the parochialism it sometimes falls into, both in terms of 
reifying the domestic, but also in terms of the repercussions of not engaging with 
history in a substantial and methodological manner.
The narrative and theoretical excursions provided so far have maintained a 
focus on the primary theoretical and empirical problematic of this thesis: how the 
‘international’ and ‘domestic’ realms interact, what the outcomes of this interaction 
may be in specific times and places, how this interaction in turn becomes the stuff 
that the world of agents is composed of and how this interaction changes over time 
and what these changes mean in terms of the events that social science seeks to 
explain. The narrower focus was to ask these questions in the context of a revolution. 
Revolutionary situations are moments when this interaction can be most clearly seen 
as it is crystallized in the emergence and development of revolutionary agents, in the 
policies of the ancien regime, in the grander scheme of politics that surrounds the 
state and the opposition alike and finally in the way this politics is reorganized. This 
thesis pursued these questions addressed to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The 
historical sociological approach to International Relations gave this thesis a clearer 
direction, as it offered ontological, epistemological and methodological insights, 
though they were never formulated in a rigid and dogmatic fashion neither in the 
theoretical literature nor in this thesis. As Chapter 2 has explored, historical 
sociology as a tradition and historical sociology in International Relations have long 
been producing certain scientific approaches with which one can begin the 
investigation of these questions. The thesis among many characteristics of these 
traditions underlined the following as they intersected with its central curiosity and
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question: that ‘history matters’329; that analysis should be multi-causal with special 
attention paid to all the layers of social interaction whenever possible; that ‘the 
international matters’; and that dichotomous thinking in the explanation of social 
phenomena should best be avoided, such as in the debates on structure/agency and 
ideational/material.
In the pages below, I will attempt to juxtapose these theoretical insights with 
the narrative on the emergence and development of the revolutionary agents and on 
the situation that led to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Indeed, the chapters on 
the case study have also undertaken this task, starting with the time span that was 
chosen for the investigation of the case, stretching back to the early nineteenth 
century. This in itself was the result of historical sociological reflexes, namely that 
‘history matters’ not as a mere background or a collection of evidence to be abused 
but as an integral part of the social phenomenon to be explained and therefore as an 
integral part of the explanans. This is only one example of the results of the 
theoretical treatment of this case study and this chapter will attempt to present these 
findings in a systematic fashion. As such, it will not endeavour to do more than what 
was already presented in the chapters on the case study, as these chapters had already 
included this double challenge between the theory and the case.
In terms of organization, the chapter will first sum up the challenges, 
suggestions and warnings brought forward by the study of the case that are posed to
329 “Taking the simple motif - “ history matters” - as its first-order maxim, historical sociology aims 
to trace and examine the slow-moving processes, sequences, and developmental paths that can, and 
should, constitute the principal points of inquiry in the discipline.” Lawson, “The Promise of 
Historical Sociology,” 415.
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the theoretical insights that gave their direction to this thesis. Lastly, it will 
recapitulate on how these theoretical insights have contributed to the account of the 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908.
7.2 Rethinking the ‘International’ in the Face of the 1908 Revolution
That the ‘international matters’ and that it should be incorporated into the 
analysis of social change is a point frequently made in passim in social scientific 
studies with a historical sociological mentality. In the initial theoretical notes of this 
thesis, it was argued that one should go beyond this mere observation and actually 
show the mechanisms of how the ‘international matters’. From the Weberian 
historical sociology tradition, we had inferred some guiding principles. Below the 
empirical implications of these principles will be summarized. However, the 1908 
Revolution in the Ottoman Empire as a case study had some particularistic features 
that are better laid out before this summary. These features do not detract from the 
possible contribution of this case study to the theoretical field, provided that they are 
explicitly stated and hence any possible illusion on the impact of this case study for 
the wider field is prevented.
To start with, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was not a social revolution 
as, for example, the great revolutions that Theda Skocpol analysed within a historical 
sociological framework and with a comparative methodology. It was, as argued at 
the end of Chapter 6, a political revolution that catalyzed the change of the political 
structure and the organization of politics at various levels. Apart from the ongoing 
class tensions in the Ottoman Empire, it did not revolve around nor reshape any 
major class conflicts but it did intervene and transformed the political tools of these
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conflicts and of course was, from its emergence until its later defeat in the First 
World War, part of these tensions. Indeed, as it was shown, it did not simply emerge 
from the imperial tensions and conflicts but from the way these collided with the 
tensions in the international field, tensions in other relevant empires (as in the case of 
the impact of other revolutions on the 1908 Revolution), and in localities (such as the 
Macedonian region). Also in terms of consequences -  though they were not 
investigated in full in this study -  it had its international dimensions that reach to the 
course of the First World War and the political organization of the Middle East and 
the Balkans in the twentieth century. Hence, the 1908 Revolution and the Empire 
within which it occurred provided us with enough historical detail amidst which to 
look into the international’s role in revolution. This is due not only to the specifics of 
the course of the revolution but also due to the world-historical moment within which 
it occurred. The critical moments in international politics, thus, were indeed present 
and gave this study plenty of food for thought.
Secondly, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 as a case study provided us 
with a single empirical narrative formed in a nineteenth century and a non-European 
context and as such the case study does not have the characteristics of a comparative 
study with cases chosen from different geographical spaces and historical periods. 
Moreover, as it was mentioned in Chapter 2, the comparative method -  with 
variations among different studies -  is an important aspect of historical sociological 
thinking and also of the way that thinking was reflected in International Relations. 
However, the fact that this juxtaposition between theory and empirical narrative 
occurred only in a single case study has also its merits and these merits indeed add 
their own contribution to this historical sociological understanding in IR. Examining
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the emergence and development of a revolutionary situation in a time span that 
stretched from the 1820s to 1908 and with sections devoted to a single decade 
(Chapter 5 on the decade between 1896-1906) and even to the two years prior to the 
revolution (Chapter 6 on the revolutionary process of 1906-1908) created many 
opportunities that are relevant to the central question of this thesis: namely how to 
locate revolutions in their international context.
The long time span and the richness in detail allowed us to look into the 
events and actors that could have been overlooked in a bigger study based on 
comparison between multiple cases. For example, the local context of Macedonia 
was given its due weight as it stems from its historical importance. As such the 
Macedonian issue showed us the more delicate balances between global, imperial 
and local politics and how these interact. The long time span made the comparison 
between different decades and junctures possible at the local, imperial and global 
levels. The same holds true for the investigation of the emergence of the 
revolutionary actors. We could trace back the institutions wherein they were 
educated to their beginnings and contextualise the mentality of why they were 
established in the first place. Examples can be given as the Royal Military Schools 
and the Translation Bureau. These were part of the bigger change of political 
structure, which gave a specific shape to the Palace, the Bureaucracy, and the 
Military as well as to the way they learned from and reacted to the similar 
international developments (an example can be how the education policy of the 
Hamidian regime was competitive in nature, competing with the influence as well as 
the nature of other educational institutions of the Europeans and how this resulted in 
a specific educational mindset that shaped the founders of the Young Turk
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movement a great deal). Hence, the fact that this thesis pursued a single case study 
did not betray, but indeed bolstered, the initial theoretical insights of the thesis: it 
may even be argued that the level of detail and the opportunity of comparison within 
a case, as they are indeed indispensable assets that the single case studies offer, 
suggest the more frequent usage of single cases for future research. Especially, in a 
topic where one is expected to demonstrate the primary theoretical assumption 
through an account of the exact mechanism of the co-constitution between the 
international and domestic in a revolutionary context, the single case certainly was 
justified by providing the detail needed for the assessment of this primary theoretical 
assumption.
These were a few words on the status of the case study via its particular 
features. Now we turn to the issue of how this case study has challenged the 
theoretical underpinnings set out in the beginning and how it may contribute to 
further research.
7.2.1 Domestic-international co-constitution beyond geopolitics
Through the study of the coming of the 1908 Revolution and through the 
specific focus of locating this revolution in the co-constitution process between the 
international and domestic realms, the thesis has demonstrated the need for the study 
of the international-domestic interaction as an integral part of studies of social 
change. As such, the case study revealed many challenges in actually showing that 
interaction and the possible nodes of social change at which one can start this 
investigation at an empirical level. International diplomacy and wars were the 
obvious beginnings especially due to the historical sociological lens of the thesis.
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The critical juncture identified in Chapter 4, was a result of this lens, which is 
adjusted to see the international realm as inter-connected with (if not necessarily co- 
constitutive of) the domestic realm and which sees wars and their territorial, political, 
economic and ideological consequences as an integral part of state formation and 
changes in state power. Hence, with the help of this theoretical mindset, the 
importance of the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-1878 and of the Berlin Treaty of 
1878 emerged not only as important moments of Ottoman-European relations but as 
integral components of the Ottoman politics which made the rise of the Young Turk 
movement possible.
Here die challenge was to transcend mere geopolitics and move to a more 
multi-layered, multi-actor political scene, where economics, politics, ideologies and 
military developments crystallize not only as Michael Mann’s IEMP model points to 
in the state, but also demonstrates how these developments related to the local level 
(such as the impact of this critical juncture on the Balkans) and how these 
developments via the global, imperial and local levels cut into the political formation 
of the future opposition movement. This challenge demonstrated, as it was already 
intuited in Chapter 2, that the ‘international’ would only be simplified and lose its 
explanatory power (which arises from the empirical study) if it is simply reduced to 
the geopolitical realm. And that held true even for these geopolitical events.
The case study gave us a richness illuminating this geopolitical level and 
going beyond it: Alongside the geopolitics, there were a variety of state policies that 
spilled over to the international realm, most of which cannot simply be explained by 
the necessity and the competitive rigidness of geopolitics. I am here referring to the
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unique combinations that all this interaction produced: the way the Ottoman ruling 
elite chose to modernize and the tensions within that were as determinant as the 
results of the wars and peace treaties, not because of the primacy of the domestic 
level in explaining domestic change but because these choices of the Ottoman actors 
displayed their true implications and ramifications in conjunction with the 
international determinants. This co-constitution process can be most visibly seen in 
the way the Berlin Congress paved the way for another set of tensions, and merged 
with the existing ones, such as the Armenian issue. As the Sultan felt the pressures of 
dissolution via a specific combination of the perceived external and internal threats, 
the measures he undertook led to reactions from different groups. As explained in 
Chapter 4, the European, specifically British attitude towards the Armenians and the 
suggested reforms for the Armenian problem, combined with Hamid’s harsh 
oppression strategies resulted in the 1894-1896 crisis, which was both an Ottoman 
conflict and an international crisis at once. That this international crisis facilitated the 
expansion of the CUP as a newly founded student opposition organization in Istanbul 
around the same time is an example of this co-constitution process. The international 
here is not merely a trigger, nor a realm of necessity as the Hamidian reaction 
demonstrates. Ottoman actors did have room to manoeuvre and as such the 
international does not emerge only as a constraining element on domestic politics. 
Rather it enters into the very formation of Ottoman politics. An examination of the 
international-domestic interaction becomes an issue of providing context to political 
developments, an essential task indeed. Hence when one remains solely on the 
geopolitical terrain, one would miss how the Berlin Treaty, at various levels and with 
varying degrees of influence, entered into the constitution of the world in which the 
Young Turks were politicized.
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Another example from the case study that challenges the reduction of the 
international-domestic interaction solely to geopolitics and state behaviour within 
that realm is the central place of Macedonia in the narrative of the 1908 Revolution. 
The Macedonian issue in the late nineteenth century reveals clearly what I mean by 
the combined effect of global, imperial and local politics on the coming of the 
revolution. The revolts in the Balkans from the early nineteenth century onwards 
created a pattern of turmoil, whereby the upheavals against the Ottoman state were 
linked to European public opinion and political culture and then linked to Great 
Power politics and rivalries and thereby via the mediation of these latter nodes had a 
second influence on the Ottoman state. These revolts sometimes led to wars, 
sometimes to international conferences and sometimes to treaties in conformity with 
the spirit of the international diplomacy of that age. But beyond these, this pattern 
shows that these seemingly straightforward diplomatic issues were more than their 
appearances: an inner-Ottoman conflict contained all the expected tensions of an 
imperial issue and then transcended these by the addition of European political and 
cultural tensions and then reshaped the Ottoman attitude towards that issue in the 
light of the European attitudes. Also, when these local tensions reached the status of 
an international affair, they remain present in the political scene while constantly 
being transformed by the global and imperial developments. A good example is the 
transformation of the Macedonian question after it was internationalized. The Anglo- 
Russian entente at the turn of the century had then shaped this question even further 
and thereby reshaped the attitudes of the Ottoman state and Ottoman opposition. For 
example, while Abdulhamid II was forced to create new strategies to cope with 
situation that was at once local and global by dealing with different actors at different 
levels and with different methods of compromising and intimidation, the Young Turk
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movement responded with a heightened anti-interventionism towards the European 
role in Macedonia. Another dimension of these relationships is the fact that the 
Young Turk movement was also responding to Hamidian policies at the same time. 
Hence, inter-state relations/geopolitics as the level of analysis remains too simplistic, 
indeed too parochial for us to uncover and social scientifically treat all these complex 
layers of interaction among different actors from different levels, especially when the 
directionality of this chain of causation goes back and forth among these different 
levels.
The critical juncture of the late 1870s and the Macedonian issue are only two 
examples among many that were provided throughout the chapters on the 1908 
Revolution that challenge the view that sees revolutions as primarily domestic events 
and demonstrates that when looking at their long-term and short-term causes, 
revolutions are tied intrinsically to the international realm. Hence, from a historical 
sociological point of view, we need to find ways to study revolutions in their 
international context, without simplifying the latter. That these ways have to 
transcend the mere geopolitics, an attitude attributed to the Weberian historical 
sociology tradition in IR, is a point bolstered by this case study and indeed one of the 
themes of this thesis: namely, domestic-international interaction is a multi-layered 
phenomenon and requires the same effort as shown by HS scholars to the layers of 
domestic social change.
To conclude this subsection, the case study revealed the need to refine our 
exploration methods into the co-constitution processes between the international and 
domestic in the accounts of revolutions and social and political change of seemingly
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domestic variety. By methodological refinement I mean a meticulous effort to 
soundly combine the chosen units of analysis, actors identified with agential powers, 
the chosen terrains of relations among these actors and levels of analysis deemed as 
interacting. If our methodological lens is adjusted as such, then the messiness of all 
these interactions would make social scientific sense, while escaping the trap of 
reification of any of these units or levels. This single case study can be judged as 
successful if it contributes to these efforts of methodological refinement. And this 
should be done not in a dogmatic way that would betray the tradition of historical 
sociology in International Relations, as our investigation should be sensitive to the 
specificities of time and space in accordance with the social phenomenon to be 
explained. Also, developing ways to include the multi-layered nature of this co­
constitution, in parallel with the multi-causal analysis -  another hallmark of the HS 
in IR tradition - would allow us to integrate the specific world-historical moments 
that go into the emergence of a specific revolutionary situation. The direction 
provided by this multi-causal analytical framework was crucial indeed as the thesis 
tackled the long and short term causes of the 1908 Revolution.
7.2.2 The causes of Revolution: The international dimension
“The international system is not only a consequence o f domestic politics and structures
but a cause o f them. ”330
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 takes its place in Turkish 
historiography, as well as in the accounts of Middle Eastern history and politics, via 
its consequences, namely the Unionist era that started after the Revolution and
330 Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” 
International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978): 911.
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intensified around 1913. The policies of the Unionists after they assumed power, 
how these affected the modem Turkey that emerged after the First World War and 
what continuities and ruptures there are between the Unionist era and the Kemalist 
era, these are questions that have set the limits of the discussion on the 1908 
Revolution for many decades. Recently,331 the literature on the Revolution was 
expanded and enriched and two major works by Hanioglu332 not only document but 
also establish the narrative on the Young Turk movement from its foundation up 
until the year of Revolution. Yet, there is still room for further exploration and one of 
the themes to be explored further is the international context of this revolution and 
specifically the international context of the causes of this revolution. Any account of 
the 1908 Revolution should do “justice to the integrative nature of thefin-de- 
siecle world, one in which the Ottoman Empire, at least its self-identified intellectual 
elite, are so clearly engaged.”333 Though neither the causes nor the consequences 
were fully explored within the world-historical context of the revolution, such an 
exploration of the causes of the revolution sets a double challenge to the theory and 
the literature on the case. Here the former will be elaborated upon.
Going back to the parochialism analogy, the study of the international 
dimensions of the causes of a revolution has an obvious potential for escaping this
331 Sohrabi, “Constitutionalism, Revolution and State”; Kansu, The Revolution o f 1908 in Turkey; 
Hacisalihoglu, Jon Tiirkler ve Makedonya Sorunu.
332 Hanioglu, Young Turks in Opposition and Preparation for a Revolution . Also for an excellent 
book review on Preparation for a Revolution, see Isa Blumi, “M. Sukrii Hanioglu’s Preparation for a 
Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908” The MIT Electronic Journal o f Middle East Studies 2 
(2002) http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/mitejmes/ Blumi underlines the interactive relation between the 
Ottoman and European political worlds as he reviews Hanioglu’s work: “How the various political 
movements are shown to evolve over time through the constant incorporation and perhaps, essential 
modification of outside influences has potentially much to say about the nature of tum-of-the-century 
European political and intellectual life. This is all very clear from the very start.” Ibid.
333 Ibid.
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parochialism that exists in the field of theory and empirical narrative. If we can show 
that domestic change is caused by a combination of factors and that these factors 
may include inputs from what are perceived as both international and domestic 
realms with varying degrees -  varying according to time and place -  domestic 
change would cease to be domestic per se and would be rescued from the 
parochialism of strictly national histories. This is only one side of the challenge. The 
other side directs this parochialism criticism towards the field of the study of the 
international and demonstrates that studying the international level by purely 
remaining at that level would prevent us from seeing how the international can 
condition, shape and indeed even create the very presence of domestic change. This 
would be the challenge to the parochialism at the international level.
While trying to understand what it was in the international political world that 
conditioned the emergence of the revolutionary situation and the rise of revolutionary 
agents in the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, certain issues surfaced 
that were hinted by our theoretical direction yet not fully ripened. One obvious issue 
was how to make sense of the delicate balance between the international’s impact on 
the Ottoman Empire, both on the state and on the opposition and the respective 
autonomy of these institutions and actors. Were the policies of the Hamidian regime, 
both international and domestic policies, dictated by the necessities of the 
international realm? Is that what we should understand by the international’s 
constitution of the domestic? The same holds true for the revolutionary agents. Did 
the Young Turks have a choice in giving direction to their movement? Were their 
intellectual roots, organizational methods and discourses a direct result of the 
political life in Europe? In all the chapters on the case study, this issue arose. The
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issue when abstracted from a certain angle refers to the relative impact of the 
international and the domestic realms. The case study as presented in this thesis 
consistently revealed die fallacy behind this angle. As shown repeatedly in the way 
the Young Turk movement was formed and developed as well as in the formation of 
the reflexes of the Hamidian regime, the international did not counteract against the 
autonomy of the domestic actors. This either/or thinking, as hinted at in Chapter 2 in 
the theoretical discussion as well, is erroneous. When looking at the actual unfolding 
of the historical events, the international does not emerge as setting the boundaries of 
the autonomy of the actors, nor of the Ottoman state as an institution and an 
international actor. But that should not and does not mean that we cannot infer the 
conditions of the capabilities, resources and repertoire of action of the actors and 
specific choices that arose from the capabilities of the actors arising from the 
international’s interaction with the domestic realm. Indeed, these means of the actors 
emerged from the conditions of the world around them.
Hence, a sound and empirically meaningful conceptualization of the causal 
link between the international and the domestic is not a one-way determination (the 
international determining domestic politics) nor is it one of constraining (the 
international constraining the autonomy of domestic politics). Rather it is one of co­
constitution (the international contributing to the emergence of the very conditions of 
the autonomy of domestic actors). In Chapter 2, Hobden’s use of ‘both/and’ logic 
where he had argued that the structures (both domestic and global) enabled and 
constrained the states was mentioned.334 Here, the case study suggests modifying this 
approach: the international (whether via the international structures or actors in the
334 Hobson, “The Two Waves of Weberian Historical Sociology,” 75.
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international field) is an integral part of the causal explanation of the specific nature 
and behaviour of the states and of the opposition movements against them. Perhaps 
the phrases of ‘enabling and constraining’ as tools of explanation of the causation 
already assume two very distinct realms, a relationship between two external objects. 
But neither the empirical findings of this case study nor our primary historical 
sociological reflexes confirm this. Michael Mann was already quoted in the 
beginning of Chapter 2: “Social life does not consist of a number of realms -  each 
composed of a bundle of organizations and functions, ends and means -  whose 
relations with one another are those of external objects.”335 The analysis of the 
international’s relation to the causes of the 1908 Revolution revealed the intemality 
of the international and the domestic to each other in these world-historical moments 
from which revolutions emerged and displayed the theoretical difficulty of 
conceptualizing this intemality of showing the integrative nature of these set of 
relations without which one cannot tmly grasp why the 1908 revolution occurred at 
the time and place it did.
Another issue that we had to deal with was the position of the state within this 
chain of causality. Is the international’s impact only mediated via the state as the 
political institution that is Janus-faced and has functions and interests in both realms? 
If not, how can one tackle the empirical data on the interaction between the Young 
Turks and their wider world? One cmcial moment was when the Young Turks were 
forced into exile by the pressures of the Hamidian regime, when the regime pursued 
these opposition members in Europe and even put pressure on European 
governments to ban their presence and/or their political activities and when the
335 Mann, The Sources o f Social Power Vol.l, 18.
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Young Turks became an item in the European public opinion at the time. 
Furthermore, the issue of asking for or preventing foreign intervention in the 
Ottoman politics came to the fore among the Young Turk circles and created internal 
divisions mostly visible in the first Congress of the Ottoman opposition convened in 
1902. Some of their perceptions about the European actors, especially of the 
European states changed in the decade before the revolution, as demonstrated in 
Ahmed Riza’s critique of penetration pacifique. So the relations between the Young 
Turks and the European actors not only entered into the ideological composition of 
the Young Turks (from the start with their fascination with positivism and 
materialism and later with their reaction to the European imperialism) but also into 
the day to day struggle that they had waged against the Hamidian regime, and finally 
into their revolutionary tactics as their anti-imperialist propaganda in the Balkans and 
among the soldiers of the III Army display. That the Young Turks had their own 
direct relations with and perceptions of European politics and European political 
actors, in addition to those international influences mediated by the state, poses a 
challenge to the understanding of international-domestic interaction based solely on 
the mediation of the state. In an account of revolutions that locates a specific 
revolution in its international context, the state, despite its central and mediating role, 
cannot be the sole node over which one would read the international-domestic 
interaction. The case study forces us to rethink the chain of causality and which 
actors it entails. Hence, a reconceptualisation of the state’s interaction with the 
international field also necessitates conceptualising the international’s impact on 
state-society relations and finally theoretically approaching the issue of locating the 
non-state actors namely the revolutionary agents (in our case study) in their own 
international context.
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These two themes, namely the necessity of rethinking the logics of ‘either/or’ 
and ‘both/and’ with regards the co-constitution between global, imperial and local 
levels and the necessity of rethinking who specifically among the actors of domestic 
change enters this co-constitution process between the international and the domestic 
and how, are some of the highlights of the contributions of this case study. These 
contributions relate fundamentally to the period chosen to examine the 1908 
revolution namely the long-term and short-term causes of the revolution and the 
unfolding of the revolutionary situation. Analyzing the causes rather than the 
consequences has underlined the issue of causation and opened up the mechanisms 
of co-constitution. It also allowed us to see the multi-causality mentality in its 
empirical implications. Only by avoiding the monolithic approach to causation gives 
us the possibility to even assume that the international’s impact does not have to be 
in an ‘either/or’ relation with the domestic politics. Now we turn to another theme of 
the thesis which lies at the intersection of the case and the theory: the issue of staying 
‘in’ history, the means and the merits of doing so and the difficulties of historicising 
the international-domestic interaction in the coming of a revolution.
7.2.3 Historicising international relations: Staying ‘in’ history
The crucial trait of historical sociology in IR to stay ‘in’ history instead of 
simply picking and choosing ‘from’ history as one seems fit was reflected in this 
thesis as a major direction. The very effort to study the 1908 Revolution, a political 
revolution from the turn of the century in a non-European Empire itself, namely the 
choice of the case study itself was part of that reflection. That there is a merit in 
looking at the ways political change was brought about in the past and how it was 
linked to history antecedent and the implicit assumption that these changes are
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interlinked to the world as we see it now, are basic reflexes of historical sociology. 
To contextualize this political revolution in international history with all the relevant 
layers that this thesis could uncover, rather than in the narrower field of international 
diplomacy or even in the purely national history is a reflex of historical sociological 
approach in IR. Both these reflexes gave the broadest directionality to the choice of 
the case study as well to the choice of the time period (namely that it was chosen to 
be extended back to the early nineteenth century) and finally to the challenging but 
rewarding choice of contextualizing the revolution within the political tensions of 
various sorts in regions relevant to the Ottoman political scene.
The challenge involved in this attempt to historicise both the revolution and 
the international-domestic co-constitution of this revolution was first and foremost 
how to escape the fallacy of picking and choosing from history: i.e. which world- 
historical events to include in the narrative. Here the meta-issue is the how to 
establish historical causation in an explanatory fashion, what justifies the choices of 
events as causes and effects, and more generally what counts generally as 
explanation in history. These were topics of the philosophy of the social science that 
are impossible to touch upon in any length in this thesis. But even the intuition that 
these topics are relevant and indeed important to explore, regarding the causal 
explanation of a revolution located in international history is valuable in itself. In 
practice, the causation in the empirical narrative was presented as ‘causes’ 
conditioning the ‘effects’ rather than a rigid cause-effect relationship. Historical 
sociology as a tradition does not give up the idea of causation and the possibility of 
causal explanations. But the insistence on multi-causality softens the strict causality 
which is difficult to derive from the empirical world anyway. The event in question
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may be over-determined and indeed complex revolutions mostly are over- 
determined.336
As Bryant explains, HS works with a contextual logic, “in which phenomena 
are explicated and understood by tracing both their genesis and their intrinsic 
relations to other mediating structures and processes. This contextual logic is at once 
sociological, in that it attends to roles, institutions, and structures, and historical, in 
that it comprehends human agency in all its various forms as temporally ordered and 
conditioned.”337 Within this logic, how to choose the historical events that will be 
interpreted in a causal relation with the event to be explained goes beyond being an 
issue of historiography and requires a sound application of the theoretical insights at 
hand, no matter how broad they might be. As both Bryant and Mann argue in their 
replies to Golthorpe’s infamous criticism against the historical sociology tradition 
and its use of history, these theoretical underpinnings already give a direction to the 
messiness of the data, whether collected from primary or secondary sources.
Therefore, the choice of the Auspicious Event (1826), the identification of 
1878 as the critical juncture, the inclusion of the Armenian revolts and Hamidian
336 Michael Soriven defines overdetermination as “any cases of multiple causation where the causes 
are not mutually exclusive. If a revolution is overdetermined, as such events frequently are, there are 
several factors present which will ensure its occurrence one of which we may assume gets in first.” 
Michael Scriven, “Causes, Connection and Conditions in History,” in Historical Methods in the Social 
Sciences, Vol. II: Foundations o f Historical-Sociological Inquiry, ed. John A. Hall and Joseph M. 
Bryant (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 371.
337 Bryant, “Evidence and Explanation in History and Sociology: Critical Reflections on Goldthorpe’s 
Critique of HS,” in Historical Methods in the Social Sciences, Vol. Ill: The Logic o f Historical- 
Sociological Inquiry, ed. John A. Hall and Joseph M. Bryant (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 39.
338 John H. Goldthorpe, “The Uses of History in Sociology: Reflections on Some Recent Tendencies”; 
Bryant, “Evidence and Explanation in History and Sociology: Critical Reflections on Goldthorpe’s 
Critique of HS,” and Mann, “In Praise of Macro-Sociology: A Reply to Goldthorpe,” in Historical 
Methods in the Social Sciences, Vol. III.
239
massacres, but also the inclusion of the spirit of the age, the new imperialism, the 
importance given to the shifting alliances in Europe, the attention paid to Great 
Power rivalry, whether in the rise of Germany or over the Far East, and the analysis 
of the demonstration effect between other revolutions of the time and the 1908 
Revolution were not selected randomly but because the use of history as an integral 
part of the explanation required us to be selective. The criterion was to distinguish 
what went into the constitution of the emergence of the revolutionary situation and 
the objective was to transcend the presentation of a sheer empirical narrative. The 
use of international history displayed a theoretical and methodological difficulty and 
demonstrated that historicisation of the international context of a revolution also 
involves the theoretical treatment of a narrative. It exposed the difficulty of the main 
task, elaboration upon the co-constitution of the international and the domestic 
realms over a long time span in the context of international history.
The second challenge was not to turn this co-constitution of the international 
and the domestic in the coming of the revolution in a static flow of history but to 
reveal its changing and fluctuating nature as well: so the difficulty lay in trying not to 
impose this assumed theoretical co-constitution onto the events but to see through the 
events how this co-constitution actually worked over time. It is not too difficult to 
argue for the ideological impact of world-historical time on the revolutionaries as the 
positivist and materialist outlook, the constitutionalist political spirit, the stress on 
liberty and even the emphasis on anti-interventionism into the internal affairs of the 
Empire can be traced back to European intellectual life. It was, however, a real 
challenge to show why these emerged in the specific periods and instances that they 
did and why they were transformed as the movement gained momentum or
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experienced a setback. For example the Reval Meeting of June 1908 is often 
declared in the literature as one of the primary triggers of the Revolution and as an 
important influence on the timing of the revolution. However in order to establish the 
explanatory status of the Reval Meeting one is required to work with inferences from 
several decades prior to the event, with the history of the Anglo-Russian relations 
over the Balkans and over the Eastern Question, with the Young Turks’ perceptions 
of the British and Russians and their expectations and anticipations from these actors 
as well as from the Ottoman Sultan and finally with the past experiences of the 
soldiers present in the region and the inhabitants of the region. In the background of 
the pages on this issue, there is a somewhat concealed comparison among the 
different periods that made up the world that the Young Turks knew at the time of 
the Reval Meeting and the assumption that international-domestic interaction, though 
ever present, actually works with varying degrees of influence and varying degrees 
of responses to it. As such the case study exposed another possible fallacy one should 
expect in the analysis of this interaction, namely reifying either of its two 
components and fixating it to a certain degree of influence upon the other. The only 
meaningful escape from this fallacy was to be sensitive towards the changing 
political balances and mentalities over time not only inside the Empire but also 
outside the Empire. Hence once again we observe the benefits of being time and 
place specific, of staying ‘in’ history. Now we will move on to a sub-theme of this 
thesis that repeatedly surfaced in the unfolding of the narrative on the 1908 
Revolution: namely the issue of structure and agency as it is interlinked to the study 
of the domestic-international interaction.
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7.2.4 Structure and agency
The frequent surfacing of the structure/agency issue in the chapters on the 
case study is fundamentally due to the fact that the case was a revolution where 
actors through their agential powers engender a certain kind of change and as such 
emerge as agents and the degree and impact of these agents is a long-lasting social 
scientific debate, one that we also revisited in our theoretical discussion in Chapter 2. 
That historical sociology as an approach and historical sociological take on IR also is 
concerned with how agents and structures are related to each other is also another 
reason for the presence of this issue in this thesis. But there is another reason as well. 
In order for the study of the domestic-international interaction to have explanatory 
value, it must account for the agents who are shaped by and shape back the world. 
So, as the empirical narrative on the events that led to the 1908 Revolution advanced 
it forced us to rethink the issue.
The actors of social change, the meanings they attach to their actions, their 
capabilities and their social power to engender change was and remains a topic of 
social scientific discussion. It is often argued, similar to the arguments that 
‘international matters’ or ‘history matters’ that ‘agency matters’. However, again 
similar to the discussions above exactly how it matters poses a difficulty. The thesis 
did not have its central focus on this theme but rather took on this discussion as it 
related to its primary question. The initial insight did not change after the 
investigation of the case, which was arguing for the futility of dichotomous thinking 
with regards to the structures and agents.
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The difficulty arose when the case study demonstrated that the international 
goes into the constitution of not only the political world within which the actors act 
but also to the constitution of these very actors themselves. The difficulty here lies 
between this theoretical insight and empirical observation and the following; that 
these actors have room to manoeuvre in this political world and the very possibility 
of their autonomy is again partly constituted by the international field. Various 
examples of this issue were provided throughout the chapters on the case.
The establishment of the first constitutional regime in the Ottoman Empire 
which only survived for two years (1876-1878) is one of these examples. The 
rebellions in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, combined with the 
attention they received from European governments, most notably the British, paved 
the way for an international conference convened to discuss the faith of the Balkans. 
In many ways as explained in Chapter 4, this international affair was a combination 
of die alliance system in Europe and the tensions within the Empire. It showed the 
characteristics of the structure of the international system in that period. It was 
further combined with the ongoing political debates among the Ottoman bureaucracy 
(the details were given in Chapter 3). The result was the success of the Ottoman 
reformists in declaring the constitution. Hence, the emergence of die constitution 
(Kanun-i Esasi) for the re-enactment of which the Young Turks would strive for 
three decades, was a result of the agential powers of die Ottoman bureaucracy. That 
this declaration coincided with the Istanbul Conference on the Balkan problems 
should not mean that the actors were helpless and die constitution was a direct result 
of the international system’s pressures at the time. Rather, the international scene, by 
putting pressure on but also facilitating the Ottoman actors, was in a constitutive,
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integrative relation with the declaration of the constitution. This specific combination 
of various factors, structural and agential, created the very possibility of an Ottoman 
opposition against the Sultan who suspended the constitution.
This example forces us to rethink about what is really involved in the relation 
between structures and agents while the multi-layered nature of this relation suggests 
an escape from the dichotomous thinking. If the international does not simply 
condition the world of the agents but also the mentalities, opportunities and means of 
actions of the agents themselves, indeed even the very emergence of these actors as 
revolutionary agents then the structure versus agency dichotomy loses part of its 
analytical power. Here the international includes both structural elements but also 
elements of contingency and of other actors from the international field. Another 
example should clarify this challenge of the case towards the thinking on 
structure/agency issue even further. The years of 1905 and 1906 were crucial for the 
transformation of the situation in Macedonia but also for the transformation of the 
Young Turks into revolutionary agents as well and the forces at play were 
international, of both structural and agential variety, at the ideational and material 
levels.
As detailed in Chapter 5, the Japanese victory over Russia and the following 
1905 Revolution in Russia influenced Ottoman politics from several angles. Russia’s 
loss in the Far East meant a renewal of the Russian interest in the Balkans, which 
caused a chain of events that led to the exacerbation of the Macedonian issue, added 
a new dimension to the Great Power rivalry over Macedonia and hence was an 
example of the inter-state relations displayed through geopolitical tools of politics
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very much taken into account by structural accounts of revolutions. (Skocpol’s 
structuralist account was an example investigated in Chapter 2). Here the 
international emerges as inter-state relations, as geopolitics and hence the relation 
between the international and the agency becomes distant, blurred and fails to be 
included in that dimension of the causes of the revolution. There is however another 
aspect of the events of 1905 that influenced Ottoman politics in general and the 
Young Turks in particular. The victory of an Asian power which underwent the 
reform process confirmed the benefits of a constitutional regime. The revolution of 
1905 in Russia confirmed the same phenomenon with the addition of the method of 
achieving that object, namely through a revolution. Japan and Russia, and in 1906 
the Iranian constitutional revolution all had influences on the opinions, methods, and 
repertoire of action of the Young Turks. They might not have directly borrowed the 
ideology behind the Russian revolution nor did they undertake a more mass involved 
from below strategy of the 1906 Iranian Revolution. However, the international in 
this juncture went into the transformation of the Young Turks and partly constituted 
their emergence as revolutionary agents.
Also to be added is another emphasis that has surfaced from the empirical 
narrative and was discussed partially above, namely the position of the state and the 
ruling elite in the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan and the bureaucracy in the Ottoman 
Empire were also engaged in a relationship with the Young Turks, sometimes harsh 
and oppressive, at times forgiving and incorporating. The set of relations among 
actors themselves is also among the factors that go into this unique combination 
which engenders them and in which they intervene. The elements of this set of 
relations include structural factors but also contingencies, involve ideational and
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material issues. The historical path of the formation and development of the Young 
Turks cannot be fully grasped unless we take the Ottoman state, its foreign and 
domestic policies and its attitude towards the opposition as an integral part of the 
narrative. Several examples of how the Hamidian policies had an effect on the 
movement, apart from being the target of the opposition, were given in the thesis. 
Suffice it to note that even the triumph of the revolution in the summer of 1908 
depended both on the capabilities of the revolutionary actors and on Abdulhamid II’s 
perception of these capabilities in conjunction with his interpretation of the wider 
international context.
The formation, development and the final victory of the Young Turk 
movement gave us a rich narrative whereby we could examine the various nodes of 
the international-domestic interaction in the light of the initial theoretical insights. 
The narrative forced a rethinking on these insights. The consequent evaluation of the 
initial assumptions can be listed as follows. Firstly, the assumption that the 
international-domestic interaction is a vital component of this political revolution 
was reinforced. Thus we can safely argue that, wars, treaties, European public 
opinion, Great Power rivalry, the political economic developments of an 
international magnitude, and also the prevalent ideologies in international currency, 
the revolutionary developments elsewhere in the world and even the educational 
policies of other countries all composed the world in which the revolution occurred 
and as such they composed the very revolution. Hence, the international, 
transcending mere geopolitics, surfaces as an indispensable and integral part of the 
narrative of the revolution and so it should be in our theoretical excursions. Its study 
should go beyond the investigation of the inter-state relations but should not neglect
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that either. The case study proved that this kind of balancing requires meticulous 
attention to empirical detail but also a sound methodology that shies away from 
reification. It suggested a thorough use of international history and an escape from 
dichotomous thinking as guiding principles of research of this kind. It also suggested 
that attention should be paid to the dynamics of the relations between global, 
imperial and local levels at the same time, as it is within these dynamics we can 
grasp what appears to be a theoretically abstracted relation between the international 
and domestic at an empirical level. The case study also bolstered the assumption that 
the international is not only an issue in the consequences of revolution but should be 
taken into account in our causal explanations of the revolutions. Finally, it gave 
support to the argument that structure and agency, ideational and material factors and 
international’s influence and domestic autonomy should not be conceptualized in a 
dichotomous way. It is the very relations between them that constitute the social 
world and give rise to the social phenomena that we are trying to explain.
This treatment of the 1908 Revolution also proved to be challenging in some 
ways to a certain kind of thinking on the Revolution. The mere attempt to locate 
1908 in the international context was difficult as no detailed study of this kind was 
present. So now we turn to the case study itself and will try to assess the broader 
implications of such a treatment on our understanding of this very Revolution.
7.3 Locating the 1908 Revolution in its ‘International’ context
The preceding section discussed the suggestions of this thesis in respect to the 
possible ways of escaping parochialism in IR. This section will briefly outline the 
main conclusions and suggestion with regards to the case and how to escape the
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parochialism of purely ‘national’ histories.339 Going back to Mann’s definition of 
society and his emphasis on the unbounded character of society, also the reflexes of 
HS in IR that the realm of nation-state is an integral part of the broader international 
conflicts and tensions, norms and orders a challenge arises. It is not enough to 
demonstrate the complexity, multi-layered nature and subtleties of the international 
realm, because so is the very realm with which the international engages in a 
constitutive relation, namely the domestic. As such, the endeavour to locate what is 
assumed to be domestic social phenomena in their international context is not simply 
about our conceptualizations of the international but also about our way of thinking 
about the society.
These insights have moved the narrative on the 1908 Revolution to a broader 
context and thereby have shown the complexity behind this political revolution, 
which can be easily dismissed as a coup d’etat in disguise. When taken with all the 
various factors that go into its constitution and with a little thought on the broad 
consequences of the Revolution, it would become possible to do justice to the 
historical importance of this Revolution. This thesis tackled the coming of the 
revolutionary situation as it emerged in the summer of 1908 by linking it to the inner- 
Ottoman tensions as well as to the global and local conflicts. For example, Chapter 6 
demonstrated that the last manoeuvres, the tactical changes and indeed the reasons 
behind the final triumph of the revolutionaries cannot be fully grasped without a
339 “Establishing both the historical and international context for social analysis would denaturalise in 
one further respect, namely by removing the myth of bounded society, or what Herminio Martins has 
aptly termed ‘methodological nationalism’. This is, at its simplest, the narration of history, or the 
explanation of social behaviour, in purely national terms. Thus the development of the electoral 
system, or of education, or of language is described in purely national or endogenous terms. This 
serves not only a methodological function, in the narrowest sense, of limiting and simplifying the 
range of explanation, but also an ideological one, of keeping foreign influence at bay.” Halliday, “For 
an International Sociology,” 247.
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sound understanding of the Eastern question (as the international affair it was) and a 
sound understanding of the local dynamics in the Balkans and particularly in 
Macedonia. These are not unnecessary detours from the main narrative but indeed as 
integral to the narrative as the perceptions of the actors on these global and local 
issues.
This endeavour to understand the revolution not within the boundaries of the 
‘nation-state(s)’ that emerged after but within the intersections of global, imperial 
and local issues is also bolstered by another trait present in the HS tradition of 
understanding social change and revolutions in particular, namely focusing on the 
capabilities, resources, repertoire of action, most importantly on the organizational 
means of the actors as they are presented to them by the world around them. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2 among the features of Mann’s IEMP model and also in 
Chapter 6 by the use of the framework of Charles Tilly, this focus on what were 
available to the actors in terms of organizational means through which they would 
realize their goals, which were conditioned again by the world around them, keeps us 
from falling into a strict voluntarism but also helps us to integrate the structural and 
contingent factors in a meaningful narrative. When looked at from this perspective, 
we had to squeeze the existing secondary literature on the Young Turk movement 
and expand it to include the global and local tensions that indeed created and 
facilitated the use of these organizational means. There is no doubt that the Young 
Turks took full advantage of the international and local situation in Macedonia. A 
purely national history of the Young Turk movement would be too simple and too 
narrow to include all these other levels the linkages among which was the main 
theoretical guidance of this thesis.
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A second difficulty related to the case study arose with regards to the chosen 
time-period and the intention of studying the causes rather than the consequences of 
the Revolution. As also mentioned before, it is the Unionist era that was brought 
about by the 1908 Revolution that is generally studied in Turkish historiography. The 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent foundation of the Republic of 
Turkey compose the main context within which the 1908 Revolution was perceived. 
Recently a few studies also approached the Unionist era in the context of the other 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire.340 Nevertheless, the Revolution receives the 
attraction of the social scientists by the virtue of its consequences. This tendency is 
prone to produce fallacies. These fallacies are the false assumption that the Young 
Turk movement was a homogenous movement with one common plan of action and 
one ideology and the more general fallacy of retrospective explanations in history. 
What emerged as a nationalist, militarist, one-party regime upheld by a group of 
Young Turks in the aftermath of the revolution, namely the Unionist government 
should not be retrospectively reflected back onto the mentalities, capabilities and the 
wider contexts of the Young Turks before the revolution. In this sense the theoretical 
insights of this thesis presented a valuable opportunity to the empirical narrative: to 
historicise the coming of the revolution in its wider context.
This historicisation of the causes of the revolution is an important 
contribution to the rescue of the narrative from retrospective thinking. As it was 
spelled out in Chapter 4, only by looking at the wider context in a longer time-span 
can we truly understand that it was neither evident nor inevitable for the Young 
Turks and the Sultan they desired to overthrow that the Ottoman Empire would
□ For an excellent example see Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks.
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disintegrate into several nation-states. The critical juncture identified through a 
historical sociological lens also pointed out to the contingencies along the way and 
most importantly the contingency of war. The later transformation of the 
revolutionary agents traced throughout the chapters also underlined the absence of a 
homogenous and strict plan of the Empire after the revolution among the Young 
Turks. Through the two Congress of Ottoman opposition and the internal division 
and strivings among the Young Turks, we observed both the heterogeneity of the 
movement and the change in the political perceptions of the various groups within 
the movement. Also exposed to change were their envisaged methods to bring about 
the toppling of the Hamidian regime.
Another challenge of the theory to the case due to this historicisation was the 
status of the state within the narrative. The Hamidian regime could easily be 
simplified in the narrative as an oppressive regime and a common target for all the 
Ottoman opposition movements. However, the historicisation of the coming of the 
revolution is also the historicisation of the Hamidian regime to a certain degree. As 
the HS approach in IR emphasizes a rethinking of the state, and since not all but most 
power crystallizations occur in the state and also simply because the opportunities 
and capabilities of the regime figured a great deal in channelling the opposition 
movement one way or another, Hamidian international and domestic policies and the 
unique combinations of these two entered our account of the 1908 Revolution.
This historicisation and doing so in global, imperial and local contexts also 
resulted in transforming the 1908 Revolution from the narrow box of the Republic of 
Turkey to become a world-historical moment, to being a part of the more global
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tensions and conflicts and hence to a place where comparisons between similar and 
different cases is now more foreseeable. Indeed this task is recently taken by 
historians working in different fields. They do not use a methodological comparison 
between strictly identified cases but by taking the late Ottoman history in its 
international context, they can produce judgements as to the shared traits of the late 
Ottoman political, social, economic and ideological development with other parts of 
the world. Indeed, that is one of the valuable intuitions of this thesis as well. 
Although it was not developed to its full potential as the central question of this 
thesis was and still remains the investigation of the role of the international, the case 
study as produced here underlines the need for such studies on the late Ottoman 
period and beyond.
Finally, by locating the revolution in its international context, the thesis 
contributed to a healthier grasp as to the world-historical importance of the 1908 
Revolution. It is not the simplified work of a few soldiers who in a miraculous way 
convinced the Sultan, who ruled and reigned in the Empire for three decades, to give 
up most of his powers in a matter of weeks. The answer to the question as to how 
they succeeded lies in international history, before and after the revolution, to which 
both the Empire they were trying to save and later the revolutionaries themselves 
contributed a great deal. This account of 1908 Revolution, by treating it with the 
historical sociological reflexes discussed at least for two decades within the 
discipline of IR, by keeping it ‘in’ history and within a wider world and a wider 
network of linkages, contributed to the efforts to understand how the revolution 
happened, how it succeeded and also suggested that unless these questions are
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answered with the direction that the theoretical insights have provided, it would be 
extremely difficult to locate its aftermath within world history.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
For concluding remarks, it would be appropriate to state the main theme of 
this thesis and the contributions that the author hopes to have achieved. The main 
contribution was intended to bolster the efforts in the discipline of IR towards 
establishing an integrative political analysis of the international and the domestic 
realms, a theoretical framework that would work on the disorderly world of ours and 
that would be able to historicise and analytically account for world-historical changes 
that have brought about the political map of today. The author hopes to have revealed 
the challenges and rewards of theorizing and analytically understanding the historical 
narratives about these world historical changes; the difficulty of grasping these inter­
relations not with ever more schematized and narrow theoretical categories but with 
historical and sociological reflexes adjusted to make sense of these inter-relations, 
connections and demonstrations’ effects. The aim was to give support to the 
endeavours to come up with a historically and sociologically minded IR that would 
not dichotomize, fixate and reify the phenomena under investigation but would see it 
as the messy totality that it was and still is and would allow along the way for the 
role of contingencies, dreams and hopes of the actors who made this world we study 
in the first place.
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